

PART 3. HUNGARIAN AND POLISH TERRORISTS IN CARPATHIAN UKRAINE

Germany's position towards Carpathian Ukraine has forced the Hungarian government to suspend its aggressive plans. However, this did not mean that it gave up its intention to organize an invasion to Transcarpathia. Hungarian Ambassador to Poland A. Hori wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary K. Kanya, that Budapest "at this moment, considers it possible to achieve its goals through diplomatic means"¹⁹². In spite of the fact that its armed forces were ready to wage warfare across the whole front, Poland also understood that "military intervention... would rather be much more damaging to the case than giving a benefit to it"¹⁹³. Hungary continued to hope that "the Ruthenian government... would ask us to let the Hungarian troops in with the aim to maintain order in the remaining Ruthenian territory". Poland was required only to "intensify the actions of sabotage units", and in the case of "operation in the Ruthenian region, the Hungarian General Staff requested support from only one Polish division"¹⁹⁴.

The Hungarian preparations for the invasion of Carpathian Ukraine did not stop for a moment. M. Kozma made a note in his diary on November 17, 1938: "On the 20th, at night, the Ruthenian

¹⁹² Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 134.; Поп И. И. Польско-венгерский альянс в период Мюнхена. *Мюнхен преддверие войны*. М.: Наука, 1988. С. 167–200; Поп И. Энциклопедия Подкарпатской Руси. Ужгород: Издательство В. Падяка, 2001. 431 с.

Поп И. Энциклопедия Подкарпатской Руси. Ужгород: Издательство В. Падяка, 2006. 412 с.; Поп І. Закарпатська Україна в європейській кризі 1938–1939 рр. *Дукля*. 1967. р. 15. № 1. С. 62-66; Поп І. Історія Закарпаття: критичні роздуми. *Карпатський край*. 1996. № 5-7. С. 4-22; Пушкеш А. Цивілізація или варварство: Закарпатье 1918-1945. М., 2006. 564 с.

¹⁹³ Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 134.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid. С. 135.

region will be ours”¹⁹⁵. Understanding well that the occupation of Transcarpathia by the Hungarian troops would lead to the establishment of a joint Polish-Hungarian border, Germany strongly opposed the aggression. On November 18, 1938, E. Wermann brought the attention of the Hungarian leadership to the position of Germany, which considered that “such a move from the Hungarian side is risky”, which could lead to serious complications. E. Wermann recalled that “the new Czechoslovak-Hungarian border was established by the decision of the Vienna Arbitration on the basis of the national principle”¹⁹⁶. This was followed by German and Italian notes to Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs K. Kanya, to which Budapest replied by a memorandum of November 22, 1938. According to it, Hungary was ready to cooperate with Germany, and its government announced its intention to enter the Anti-Comintern Pact and leave the League of Nations. Thus, Hungary’s attempt to occupy Transcarpathia on November 20, 1938, ended in complete collapse. Other ways had to be found. On November 25, 1938 the Hungarian ambassador to Poland, A. Hori, expressed his thoughts on the capture “of the Ruthenian region... by closing all routes through subversive actions. Through propaganda, to prepare the population for a plebiscite and, at the same time, to create the necessary conditions with vigorous diplomatic action”¹⁹⁷.

Germany’s policy towards Carpathian Ukraine, in particular its reaction to the attempt to occupy the land by Hungary, has drawn great political resonance in Europe. It seemed that the Third Reich really wanted to use Carpathian Ukraine as a Piedmont to unify all Ukrainian lands around it. On December 6, 1938 in an interview with I. Maysky, D. Lloyd George expressed the view that “Hitler’s plan was to take the “corridor” and Silesia, to tear off the Ukrainian part from Poland and to annex it to Transcarpathian Ukraine and to create from these two parts a vassal Ukrainian state like Czechoslovakia. That is the immediate goal. In the more distant future, Hitler may be thinking of taking action against the Soviet Ukraine”. Representatives

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. C. 136.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid. C. 140.

¹⁹⁷ Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 144.

of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain expressed similar views. The head of the French General Staff, general M. Gamelin, believed that “the most probable and immediate goal of German expansion would be Ukraine”. On December 15, 1938 French Ambassador to Germany R. Coulondre wrote to Foreign Minister J. Bonnet: “In Hitler’s surrounding, they speak of an operation that would replicate, on a larger scale, an operation in Sudeten: holding a propaganda for independence of Ukraine in Poland, Romania and the USSR... And the center of the movement will be Transcarpathian Ukraine... Thus, Czechoslovakia... serves Reich as a ram for breaking the gates in the East”¹⁹⁸.

Undoubtedly, the idea of creating a united Ukraine on the base of Transcarpathia originated in Berlin. However, there were also other considerations in this regard. According to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, M. Litvinov, “the noise around the Ukrainian problem was created, quite frankly, not so much by the German press as by the press of other countries, including England and France. It is possible that all of this was run from Berlin”¹⁹⁹. In the deep conviction of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR in France, J. Suritz, “Bonnet and his surrounding will breathe a sigh of relief if the Germans really invade Ukraine”²⁰⁰. The noise raised by the European press about Carpathian Ukraine has to some extent alarmed Hungary and Poland. Budapest was ready to make any sacrifices only to obtain Berlin’s permission for the full occupation of Transcarpathia. On December 27, 1938 Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs I.Csaky informed the Hungarian missions in Washington, Paris and London of his intention to withdraw from the League of Nations. Warsaw also feared that Carpathian Ukraine “might one day develop into an outbreak of such anxiety for Poland that the Polish government would be forced to take into account

¹⁹⁸ Документы и материалы кануна второй мировой войны. Т. 1. Ноябрь 1937 – декабрь 1938 г. Из архива Министерства Иностранных Дел Германии. М.: Политиздат, 1981. С. 267.

¹⁹⁹ Косик В. Україна і Німеччина у другій світовій війні. Париж – Нью-Йорк – Львів, 1993. С. 472.

²⁰⁰ Документы и материалы кануна второй мировой войны. Т. 1. Ноябрь 1937 – декабрь 1938 г. Из архива Министерства Иностранных Дел Германии. М.: Политиздат, 1981. С. 270.

interventions that could lead to further complications. This is the main reason why Poland is competing for a common border with Hungary”²⁰¹.

If earlier Hungary had accented Germany’s attention on establishing the Polish-Hungarian border, then in early 1939 it stated, from an economic point of view, the need to annex Transcarpathia. On February 26, 1939, in a letter to D. Stoyai, the Hungarian Ambassador to Germany, Csaky wrote: “Explain (to Germany – Aut.) that Carpathian region is of great importance for us, not because of establishing a joint border with the Poles, but because we do not want to allow forests to be destroyed by the so-called Ukrainian government. Thus, we strive not to take possession of the Carpathian Mountains, but to ensure that the Ruthenian region till the upper border of the forests is a part of Hungary”²⁰². That is, Transcarpathia was considered in Budapest as the base for raw materials, an integral part of Hungary, which was temporarily detached from the crown of St. Stephan. Deputy of Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Vernle informed I. Csaky that J. Ribbentrop “till now... was thinking that we are pursuing the Ruthenian region for political reasons, and he did not know what vital interests connected us to the region”²⁰³.

Throughout the interwar period, Czechoslovakia had friendly relations with Yugoslavia. As regards Hungary, it constantly sought to isolate Czechoslovakia from its allies, Yugoslavia and Romania, through the question of national minorities. The Czechoslovak-Yugoslav relations suffered a significant blow after the Munich Conference, when, in fact, Little Entente as a political union of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania came to its end. Some Balkan countries have differently felt the effects of Munich. As for Yugoslavia, it was increasingly becoming a subject to open pressure by the Nazi Germany. It is necessary to agree with V. Shandor’s view that “during the period of the first republic Carpathian Ukraine played a significant strategic role as a liaison to the countries of the Little

²⁰¹ Документы и материалы кануна второй мировой войны. Т. 2. Январь – август 1939 г. М.: Политиздат, 1981. С. 11.

²⁰² Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 156.

²⁰³ Ibid. С. 158.

Entente – Romania and Yugoslavia. In the new balance of powers, it has lost its original significance”²⁰⁴.

Despite such changes in world politics, the Yugoslav government strongly opposed the Hungarian encroachment on Transcarpathia. This is also concerned with the Yugoslav periodicals. “Vreme” reported: “The population of this region does not want to return under the Hungarian rule, which left sad memories. Subcarpathian Ukrainians assert their rights in alliance with Czechs and Slovaks”²⁰⁵. Yugoslavian government demanded that Germany and Italy did not support the idea of a joint Hungarian-Polish border²⁰⁶. Yugoslav daily “Politics” supported Romania’s position, which was favorable to Carpathian Ukraine²⁰⁷. The attitude of the peoples of Yugoslavia to Transcarpathia can be seen in the article “Serbs, Croats and Slovenians are with us!”, published on the pages of “Nova Svoboda”²⁰⁸.

Romania, like Yugoslavia, was loyal to Carpathian Ukraine, at least as long as there was a federal Czechoslovakia. It is no coincidence that A. Voloshyn, convinced of the hopelessness of protecting Carpathian Ukraine on his own, made an attempt to negotiate with the Romanian government on the accession of the region to it. The motivation was next: Ukrainians, who live in Romania – our brothers and sisters. Romania has repeatedly accused Hungary of frantic radio propaganda against Transcarpathia. Romania’s foreign policy was determined by the following main points: 1) loyalty of the Romanian government to Czechoslovakia; 2) the desire to maintain normal economic and political relations with it; 3) aversion to the military reinforcement of Hungary; 4) distrust to Budapest’s assurances concerning Transylvania; 5) reluctance to participate in political combinations against Germany²⁰⁹.

²⁰⁴ Шандор В. Спомини. Т. 1. Карпатська Україна. 1938-1939. Ужгород: МПП «Гражда»; Карпатський Союз, 1996. С. 218.

²⁰⁵ Вегеш М., Задорожний В. Карпатська Україна 1938–1939 рр. у світлі європейської періодики. *Карпатська Україна і Августин Волошин*. С. 56.

²⁰⁶ Нова свобода. 1938. 15 жовтня.

²⁰⁷ Нова свобода. 1938. 29 жовтня.

²⁰⁸ Нова свобода. 1938. 3 жовтня.

²⁰⁹ Вегеш М., Задорожний В. Карпатська Україна 1938–1939 рр. у світлі європейської періодики. *Карпатська Україна і Августин Волошин*. С. 58.

Romania fully fulfilled its allied commitments concerning Czechoslovakia. Proof of this is the signing of an agreement on the export of corn to the mountainous regions of Transcarpathia. However, this did not mean that Romanian government had no interest in Czechoslovakia. As soon as it became known that the Czechoslovak Republic ceased to exist as a state, Romania put forward its demands. Hungarian Ambassador to Romania L. Bardoshi informed I. Csaky that on March 16, 1939, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Hafencu “referred to his earlier reports that the Romanian government due to recent events had changed its position, which it had in Galati, about the question of the Ruthenian region. Romania also has interests in the Ruthenian territory. This applies to the border villages inhabited by Romanians and to the territory through which the Maramoros – Sighetu – Colomea railway passes”²¹⁰.

The international situation of Carpathian Ukraine has been significantly complicated by the continuous attacks of the Hungarian and Polish terrorists. As early as September 1936, there was a meeting between Hitler and Hungarian Regent M. Horthy, which “initiated later cooperation between the German-Hungarian political and military forces”²¹¹. At first, however, Berlin did not consent to open intervention and the Hungarian government limited itself to sending terrorist groups to the cities and villages of Carpathian Ukraine.

On October 1, 1938, Hungarian Prime Minister B. Imredy secretly instructed former Interior Minister M. Kozma to form sabotage groups for the subversive work in Transcarpathia. “In the mid-eleventh,” M. Kozma wrote in his “Diary”, “Imredy called me and asked to take over the political leadership of the action in the Ruthenian region, to promote propaganda there and to lead the rebels. He accepted all my suggestions and agreed with the use, if it is required by the situation, of illegal and violent means”²¹². Together

²¹⁰ Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 158.

²¹¹ Химинець Ю. Закарпаття – земля української держави. Ужгород, 1992. С. 89.

²¹² Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 108.

with I. Geyash, M. Kozma created a “Poor Guard” (“Sabotchopot”) of 600 people²¹³. As early as September 1938, S. Fentsyk began to create terrorist groups. Blackshirts gangs were formed in Beregovo, Mukachevo and Radwanka. Their groups, which also contained the pupils of the “Rus’ Scout”, were headed by S. Krainiak, B. Baletsky, V. Reberka²¹⁴.

M. Kozma was convinced that waging a “small war” should be entrusted to any “former ataman of a robbery gang”²¹⁵. Something like this can be read in another place of the “Diary”: “Immediate resolution of the Ruthenian question is so important from the perspective of Hungary’s future that for this reason I am ready to take any risk, if necessary – to stand against the wall”²¹⁶. M. Kozma considered the activities of the terrorist units only in alliance with the Poles. “I suggested to Imredy,” he wrote on October 4, 1938, “that Csaky, me or anyone else would fly to Warsaw immediately to discuss directly with the Poles the political side of the issue, to organize a meeting of our people who would reach the Polish border, to discuss the question of the location and possible use of a unit of 100-200 people – the number depends on the wishes of the Polish side – and, finally, to discuss the organization of the Polish voluntary action and cooperation with them”²¹⁷.

²¹³ Співак Б.І. Нариси історії революційної боротьби трудящих Закарпаття в 1930–1945 роках. Львів, 1963. С. 256; Сливка Ю. Проблема Закарпаття у міжнародних відносинах на зламі 1938-1939 років. *Августин Волошин як український державник, педагог і релігійний діяч*. Матеріали Всеукраїнської наукової конференції, присвяченої 130-річчю від дня народження Героя України, о. Августина Волошина і 65-річчю проголошення Карпатської України. К.: Видавництво «Прецедент», 2004. С. 34-43; Сливка Ю. Україна в Другій світовій війні: політичний та міжнародно-правовий аспекти. *Україна у Другій світовій війні: українсько-польські стосунки*. Україна: культурна спадщина, національна свідомість, державність. Випуск 13. Львів, 2005. С. 36-67; Сливка Ю. Ю. Західна Україна в реакційній політиці польської та української буржуазії (1920-1939). К.: Наукова думка, 1985. 271 с.; Сливка Ю. Ю. Підступи міжнародної реакції на Закарпатті в 1938-1939 роках. Львів, 1966. 72 с.

²¹⁴ Співак Б.І. Нариси історії революційної боротьби трудящих Закарпаття в 1930–1945 роках. Львів, 1963. С. 258.

²¹⁵ Ibid. С. 257.

²¹⁶ Ibid. С. 220.

²¹⁷ Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 109.

M. Kozma's proposal was welcomed in Warsaw. On October 7, 1938, Hungarian Ambassador to Poland A. Hori informed Foreign Minister K. Kanya that the Poles "recommend to start an immediate widespread sabotage in the Ruthenian region... I agreed on the similar actions from the Polish side – with the help of the agents. But until now, until I can't refer to the serious acts of sabotage from the Hungarian side, all my efforts will prove futile"²¹⁸. The Polish General Staff was actively involved in the work. On October 10, 1938 a Hungarian military attaché in Poland, B. Lendiel, reported to the Chief of the General Staff of Hungary that "soldiers of active duty in civilian clothing, I think, will be sent to Mukachevo and Uzhgorod under the direction of an officer. The number of people in the units will be in line with our plans... On other roads they will send to the Ruthenian region patrols, consisting of volunteers, for the purpose of carrying out explosions and other disruptive actions. The Polish side will intensify its operations when Hungarian subversive forces will deploy combat operations. To coordinate all the actions, they asked to inform them daily of the situation"²¹⁹.

The appearance of the Hungarian terrorists was mentioned in the first half of October, 1938. In the diary of V. Grendzha-Donsky there is the following text: "Yesterday, at 4 o'clock in the morning, Hungarian terrorists appeared in our country. Near the station of Benia, they attacked the Borzhiv railway bridge, killed one soldier on guard, damaged the bridge with ekrazit and attacked the train number 1108. They also killed the station commander, robbed the passengers, captured several of our soldiers and took them with them. They went to Beregovo wineries and forests"²²⁰. The first appearance of the Hungarian terrorists V. Grendzha-Donsky refers to October 10, 1938. P. Stercho also holds a similar point of view: "At night, from 9th to 10th October, 1938, the first group of "Rondosh Garda" came to the border territory of Tarpa and from there, through the connection of Mukachevo Hungarian Miklovsh Erdeli, crossed the border on the

²¹⁸ Ibid. C. 112-113.

²¹⁹ Ibid. C. 113.

²²⁰ Гренджа-Донський В. Щоденник. *Твори*. Т.VIII. Вашингтон, 1987. С. 23.

Borzhava River and invaded Carpathian Ukraine”²²¹. Ukrainian scientists O. Dovhanych, Z. Pashkuj and M. Troyan believe that the first Hungarian terrorists of 12 people appeared on the territory of Transcarpathia on October 5, 1938²²². However, archival documents, which could testify to this fact, were not found.

From the encrypted telegram of the Hungarian Foreign Minister K. Kanya to Ambassador to Poland A. Hori, it is clear that as of October 12, 1938, the Hungarians “managed to drop approximately 750-800 people into the Ruthenian region. After the clashes and acts of sabotage that took place yesterday and the day before yesterday, the Czechs literally closed the border tightly”²²³. On October 14, 1938, Hungarian terrorists were mentioned for the second time in the vicinity of Beregovo. Czech gendarme A. Rygan, from the village of Dubrynych, was killed in a clash with them. However, reinforcements approached in time and the terrorists had to retreat. Government newspaper “Nova Svoboda” informed about the emergence of 300 armed terrorists near Muzhievo²²⁴, and on October 21, 1938 – near Volovets²²⁵.

Attacks of Hungarian terrorist have intensified since the Vienna arbitration. The commander of the 12 Czechoslovak division reported that on November 3, 1938, “between 3 and 5 o’clock there was an attack by terrorists on the village Kosyno... Fire with automatic pistols and machine guns was started towards the terrorists, hand grenades were used. Post-graduate student was killed during the attack... Terrorists used the “dum-dum” bullets”²²⁶. On the same day, the Hungarians repeated the attack, which injured five Czechoslovak border guards. On November 4, two terrorists opened fire in Kosynsky Verkh. They were armed with hand grenades and automatic pistols. Three Czechoslovak border guards suffered minor

²²¹ Стерчо П. Урядова координація операцій мадярських і польських терористів у Карпатській Україні в 1938–1939 рр. *Державність*. 1993. № 1. С. 16.

²²² Довганич О.Д., Пашкуй З.А., Троян М.В. Закарпаття в роки війни. Ужгород: Карпати, 1990. С. 14.

²²³ Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 113.

²²⁴ Нова свобода. 1938. 20 жовтня.

²²⁵ Гренджа-Донський В. Щоденник. *Твори*. Т.VIII. Вашингтон, 1987. С. 34.

²²⁶ Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5349. karton 23.

injuries during the firefight. On 5 and 6 November, armed incidents at the Hungarian-Czechoslovak border were fixed again, during which one Czech soldier was seriously injured. On November 9, Hungarian terrorists, armed with automatic pistols and hand grenades, launched a new attack on Czechoslovak border guards in Kosyn. Czech sergeant was killed and five people were injured in the clash²²⁷. On November 11 a unit of twenty Hungarian terrorists was attacked by Czechoslovak troops near the village Pidhoryany. The Czechoslovak side had no losses²²⁸. On November 17, an attack of thirty Hungarian terrorists near Strabichovo was repelled. On November 21 they arrived in Maly Davydkiv, and on November 22 – in Shalanky, two terrorists, armed with machine guns and automatic pistols, were detained by Czechoslovak border guards. On November 25, 1938 a firefight began in the area of the village Chlumec, south of Uzhgorod. On the same day, Hungarian terrorists were attacked near Rakoshyno²²⁹. The next day, several “persistent terrorists”, led by Michal Gimro, were detained²³⁰. Hungarian terrorists have repeatedly appeared in this village. The head of the Mukachevo district administration reported on November 28, 1938 to the Presidium of the regional administration in Khust that “civilians attacked the defense of 4/86 company located in the courtyard of a Hungarian school in Rakoshyno, firing with automatic pistols”²³¹. The attack was organized by Tor Baka Irji, Tor Baka Jozef, Molnar Jan, Alexander Tar, Stefan Geza Tor, who were suspected of being linked to Hungarian terrorists in Mukachevo. While trying to escape, three terrorists were killed. The investigation found that in Rakoshyno a local “Sabatchopot” unit was organized, which maintained close ties with Mukachevo and obtained weapons from there²³².

During December 1938, armed Hungarian terrorists regularly attacked settlements in Carpathian Ukraine. On December 6, during a shootout with Czechoslovak border guards, one terrorist was killed in

²²⁷ Гренджа-Донський В. Щоденник. *Твори*. Т. VIII. Вашингтон, 1987. С. 73.

²²⁸ Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5349. karton 23.

²²⁹ ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 32. Арк. 1-3.

²³⁰ ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 44. Арк. 1.

²³¹ ДАЗО. Ф. 211. Оп. 1. Спр. 42. Арк. 20.

²³² ДАЗО. Ф. 211. Оп. 1. Спр. 43. Арк. 20.

the village Bogdan²³³. On December 7, thirty terrorists from Uzhgorod attacked the village Dovhe. The machine guns and rifles were fired at them, grenades were used. Having lost one man killed, they retreated in the direction of Uzhgorod. On December 8-9, fire from the territory, occupied by Hungary, was opened at the Transcarpathian border points. There were no casualties. On December 10 there was a new attack on the village Dovhe, and on December 12 – on the village Horyany. During the attack of six terrorists on the settlements of Verbovets and Oleshnyk on December 13, a Czechoslovak border guard was seriously injured, after what his leg had to be amputated. There was no loss on the part of the terrorists. On December 21, a shootout with terrorists in the Radwanka Forest continued until dawn. On December 23, terrorists attacked the village of Horyany, and on December 24, they attacked the village Barvinkosh. On December 25-29, Hungarian planes crossed Czechoslovakia's airspace several times, but the attack was not started²³⁴. On December 30–31, a group of Hungarian terrorists made several attacks on the village Makarievo²³⁵. One of them was described in detail by “Nova Svoboda”: “Four Hungarian terrorists entered the house and asked if there are finances. They searched the whole house but found nothing. Now, when they left the house, they threw 6 hand grenades, then started shooting for 20 minutes. The shots of the Hungarian terrorists were answered by our guard STOS (border units – Aut.) with machine gun shots”²³⁶.

V. Komarynsky, who headed the press and propaganda department in the government of Carpathian Ukraine, wrote to the Presidium of the Ministry of Internal Affairs: “I’m telling that during the last days Hungarian terrorists started to make disturbing actions at the border, they are not aristocratic Magyars, but, on the one hand, the fugitives-deserters from our army, and on the other had, the supporters of Dr. Fentsyk, Brodi and Demko, who fled from our territory to Mukachevo. According to the calculations, there are about

²³³ Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5349. karton 23.

²³⁴ Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5349. karton 23.

²³⁵ ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 319. Арк. 1.

²³⁶ Нова свобода. 1939. 19 січня.

300 such people in Mukachevo”²³⁷. Therefore, those were the terrorist groups that began to form in the Transcarpathian territory occupied by Hungary. According to the Czechoslovak Security Service, on January 1, 1939, in Uzhgorod there were 6000 terrorists ready to conduct sabotage actions in Carpathian Ukraine²³⁸.

On January 5-6, 1939 “the Hungarian terrorists themselves provoked the incident and attacked our border guards. The leader of these terrorists was the former district police inspector Bilyk Ferenc, then Basarab Ferenc, Chulak Todor and Shelebi Miklosh. Basarab, Chulak and Shelebi crossed the border near Pidmonastyr – they intended to take the Czechoslovak border guard and attack further... There were 350 terrorists, organized for this attack, almost all of them were Hungarians, 50 of them came directly from Mukachevo, others – from the neighborhood”²³⁹. Similar events took place in the vicinity of Uzhgorod. Border guard was attacked by a group of Hungarian terrorists led by Ishtvan Kalmar²⁴⁰. It should be noted that the Bolshevik newspaper “Pravda” noted on its pages “the small clashes that were taking place at the new Czechoslovak borders on the territory of Transcarpathia”²⁴¹.

The big fight took place on January 6, 1939 in the village Rosvygovo. There were between 200 and 250 terrorists. The fight lasted for two hours, after which the terrorists returned to their territory. Czechoslovak border guards lost one financial guard, one platoon soldier, six were injured and seven were reported missing. What were the casualties of the terrorists – that was not found out²⁴². On January 16, “Hungarian terrorists attacked STOS guards near Barvinkosh. There were 60-80 people. They were fired from heavy and light machine guns from Baranyntsi. The crowd passed the demarcation line, and maybe even 1 km in the direction to

²³⁷ ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 319. Арк. 2.

²³⁸ Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5349. karton 23.

²³⁹ Нова свобода. 1939. 3 лютого.

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ Гранчак І.М., Поп І.І. Закарпаття в чехословацько-радянських відносинах періоду другої світової війни. *Карпатика. Актуальні питання історії, історіографії і культури країн Центральної і Південно-Східної Європи*. Ужгород, 1993. С. 221.

²⁴² Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5349. karton 23.

Baranyntsi. Two policemen were wounded on our side”²⁴³. Similar clashes took place on January 2, 1939 in the village Barbovo²⁴⁴. On January 7, terrorists attacked the Czechoslovakian unit of STOS in Kamianytsia²⁴⁵.

Hungarian terrorist groups were constantly replenished with new people. Different methods were used for this, often with force. “According to reliable testimonies,” said the head of the Sevlyush district administration of the Presidium of Subcarpathian Rus’, “the Hungarians continue to enroll in the special “Sabatchopot” formation and train persons recruited in the local territory, demobilized soldiers and refugees from this territory, whom they want to use to cause turmoil in our area. It was found out that on November 14, 1938, two Hungarian recruits came in Vyshni Shard – Vilmosh Pap and Lajos Yugas, who, as they said, had been authorized by the Hungarian authorities to recruit on the local territory 500 men for the Hungarian troops. It was further revealed that many young people, including about 30 conscripts who are expected to join military service this year, fled to Hungary, where they were enlisted for military training. The demobilized soldier Wamosh of Sevlyush told here that Hungarian soldiers had beaten him for refusing to join the so-called “Sabatchopot”²⁴⁶. “In the village of Khlumtsi,” the local gendarmerie chief reported, “Vince Hortwaj and his 10-year-old son... went to the house to write down the persons... When compiling the list, Hortwaj asked people whether they would recognize themselves as Hungarians, and if the villagers answered positively, then they were writing their name themselves. Hortwaj did not explain to anybody, who was in his list, what was the purpose of the census”²⁴⁷.

The English journalist Henderson wrote that in the “outskirts of Shalanka, 12 miles east of Beregovo, the Czechoslovak army captured 297 Hungarian terrorists, including 26 officers, 62 non-commissioned officers, one post-graduate student, four Czechoslovak citizens of Hungarian nationality and the rest were Hungarian

²⁴³ ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 56. Арк. 5.

²⁴⁴ ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 319. Арк. 1.

²⁴⁵ Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5349. karton 23.

²⁴⁶ ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 73. Арк. 18.

²⁴⁷ Ibid.

revisionists... The documents taken from them indicated that the terrorists had been sent by the General Staff of the Ministry of War. The interrogation of the terrorists proved that the captives were collected and trained in Kishvard near Teyashband, and are under the command of Lieutenant Ishtvan Geyash... There are around 2000 Hungarian terrorists scattered in Ruthenia...”²⁴⁸.

As of February 10, 1939, Hungarian terrorists attacked the borders of Carpathian Ukraine 22 times²⁴⁹. We should note that these are just the fights in which the Carpathian Sich participated. Director of the Police of Carpathian Ukraine Yu. Bilei in an interview to “Nova Svoboda” stated that “in Khust our Ukrainian guys caught two Hungarian terrorists”²⁵⁰. Ordinary terrorists were strongly encouraged and rewarded by their leaders. “The terrorist receives 3,5 pengoes a day, 50 pengoe for an attack” – reported “Nova Svoboda”²⁵¹. Evidence of the massive terrorist attacks on Carpathian Ukraine is the fact that as of February 25, 1939, the State Prosecutor’s Office detained 345 Hungarian terrorists²⁵². After the amnesty was announced, they were all released²⁵³.

In October 1938, the appearance of Polish terrorists was mentioned. Polish historian D. Dombrowski wrote: “During the interwar period, the territory of Transcarpathia was a region, which the Polish authorities observed with particular attention. This interest was triggered, first of all, by the geopolitical role, played by these lands after the First World War”²⁵⁴. It is worth agreeing with the scientist’s statement that “dislike of Czechoslovakia in the interwar period was felt on both sides of the border. Reasons for reluctance to settle mutual conflicts can be found in both Warsaw and Prague. In the thirties the ambitions of the architect of the foreign policy of the neighbors were imposed on mutual disputes. It was no secret that President Benesh and Minister Beck did not like each other. Both

²⁴⁸ Шандор В. Спомини. Т. 1. Карпатська Україна. 1938-1939. Ужгород: МПП «Гражда»; Карпатський Союз, 1996. С. 155.

²⁴⁹ Нова свобода. 1939. 25 лютого.

²⁵⁰ Нова свобода. 1938. 21 лютого.

²⁵¹ Нова свобода. 1938. 3 лютого.

²⁵² ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 17. Арк. 3.

²⁵³ ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 17. Арк. 4.

²⁵⁴ Домбровський Д. Польща і Закарпаття. 1938-1939. К.: Темпора, 2012. С. 7.

sought to emerge as leaders of the Central European countries and gave the same role to their countries”²⁵⁵.

The Polish troops, like the Hungarian ones, without Hitler’s official consent to invade Carpathian Ukraine, decided to restrict themselves to terrorist acts. On October 27, they attempted to explode a bridge near Zhornava, and the next day they attacked a bridge in Vučkovo. Czech gendarme Kalchik and several Transcarpathians, in particular, J. Loy were killed in the fight with them. In the village Torun Polish terrorists killed I. Kost from Synevyr²⁵⁶. However, these first terrorist attacks should not be regarded as a single attempt to undermine the stability of the internal political situation in Czechoslovakia and Carpathian Ukraine. Archival sources, taken to scientific circulation by D. Dombrowski, testify to a clear military-sabotage operation that was purposefully conducted by the Polish special services and became known under the code name “Operation Crowbar”.

Major Edmund Charaszkiwicz, who was appointed head of the “Crowbar” action, identified the following major stages: 1) preparation (from 7 to 22 October, 1938); 2) combat-sabotage actions (from October 22 to November 12, 1938); 3) guerrilla-sabotage actions (from November 17 to November 27, 1938); 4) termination of actions (from November 28 to December 31, 1938). Major Felix Ankerstein identified three cycles of sabotage operation: 1) preparatory (until October 20, 1938); 2) the organization and conduction of sabotage actions in Subcarpathian Rus’, together with fighting units from Rozluch and with guerrilla units, which are immediately mobilized with the help of the Riflemen Union (from October 20 to November 10, 1938); 3) the organization and formation of guerrilla units, their preparatory actions in anticipation of the order for the execution of the action and the completion of the whole action (from November 5 to December 10, 1938)²⁵⁷.

D. Dombrowski in his monograph lists the Polish command of the action “Crowbar” in Carpathian Ukraine: Major Felix Ankerstein, alias “Malsky” – commander; Captain Jan Melcharsky, alias

²⁵⁵ Ibid. С. 8.

²⁵⁶ Гренджа-Донський В. Щоденник. *Твори*. Т. VIII. Вашингтон, 1987. С. 71-72.

²⁵⁷ Домбровський Д. Польща і Закарпаття. 1938-1939. К.: Темпора, 2012. С. 148.

“Bonetsky”, Deputy Commander, Camp Commander in Rozluch and of combat organization; Captain Alexander Romishovsky, alias “Florian” – Operative Officer; Major Vladyslav Novozheniuk, alias “Novyi” – Commander of the Eastern Subversive Subgroup (Stryi – Dolyna – Kalush); Captain Julian Borkiewicz, alias “Bachynsky” – Commander of the Western Subversion Subgroup (Turka – Lesko – Sanok); Captain Vladislav Guttry, alias “Grodzky” – Head of the Intelligence in Carpathian Ukraine²⁵⁸. The latter, who was in Uzhgorod, covered himself with a diplomatic passport, “since October 12, 1938, he regularly inspected communication networks near Velykyi Bereznyi, Perechyn, Uzhgorod, Svalyava and Serednie. Taken materials about the objects to be destroyed (high-voltage transmission lines, bridges, communication lines), he sent to Captain Melcharsky by diplomatic mail”²⁵⁹.

On November 10, 1938 the Press Service of Carpathian Ukraine reported that the Polish terrorists had “dragged to Poland Jaroslav Vesecki, Vyacheslav Rakos and Tsisir, members of the border guards, who are still unknown whether they live”²⁶⁰. “Nova Svoboda” reported that “the Finance Directorate in Khust, through the mediation of the authorities of Carpathian Ukraine, will seek through diplomatic channels the Polish governments to release our border guards”²⁶¹. On the night of November 18, 1938, “several dozen Polish terrorists in the vicinity of Nyzhni Veretsky (Nyzhni Vorota – Aut.) attacked our border guards. In a shootout, they were driven towards the Polish border. Terrorists left one dead and several injured”²⁶². The attacks by Polish terrorists were mentioned on November 2, 3, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 1938. Inhabitants of Poland’s border villages of Torun, Pryslyp, N. Studeni, Synevyrskaya Polyana suffered from these acts²⁶³.

D. Dombrowski believes that the most tragic moment of the “Crowbar” action was an operation carried out under the direction of Lieutenant Vladislav Volsky. The saboteurs of the latter suddenly

²⁵⁸ Ibid. C. 157.

²⁵⁹ Ibid. C. 155.

²⁶⁰ ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 2. Спр. 5. Арк. 8.

²⁶¹ Нова свобода. 1939. 18 лютого.

²⁶² Нова свобода. 1938. 25 листопада.

²⁶³ Нова свобода. 1938. 20, 25 листопада.

attacked on the night of November 15, 16, 1938, near the village of Prysli. Three saboteurs were killed on the spot, another was tortured by Czechoslovakian gendarmes. Vladislav Gurnitsky, Vladislav Goffman and Adam Michalkow were killed at the scene of the fighting. The last fatal victim of the action was, according to the assumption of the Polish side, its commander... The fate of the dead was not exactly determined²⁶⁴. The information about their deaths came to the organizers of the “Crowbar” action thanks to informants in the territory of Carpathian Ukraine. The burial places were probably never found out. On November 18, 1938 in a skirmish with Czechoslovak troops, Captain Klepacki, Roman-Józef Karpinski and Wawziniec Urbaniak were killed. According to Czechoslovak intelligence services, a unit of Polish saboteurs of up to 100 people opened the fire (and threw grenades) at a post office in Torun and at a gendarmerie post. The fight lasted from 02.00 to 04.30 in the morning on November 22, 1938. The Poles returned after coming of the support forces from Volove. On their return, the group detonated a small road bridge near the previously destroyed mail. Although about a hundred grenades were detonated during more than two hours of fighting, no casualties were recorded²⁶⁵.

From the telephone telegram of Hungarian ambassador to Poland A. Hori to Hungarian Foreign Minister K. Kanya of November 9, 1938, it is clear that the Poles had doubts about limiting the struggle against Czechoslovakia only to terrorist actions. “The question of the Ruthenian region,” wrote A. Hori, “should be resolved quickly and in the most radical way. It is possible that we can achieve the goal solely by means of insurgent units. But what happens if they are crushed? Will we be satisfied with the fact that our attempts failed? It is possible that our insurgent actions will be repulsed by a blow to regular Hungarian troops”²⁶⁶. On November 25, 1938, General Vladislav Langner issued an order to disband the guerrilla units. The volunteers had to be released and sent home during several days, and by the beginning of the next month they had to return their

²⁶⁴ Домбровський Д. Польща і Закарпаття. 1938-1939. К.: Темпора, 2012. С. 197-198.

²⁶⁵ Ibid. С. 203.

²⁶⁶ Венгрия и вторая мировая война: Секретные дипломатические документы по истории кануна и периода войны. М.: Наука, 1962. С. 133.

equipment, weapons and uniforms. Unnecessary higher staff and ordinary staff were required to return to their locations. By December 10, 1938, all calculations and reports had to be completed. After receiving the order from General Langner on November 25, 1938, Major Ankerstein ordered the finish the “Crowbar”²⁶⁷. However, it is necessary to agree with D. Dombrowski’s conclusion that “the information on the completion of the action came late, General Langner’s order could not be immediately implemented. Czechoslovakian documents claim that the last Polish attacks lasted from November 26 to November 28, 1938. There was one victim of these attacks – a customs officer, who died near Synevyr Polyana”²⁶⁸.

The terrorist attacks caused great moral and material damage. Only the Polish terrorists, as of November 25, 1938, inflicted losses of 277500 Kč.²⁶⁹. Inhabitants of the village Torun informed their government that “on 5.XII terrorists imposed ecrasite (explosives – Aut.) under the notarial government (damage of 3400 Kč., which was partially covered by 1500 Kč.), but on 22.XIII the government was again fired at each side by the terrorists for 2 hours. 3 grenades were thrown into the building – damage of 5 thousand Kč.”²⁷⁰. There were human casualties after almost each attack. Only in the few days of November 1938, 3 soldiers, 2 chetniks, 1 financial guard, 1 notary, 2 children were killed at the Polish-Czech border²⁷¹. On November 28, 29 and 31, Polish terrorists attacked the village of Vuchkove three times. The Riflemen detained the persons of Polish nationality Bohdan Senczak and Rudolf Pes²⁷². These and other facts were reflected in the reports of Czechoslovak security personnel. They recorded weapons, funding and the level of military training of terrorists²⁷³. The attacks of the Polish terrorists did not stop in January–February 1939 as well. Village of Pryslyp was «attacked by 10 Polish terrorists, who seized the post office. The mail house was

²⁶⁷ Домбровський Д. Польща і Закарпаття. 1938-1939. К.: Темпора, 2012. С. 204.

²⁶⁸ Ibid.

²⁶⁹ ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 65. Арк. 1.

²⁷⁰ ДАЗО. Ф. 4с/18. Оп. 1. Спр. 45. Арк. 1.

²⁷¹ ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 65. Арк. 1.

²⁷² Vojensky Historicky Archiv, Praha. i.c. 5349. karton 23.

²⁷³ Archiv Ministerstva Zagranicnich Veci, Praha. i.c. 2012. karton 655.

bombed with hand grenades and post administrator Kalyna was killed. Ms. Kalynova and her husband defended the post office. Pieces of grenades tore her chest and head”²⁷⁴.

The Carpatho-Ukrainian authorities, in response to the Polish ambassador’s protests, which accused it of promoting anti-Polish propaganda in the territory of the region, constantly cited the facts of the devastating activities of the Polish terrorists. On November 13, 1938 in Nyzhniy Studeny, a terrorist was killed while crossing the border, at his body there was found a “pistol with a “Cerba” badge, a cigarette box, a leatherwallet, in it there were 50 kč, 1 Polish zloty and 15 Polish grosz”²⁷⁵. On November 15, 1938 hand grenades of the Polish sample, a clock mechanism for lighters, lighters with the inscription “Krakow”, Polish cigarettes, chocolate were taken from the detained Polish terrorists²⁷⁶.

On November 23 a group of foreign journalists visited the Transcarpathian villages of Vuchkove, Torun, Pryslyp and Synevyrska Polyana, which were most affected by the Polish attacks. This delegation also included German Consul H. Hoffman, who “examined everything, photographed not only the places of attack, but also the belongings and weapons of the terrorists, wich were left on the ground”²⁷⁷. On November 27, 1938 “Nova Svoboda” reported: “The German authorities today sent notes to the Hungarian and Polish authorities in which... they are protesting against the sending of terrorists by the Polish General Staff from Osmoloda to Carpathian Ukraine”²⁷⁸.

According to the final report of Major Ankerstein, as a result of Polish sabotage actions in Carpathian Ukraine, 12 car bridges, one dam, a telephone switch and a post office house were destroyed (or damaged). Railway tracks and high-voltage power lines were damaged at one place. Telephone lines were damaged at 27 locations. These actions caused a complete disorder and even panic among the Czechoslovakian gendarmes, military units and border services in the

²⁷⁴ ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 159. Арк. 9.

²⁷⁵ Нова свобода. 1938. 25 листопада.

²⁷⁶ Нова свобода. 1938. 20 листопада.

²⁷⁷ Гренджа-Донський В. Щоденник. *Твори*. Т. VIII. Вашингтон, 1987. С. 87.

²⁷⁸ Нова свобода. 1938. 27 листопада.

northern, mountainous part of Transcarpathia. According to “Crowbar” commander, the losses of the enemy were 23 killed, 15 wounded, 20 prisoners, delivered to Poland, and 5 prisoners, disarmed and released on the spot. The casualties of the participants of the action were 11 dead (8 of which were killed and 3 were executed) and 7 were wounded. Three people (two of them wounded) have been captured and three others have been reported missing²⁷⁹. However, these data can hardly be considered accurate. D. Dombrowski is undoubtedly right, when asserting: “All information provided about both one’s own losses and losses of the enemy should be treated very carefully, as it differs from the information prepared by the Czechoslovak side. It is also unknown whether the list of Polish losses is accurate. There is no information on the fate of conductors who were not registered as participants of the action in the reports of Department II of the General Staff. Their function often depended on the tasks. It seems that some people were only interested in the positive results of actions, often refusing to participate in dangerous or risky operations...”²⁸⁰. The total balance of financial losses for the “Crowbar” action was approximately 250,000 PLN²⁸¹. It is undeniable that Poland’s “hybrid war” in Carpathian Ukraine could not be concealed. The authorities of Czechoslovakia published information on this topic, information that had hit the foreign press, which significantly complicated the Czechoslovak-Polish relations of the time. The main thing that the Polish authorities sought was the establishment of a joint Hungarian-Polish border, but this was not possible at the end of 1938. This will only be done in March 1939, when the Nazi troops will fully occupy the territory of Carpathian Ukraine.

It should be noted that the Czechoslovak government paid considerable attention to the protection of the borders of the region. Often, joint combat operations of the STOS and the Carpathian Sich units to neutralize terrorist groups were carried out. One such

²⁷⁹ Домбровський Д. Польща і Закарпаття. 1938-1939. К.: Темпора, 2012. С. 206.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Ibid. С. 217.

operation ended in the defeat of the Joseph Prem group²⁸². The same fate befell the Ernest Berzewitzi group. 24 officers, 62 sub-sergeants and more than 200 ordinary terrorists were captured.

Not only the settlements inhabited exclusively by the Ukrainian population suffered. Hungarian terrorist attacks on Romanian villages of Maramoros have intensified. An active position was occupied by the “Order of the Brave”, which was founded in 1920 by M. Horthy. Of the many organizations of this character, the so-called “free squads” led by the mentioned above Heyash had the worst reputation²⁸³. The main task of these gangs was to exterminate the non-Hungarian population in the area, and their program was outlined in a booklet by Decho Chaba, published in 1939. It stated that the Hungarian nation was the most prominent representative of the Mongolian ruling race, which knows only the victory, and in whose veins the blood of Atilla, Arpad and Genghis Khan boils. “I do not expect,” D. Chaba wrote, “when revenge will come. I’m not waiting! I’m destroying every Vlach who comes in my way. Destroy everyone! I will not delay. I will burn down the villages at night – Vlachs villages. I will cut with sabre the whole population, will poison all the wells and even destroy the children in the cradles, in general, I will destroy these inhumans! There will be no exception!”²⁸⁴. In 1938 one of the leaders of the Party of “Crossed Arrows”, Miwau, emphasized that “the national-socialism of Hungary is intended to secure Hungary’s advantage throughout the Danube”²⁸⁵.

Among the terrorist gangs there was an especially dangerous unit led by Nod Migali “from the Ungwar Unit”. He, as well as his subordinates, was fluent in Ukrainian and Romanian languages. The attacks by the Hungarian terrorists kept the local population in constant fear. There have been numerous cases of people fleeing to Romania, including Targu Mures. The situation deteriorated further when the territory was occupied by Hungary. The archival documents testify to the constant repression of the local population in which the

²⁸² Стерчо П. Урядова координація операцій мадярських і польських терористів у Карпатській Україні в 1938–1939 рр. *Державність*. 1993. № 1. С. 17.

²⁸³ Teroarea hortisto-fascista in nord-vestul Transilvaei. Bucuresti, 1985. P. 49-52.

²⁸⁴ Ibid. P. 38.

²⁸⁵ Arhivele Cluj-Napoka M.I. nr.8546, vol. 122, P. 180.

terrorists actively participated. There were facts of abuse against people who did not speak Hungarian. In response, there were protests against the fascist regime, in particular in Velykyi Bychkiv²⁸⁶. Therefore, terrorist gangs also penetrated into the settlements of Maramoros, where the Romanian population resided. Their actions were no different from those in central part of Carpathian Ukraine.

Attempts were made to strengthen the border troops. V. Komarynsky suggested that “all the guard points... of course should be fastened, namely: at the line from Zaluzh to Mukachevo about 30 people, and between the village of Staryi Davydkiv and Chomonnyk about 20 people”²⁸⁷. Normal relations were established between Volove Riflemen commander S. Figura and Czechoslovak border guards. Watch units were strengthened in the villages of Torun, Pryslyp, Synevyrska Polyana. “In mid-November,” H. Yavorenko recalled, “the Riflemen under the command of... engineer Voliansky arrived in Torun. At that time, the composition of the garrison ranged from 20 to 25 people... The garrison was divided into three groups... Each group consisted of 6-7 people having only one shotgun and a revolver and 6 grenades per group. The terrorists, apparently informed by local spies and their intelligence about our arrival, no longer dared to attack the neighborhoods we protected”²⁸⁸. However, the latter statement is difficult to agree with. Although the attacks by the Polish terrorists were not so widespread, they did not stop.

Additional selection for gendarmerie was announced. On February 5, 1939 “Nova Svoboda” published an announcement stating that “more gendarmes will be taken to the gendarmerie of Carpathian Ukraine”²⁸⁹.

According to our calculations, only in February – March 1939 278 people wrote applications to enlist them in the gendarmerie²⁹⁰. Even the intellectuals expressed such a desire. M. Buksar, who worked as a teacher in the village Zavosyno

²⁸⁶ Arhivele Cluj-Napoca M.I. nr.8546, vol. 122, P. 181.

²⁸⁷ ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 319. Арк. 1.

²⁸⁸ Карпатська Україна в боротьбі. Відень, 1939. С. 102.

²⁸⁹ Нова свобода. 1939. 5 лютого.

²⁹⁰ ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 1-320.

(V. Berezhnyi district), wrote: “Now all the protection of our young state is in the hands of the gendarmerie, and just among the gendarmerie commandment there are no sons of the Ukrainian people who are so needed to keep the security against active enemies at the borders, and against passive enemy of propaganda”²⁹¹. In this form, the process of Ukrainianization of the gendarmerie took place. Although, it should be noted that it was quite slow. As of February 1939, “there are about 900 of all gendarmes in Carpathian Ukraine, and among them there are 106 Ukrainians”²⁹². There have been cases of bonus payments to people who have detained a terrorist. On November 17, 1938 the Head of the Office of the Presidium of Carpathian Ukraine, M. Latsanych, issued a decree on nationwide acquaintance of the population with the government’s decision to “pay a reward for the capture of foreign terrorists”²⁹³. In February 1939, any person who “surrenders or tells about a provocateur agent or terrorist from a foreign country to the security agencies will be paid a reward of 500 kč”²⁹⁴.

The government of Carpathian Ukraine managed to convince the population in the relatively short period of time of the need for national protection of the borders of the region. Inhabitant of the village Synevyrskaya Polyana I. Loboda wrote in a letter to his father: “You, father, stand in your place and protect our borders from the Magyars, and here in the neighborhood we will watch our traitors and mercilessly destroy the Polish bandits... Single Polish bandits at day hide in our forests and do their devilish work at night”²⁹⁵. Units of self-defense were established in all the villages bordering Poland. Despite the measures taken to combat the attacks of the Hungarian and Polish terrorists, A. Voloshyn was well aware of their danger. It was for this reason that he issued an order to temporarily close the borders. In particular, it stated: “In order to ensure a peaceful election... I will close with immediate validity all demarcation lines to the Kingdom of Hungary and the Republic of Poland. It will be

²⁹¹ ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 87. Арк. 1-2.

²⁹² Нова свобода. 1939. 2 лютого.

²⁹³ ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 43. Арк. 2.

²⁹⁴ ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 3. Спр. 43. Арк. 3.

²⁹⁵ Нова свобода. 1938. 20 листопада.

locked... until twelve o'clock on Monday, February 13, 1939"²⁹⁶. The terrorist attacks did not stop from October 1938 until March 1939. V. Grendzha-Donsky wrote that they had "terrorized and threatened the people"²⁹⁷. A. Voloshyn stated that "attacks of the terrorists are not in the interest of good neighborly coexistence and that it is a decisively unusual act in the history of international relations"²⁹⁸. He was also forced to admit that "Carpathian Ukraine is unable to repel their attacks"²⁹⁹. After the invasion of the Horthy's troops into the territory of Carpathian Ukraine, the terrorists were massively enlisted in the Hungarian army and took direct part in the repression not only against the Carpathian Riflemen but also against the civilian population of the region.

Huge material damage to Carpathian Ukraine was caused by constant attacks of the Hungarian and Polish terrorists, who pursued a common goal: to destabilize the internal political situation in the region. Civilians often suffered during these attacks, people died. The activities of terrorist groups should be regarded as an integral part of the Hungarian-Polish plan for establishing a joint border. The appearance of terrorists forced the Czechoslovak and Ukrainian governments to make considerable efforts to organize the defense of their borders. Various methods were used to prevent the attacks of the terrorist gangs: additional units were formed at the borders, gendarmerie staff was expanded, bonuses for captured terrorists being paid, and so on. These activities have led to qualitative changes, resulting in sabotage actions being significantly reduced, although they continued until the last days of Carpathian Ukraine. Young Carpathian Sich played a significant role in the struggle against terrorist groups. It often cooperated with Czechoslovak border guards, which also had positive consequences.

²⁹⁶ ДАЗО. Ф. 17. Оп. 2. Спр. 319. Арк. 6.

²⁹⁷ Гренджа-Донський В. Щоденник. *Твори*. Т. VIII. Вашингтон, 1987. С. 108.

²⁹⁸ ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. 1. Спр. 9. Арк. 2.

²⁹⁹ ДАЗО. Ф. 3. Оп. №. Спр. 156. Арк. 1.