

SECTION 2.2.

INFORMATION POLICY OF THE SOVIET REGIME ON THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF NAZI GERMANY

The Soviet Union was formed as a state in which information and advocacy has become the basis of social and political life of the Soviet people. In 1910–1930 s the definition of an information space concept has not yet become significant in European countries, and the leaders of the Bolshevik Party, without having the means of information warfare, clearly understood the importance of the information for the conquest of public opinion to their interests. Therefore, after the October Revolution in 1917, especially with the formation of the USSR, the country started to construct powerful information space.

In 1920–1930s an extensive system of various institutions and mechanisms to influence the social mass was developed in the Soviet Union, whose main goal was to maintain proper world outlook in citizens minds, which partly reflected the reality, was partly mythologized, but what is more important – met specific goals of Bolshevik authorities. Active spiritual, ideological and defense-mass work focused on the formation of the representatives of all nations and nationalities, social groups patriotism within a single country – the Soviet Union and internationalism, all these could not give significant results. Moreover, this is the daily educational activities carried out along with the repressive practices and daily informing the public about the “labor achievements of the Soviet people in building socialism”, set peoples patriotic spirit to defend the gains of socialism in the event of military threat or enemy attack.

Ideological education of the masses in the USSR was put on a high level, but the German-Soviet War forced to reformulate and summarize the contents, directions, forms and means of military-patriotic education. Already in June 1941 government speakers in theirs first pubic statements and speeches characterized the German attack on the Soviet Union as treacherous. It was necessary to convince people that the war against foreign invaders was fair. The realization of this idea concluded in people’s contribution to increase its forces and raise mass heroism.

It was obvious, that the Soviet state more than any other state in history, paid attention to information and psychological impact of its own citizens. According to P. Kenez, the American researcher, this field was fuccessful due

to the pre-revolutionary experience of the Bolshevik propaganda, their organizational capabilities and the ability of the political system to isolate the population from alternative ideas and unwanted information. However, P. Kenez noted, that Bolshevik propaganda system was no longer unique: the very ideology has formed the basic guidelines, which covered all areas of life and formed the unified outlook.

Thus, the advocacy of the Bolsheviks, which was started in pre-revolutionary period among the workers and peasants, was their advantage. Later it has become a strong base for the deployment of an extensive system of propaganda including constant attention to the masses and their social life. The Bolsheviks were always close to the people and demonstrated the strength of their ideological beliefs in practice.

Today we can hardly name the country, which power in the first half of the 20th century was carried out in relation to its own population large-scale propaganda activities aimed at imposing ideas that were not perceived by society. Information space that was created in the Soviet Union, was aimed the spread socialism. Very much attention was paid to the creation and dissemination of newspapers as a tool of effective influence on public opinion. This what V.I. Lenin stressed on during his ruling times (Ленин 1967, с. 10). It should be noted that during the rise of Bolshevik power, the publications have become a real ideological weapon. The total Bolshevik control included all periodicals, radio, literature, education and science, in fact, – daily life of every citizen of the USSR.

According to the numerous documents of those times, the pro-government forces in both countries – in Germany, and the Soviet Union – sought to create a totalitarian system with continuous control of public opinion. Management mechanisms were similar in the two countries, just as mechanisms of mobilization in defense of each country.

The hard struggle with the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany in 1941–1945 led to information confrontation between these countries and the implementation of modern means and methods of ideological confrontation. The Soviet society was taught to hate fascism more and more and to identify it with cruelty, evil, violence and cynicism. The USSR was a powerful political propaganda industry. The word “German” was identified with the word “enemy” thanks to I. Erenburg who made great efforts to this. At a time when Hitler’s propaganda showed Stalin and the Soviet leaders as stupid and criminal people, Hitler was depicted on the Soviet posters as a pathetic, cruel dog or snake, killed by a Soviet warrior.

During German-Soviet war the Soviet propaganda has performed a lot of functions and broadcasted many ideological installations. It is clearly shown

on the example of the term “Great Patriotic War”. No doubt, it was a propaganda installation that had become the basis of the concept of information and propaganda war of the USSR. Right this phrase had to hide the complicity of the Soviet Union to Hitler’s aggressive campaign, which lasted until June 1941. Since the beginning of hostilities in the USSR, its leaders tried to convince the public that the war waged by the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany, is national, liberating and fair. In particular, the decree of People’s Commissar of Defense, published in May 1942, included the following: “We have no such purpose, to seize foreign countries, to conquer alien peoples. Our aim is clear and noble. We want to liberate our Soviet land from the German fascist scoundrels. We want to free our fellows – Ukrainian, Moldovans, Belarusians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Karelians from that disgrace and humiliation to which they subjected the German fascist scoundrels. For this purpose we have to destroy the Nazi army and exterminate all the German invaders...” (Сталин, 1952).

The same order stated that the Soviet leadership had no such purposes as the Nazis had, that it does not seek to impose its will and regime to Slavonic and other enslaved nations of Europe. There is no intent to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations (Сталин 1952).

The method of fastening systems was often used in military reasons, based on the fact that the perception of people is very limited due to their small amount of operational memory. That person did not have time to process a large mass of data and the excessive amount of information perceived as chaos. That’s why, during ideological impacts, simple expressions play an important role such as: “Everything for the front! Everything for victory!”, “Ukraine has been and will be Soviet”, “Glory to the great Stalin – the leader and friend to Ukrainian people!” and many other bright slogans (Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України. Фонд 1). The concept of “Patriotic War” is well-known in world history and appeals to the senses of man to an innocent victim, who traditionally and in new conditions has the right to take part in “Great Patriotic defensive War”. Although it’s hardly possible to call the war between Germany and the USSR the “Patriotic” one for all Ukrainians, even knowing how many million people were in concentration camps, in captivity as political prisoners and built fortifications under the muzzles of machine guns.

The leaders attitude to the Red Army warriors, who fell into captivity, was really impressive. This clearly demonstrates the decree of the Supreme Command of August 16th 1941 № 270. This document stated, that the Red Army, surrendered by the enemy, must be “destroyed by all means, both by land and air, and Red Army family, who surrendered, must be deprived of

state aid". The order of People's Commissar of Defence of the USSR of July 28th 1942 № 227 included the importance of the formation of "armed enclosures" (up to 200 people in each) emphasizes the need to develop "armed zahorodzahoniv (up to 200 people in each)". The decree also contained the information to place them "in the immediate rear of unstable divisions and oblige them in case of panic and disorderly retreat of division parts to shoot on the spot all cowards..." (Король 2002, 51).

This situation shows that, on the one hand, not all soldiers understood what was happening, why the Red Army retreated. They were not ready to defend the regime that has brought so much grief to most of their families. On the other hand – the order pointed out that the Bolshevik government and the leaders of the Red Army did not trust its own soldiers and commanders, the defense of "Homeland" has become a compulsion to many of them.

Since June 1941, when the fascist German army started to occupy the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, its advocacy activity was quite effective and therefore could withstand the advocacy work of Soviet propaganda activists. But since December 1941 the effectiveness of information-psychological influence of the invaders started being less intensive, as a result of the confrontation methods of Soviet leaders.

The Soviet Union reacted on Hitler's information attack already in early days of the USSR western regions occupation. On June 23rd, 1941 GHQ was established and on July 17th 1941 the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army was founded. In accordance with the directives issued by this Department, the main task of military press was to train heroism, courage, martial arts, discipline. The press used specially formulated slogans, such as: "Fascism – is the enslavement of peoples. Fascism – a hunger, poverty, bankrupt. All forces should be aimed at the fight against fascism!", "We are for the right actions. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours!". In the first months of the war such slogans determined the contents of leading military and civilian newspapers. (Панарин 2006, 18)

The next step in Stalin information policy was to create an information mechanism to ensure the GHQ. The mechanism of managing information was created. On June 24th, 1941 the joint decree of the Communist Party and the government of the USSR "On the establishment and tasks of the Soviet Information Bureau" was legislated. The same resolution defined the main tasks of the newly created outreach departments, namely:

- Guidance to coverage of international events and domestic life of the Soviet Union on radio and in the press;

- Organizing counter-propaganda against the German and other hostile propaganda;

– Coverage and hostilities at the front, preparation and publication of reports on the materials of military Command.

Throughout the period of the war, information agencies were the main sources of information of the situation at the front both in Germany and in the Soviet Union. Sovinformburo messages were the most valuable for the citizens of the USSR, which came up directly from the Supreme Command, as well as major newspapers, which hired correspondents of Sovinformburo.

An important mechanism for the formation of the Soviet information space among the soldiers of the Red Army and the population of temporarily occupied areas were linguistic and stylistic means, which undoubtedly influenced the minds of people like emotive words and linguistic expressions, epithets, comparisons etc. which had the status of permanent. They were often used as headlines in newspapers and leaflets, which were dropped from aircrafts to the occupied territories. In particular, these are some words and expressions, which characterized Soviet soldiers: “fighting brotherhood”, “ingenuity and courage”, “initiative commander”, “courage”, “their” and so on. In contrast, the image of a brave Soviet soldier had an image of the enemy, which was wittingly negatively described with the help of stained words and phrases: “terrible atrocities”, “atrocities of the Nazi monsters”, “massacre of the Nazis”, “Crimes of Nazi thugs” and others. In proverbs and sayings which appeared during the war, invaders were compared with evil invaders, exotic animals, representatives of evil spirits, creatures from the other world. The newspapers and leaflets often published even swear words “cheater”, “bandit”, “proydoha”, “Scarecrow” and others (Советская пропаганда в годы Великой Отечественной войны: “коммуникация убеждения” и мобилизационные механизмы 2007, 19).

A good example of propaganda texts of those times, which combines positively and negatively stained words and linguistic expressions can be allocation of the Commander of the South-West direction and the СССР (B) to the population of the occupied territories with a call to fight against the Nazis: “The Nazis have seized part of our native Ukraine. They captured and your neighborhood also, and now German boots trample native land. Intrigue, betrayal and cunning helped the enemy to manage it in the first months of the war. In the occupied towns and villages the invaders celebrate bloody feast: they rob, kill, rape women and even teenage girls, take out everything valuable. German fascists want Ukrainian people to become the German one. They want to turn Ukraine into a colony, and you – to become slaves”. (Русский архив: Великая Отечественная) As we see, politicians of 1940s well understood that any war is impossible without appropriate information

actions. In their opinion, the wars “should be fair, an enemy – cruel, own soldiers – real heroes “ (Почепцов 1998, 34).

The powerful information campaigns took place already from the beginning of the deployment of hostilities on both sides, whose purpose was primarily to discredit the enemy, the creation of an enemy. The main objective of informational war was to demonstrate the advantages of country’s armed forces, concealing their own loss, exaggerating the losses caused by hostile armies, military and industrial facilities and means of communication, including enemy’s radio stations. Thes the information distributed through military-controlled press and radio.

The next important step in strengthening the information policy of the Soviet Union was the propaganda of extreme vigilance. On June 29th, 1941 the SNK and CC of the CPSU (b) directive was issued by party and government organizations of frontline areas. Its contents was brought to the public on July 3rd, 1941 through the speech of Stalin. The document stated the need to organize a relentless struggle with various disorganizers, like deserters and alarmist, and those spread rumors. Spreading rumors was often defined as a crime and fell under the appropriate criminal penalties. At the same time distributed pamphlets and other propaganda materials, which explained that the spread of false rumors was a “moral sabotage”, which could be primarily interested by enemy (Коммунистическая партия в Великой Отечественной войне 1970, 42).

To coordinate and manage the information streams, which sprang in the rear and on the occupied regions of the USSR, the Office of propaganda and agitation of the CPSU (b) has created five new departments: radio and radio information, advocacy groups, literature, cinema, arts (Коммунистическая партия в Великой Отечественной войне 1970, 42). Each department was self-sufficient entity, and industry was completely controlled and subjected to total censorship.

According to the plan “About the work behind the enemy lines, approved by main political administration of the Red Army plan, there were defined following tasks from November 1942 to September 1943”: (Центральный державний архів громадських об’єднань України. Фонд 1, 68)

1) distract the Germans and attract the Soviet citizens who were under the influence of German propaganda and for various reasons appeared in enemy camp, at the police service, the gendarmerie, the so-called Cossack detachments of “Russian Liberation Army”, etc.;

2) to mobilize the population to prepare for a national uprising against the occupiers, to extend the armed struggle of the occupied areas against the Nazis;

3) to organize a mass boycott of all activities of the Germans during the seizure of areas;

4) to strongly promote the success of the Red Army, the soviet front and thereby give hope to close the liberation from Nazi rule.

The Soviet Information Bureau has become an accumulation and dissemination center of important information. But to control the information flows and to prevent unauthorized listening and hostile foreign radio broadcasts, on August 23rd, 1941 I. Peresypkin, the Deputy Commissar of Defense, issued the decree about the verification of the implementation of Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated June 25th, 1941 № 1750, according to which all citizens, living in the Soviet Union, were obliged to hand over personal radios to local connection authorities (Русский архив: Великая Отечественная 1997, 72).

Soviet Informbureau, in accordance to the basic activities, constantly managed coverage of international events and domestic life of the Soviet Union on the radio and in press, organizing counter-propaganda against the Nazi media, publishings of military reports by materials of the Command of the Red Army. Sovinformburo also guided activities of anti-fascist and Slavic committees created at the beginning of the war: Soviet women, youth, scholars, Jewish Committee (КПСС в резолюциях и решениях съездов, конференций и пленумов ЦК 1985, 213). Since 1942 vector of the Soviet Information Bureau was radically changed and focused mainly on communication with foreign media, public and political organizations. For this purpose, 11 departments were created in the structure of the information and propaganda agency (Советское Информационное Бюро в годы Великой Отечественной войны 1999, 59).

The most difficult task was to inform the world community about events which took place on the Soviet-German fronts and on the work of the home front. The Soviet Information Bureau had no connections with the international information space. It was necessary to form new ones. Opponents of the Soviet Union, including Germany, had a powerful propaganda apparatus, had a large number of radio stations, newspapers in major European countries. The Soviet Union allies quickly created a powerful information and propaganda organ. The Soviet Information Bureau faced tough task: to develop and maintain relationships around the world, to use all available methods – newspapers, magazines, radio stations, agencies, etc., to transmit official information about the Soviet Union and the events which took place in the country.

Sovinformburo let the readers and listeners from abroad know to fight for the Soviet army and people against Hitler's army through 1171 newspapers,

523 magazines and 18 radio stations in 23 countries (Советское информационное бюро 1944–1945).

Radio programs Sovinformburo such as “In the last hour”, “The construction of the Soviet Information Bureau”, “Letters from the front and the front” and others were available for listening to almost every citizen of the USSR, although the radio points worked with major interruptions. Operational summary of Sovinformburo was published daily from June 25, 1941. News from the front was gathered from 5am to 6am. Sovinformburo reports were always published on the front pages of Soviet newspapers. They were the main source of spreading information in almost every town.

At the beginning of July 1941 the Informbureau Soviet Berau together with All-Union Radio Committee, conducted a new form announcing information, which has not been used in practice before. It was regular radio transmission of political reviews. At first they were broadcasted only on the territory of the USSR, and later for listeners abroad. The reviews were broadcasted once a week (later – twice) at a specific date and time named “Averin”. In fact, their authors were a few dozen of people: Yaroslavsky, Pik, Omelchenko, Varga, Zvavych and others- 30 people on total. The certain Comintern officials were hired to work as commentators. Even more, thanks to the People’s Commissariat of Defense there were involved officers to prepare articles, who were treated in hospitals, as well as those who were sent from the front. These materials were sent abroad after Informbureau Soviet literary group processings. Commentators work seemed impossible without the efforts of the authors and compilers of the texts. All of them were united in the Literary Sovinformburo Department. During July – October 1941 the department’s staff prepared and sent abroad around 140 articles. Soinformberau has prepared more than 400 articles during this period together with specially ordered materials for newsletters of England, the USA, China and Sweden (Салата 2009, 117).

The management of Sovinformbureau in conjunction with the All-Union Radio Committee was worked out clear requirements for the contents of all materials which were broadcasted on the radio. The messages of Soviet Informbureau were based on some clear pattern. First, there were summed up the battles for different directions, then – figures of destroyed equipment and manpower of the enemy, then – losses of Soviet troops (sometimes this order was violated). The morning digest contained the last night events, and the evening issue expressed analyzed results of hostilities during the day. From the first day of the war correspondents provided descriptions of battle scenes and exploits of Soviet soldiers. During the German-Soviet war, 14470 names of the soldiers were announced, who distinguished themselves at the front

(Советская военная энциклопедия 1979, 415). Together with this, it should be noted that sometimes daily and summary reports from the fronts were false and biased, that even Stalin did not believe in them (Сообщения Советского Информбюро 1944–1945, 3).

The information, provided by Sovinformburo, was immediately published in newspapers and leaflets, which were later distributed on the fronts and on the occupied territories by the German army.

The information materials, submitted in messages, were subjected to strict censorship. Despite the specific requirements regarding the Informbureau materials which were allowed/prohibited for publishing, the editors had to make adjustments in messages, or to publish it in the way which absolutely did not meet basic line of Soviet information and political propaganda.

For example, the “Komsomolskaya Pravda” newspaper contained “The Spring”, essay by Iyulsky, in which the author, following the requirements of propaganda, showed the situation in the besieged Leningrad as if life on the streets and boulevards of the city was in rush, kids played in the gardens etc. Despite shells and bombs bursted nearby, no one paid attention on them. This information was designed for soldiers of the Red Army and the population of the occupied territories, who had to believe that the German army could not break the spirit of the Soviet people that their whole life has changed and keep on moving forward. But if this essay was read by Leningrad residents, who were starving and dying from cold in the besieged city, they would be very indignant, and who knows how it all could be finished (Советская пропаганда в годы Великой Отечественной войны 2007, 156).

The “Izvestia” newspaper stopped publishings of “Fuel is delivered on time” by A.Kuznetsov, correspondent. To show the courage and heroism of Soviet railroad workers, the author mentioned in the article the amount of destroyed railway stations, broken trains, damaged tracks etc. One part of this correspondence should have had positive influence on the population and the soldiers of the Red Army, but the rest would support the creation of German Informbureau, but it could not be allowed to happen.

Due to different reasons, 65 articles and essays have been canceled in such newspapers as “Pravda”, “Izvestia”, “Komsomolskaya Pravda”, “Red Star”, which covered the main events of war (Русский архив: Великая Отечественная 1997, 157).

To make Soviet broadcasting more accessible to all social groups of different nationalities, on November 17th, 1941 according to the Decree № 904 by the State Defense Committee, there was approved the mandatory radio broadcast in Ukrainian and in Polish. To this end, it was ordered to use one radio in October broadcasting center in Moscow for 12 hours a day to

perform Ukrainian radio and oblige Broadcasting Committee to finish the installation in Engels one of the radio tools, taken from evacuated Kharkv, till December 3, 1941. It was specifically intended for radio broadcasts in Ukrainian and Polish (Русский архив: Великая Отечественная, 25).

Based on the above, we can state that Sovinformburo leaders faced great difficulties with recruitment: they were required language skills, experience in advocacy and personal information. The particular attention was paid to the selection of correspondents who worked with foreign newspapers and agencies.

The military propaganda held abroad, played an important role in work of the Soviet Information Bureau. Thus, the report of the Soviet Informbureau of 1941–1943 showed that this department daily controlled and supervised 22 central newspapers, all military correspondence Tass and Radio Committee, TASS pictures, publishing products. This correspondence was sent to England, USA, Sweden, Turkey and Iran, which helped to adjust direct relationships with the US military magazines (Сообщения Советского Информбюро, 1944–1945, 258–259).

The government and the main political administration of the Red Army understood that to announce the information to the public in such a way was very dangerous. Therefore, the daily combat Sovinformburo construction took a long way from the General Staff to the speaker of Radio Committee and its text was significantly changes. Sovinformburo management adhered the rules under which the loss ratio had always been in favor of the Red Army. According to these claims, the messages dated June 22–24th 1941 about the downed aircraft, mentioned that the Soviet Air Forces lost 374 aircrafts, and the Germans – 381 (Сообщения Советского Информбюро, 1944–1945, 4). On June 25th 1941 it was reported that the Soviets lost 17 aircrafts, and Germans – 76. June 30th – 21 lost Soviet aircraft and 102 German airplanes (Сообщения Советского Информбюро 1944–1945, 5). To check this data in the offices was very difficult, that's why the warriors could not understand why such large army losses were presented as a victory.

Another eloquent example proves, that the information, supplied through Sovinformburo, did not always reflect the true events that took place at the front. So, we know that during the defense of Sevastopol, compounds remains (109th Infantry Division, 142nd Infantry Brigade, 4 consolidated battalion – in total about 5.5 thousand people) under the command of Major General P.G. Novikov kept on fightings. They were not mentioned in vaults at all. In such circumstances, soldiers and officers completely lost morale. And it effected the situation on the front. Such cases were not rare. The control over events at the front was lost quite often, and whole units dropped out of sight of command, resulting their commanders to operate on their own.

The Sovinformberau message shows the relation of the command to combat groups of the the Red Army, as the Soviet troops left the Sevastopol on July 3rd, 1942, which (the message) also contained the following: “The Soviet troops losses during June 7th – July 3rd: 11385 people killed, 21099 people – wounded, 8300 – missing, 30 tanks, 300 guns, 77 airplanes. Soldiers, commanders and wounded people were evacuated from Sevastopol” (Сообщения Советского Информбюро, 1944–1945, 284). However, we know that these data was not true. In fact, according to the reports declared by P.Oktyabrsky, the Chief of the Defence of Sevastopol district, the commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Vice Admiral, to the General Headquarters on July 9th 1942, the total number of Soviet troops amounted to 130125 persons, the losses – 31068 people, injured – 17894 people, those who died in field hospitals – 1207 people. Knowing these numbers, it is easy to count the number of defenders of Sevastopol, the remained – 79956 people. Almost 80 thousand soldiers and sailors who heroically defended Sevastopol were forgotten and doomed to death (Меленберг, 200).

When Hitler’s troops almost captured Kyiv and Soviet troops retreated, there were no reports from Soviet Informbureau neither on 19th nor on 20th of September 1941 about it. All that we know about Kyiv of these days is: “During the night of September 20th 1941, our troops were fighting the enemy on all fronts”. As a result, major Kyiv residents and people from the suburbs had no time to evacuate (Меленберг, 200, 74). And later, those, who did not evacuate from the area of German occupation, were called “traitors at the national level”.

Instead, we read in the same statement about Soviet soldiers freed villages in Smolensk region from the Nazis, about Bosnia and Herzegovina that keeps on fighting between Yugoslav rebels and Italian troops, about good harvest in the Omsk region and Altai Territory and other regions of the Soviet Union (Сообщения Советского Информбюро, В 8 т. 1944–1945, 74).

Despite the messages in the government newspapers, they published articles with authors, summing up weekly news or other hostile period. They wrote about about a significant advantage of the Red Army over Nazi troops, urging the population and the soldiers of undeniable victory of the Soviet troops. As an example, an article written by A.S. Shcherbakov “Hitler deceives his people”, which was published in the newspaper “Pravda” on October 5th, 1941 and broadcasted by Sovinformburo on air (Великая Отечественная война 1941–1945: Энциклопедия, 640). The draft of the article stated: “... the loss of the Germans near Leningrad – 105 thousand”; but after revision of A.S. Shcherbakov the figure was 140 thousand. In the draft we can see: “... it was documentaly proved that during three months of war the

Germans had lost 11,100 tanks, about 13 200 guns, 10 000 aircrafts, the Red Army inflicted 3–4 times more damage to the enemy”. The final “3–4 times” were corrected to “2–3” and deleted the phrase “documentally proved” (Советское Информационное Бюро в годы Великой Отечественной войны 1999, 37). There were also removed outright expressions and some German losses were understated for 3 months of the war the Germans lost more than 11 thousand tanks, 13 thousand guns, 9 thousand aircraft and more than 3 million soldiers (Советское Информационное Бюро в годы Великой Отечественной войны, 1999, 39). It should be noted that in service in the Wehrmacht did not have so many tanks. Comparing Soviet losses to German ones, the first ones looked more optimistic: “1,128 thousand in manpower, about 7 thousand tanks, 8,9 thousand Guns, 5,316 aircrafts” (Советское Информационное Бюро в годы Великой Отечественной войны 1999, 41)

Comparing Informbureau messages to the figures of the Soviet military losses in A.S. Scherbakov records, we can conclude that digital material reports did not meet reality but consisted of propaganda purposes. All these events created the image of the invincible Soviet Army for the Soviet population, who worked behind the enemy lines or was in the zone of German occupation; the Army, which could not be defeated.

The last issue of “The Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945” encyclopedias edited by M.M. Kozlov, contains the information that the German Arm lost in November 1941 only 750 thousand people (Великая Отечественная война 1941–1945: Энциклопедия 1985, 13.). The studies of M.I. Meltyuhov shows that the Germans before the war with the Soviet Union had only 3899 tanks and 4841 aircraft (Мельтюхов 1991, 18). Thus, it appears that the article of the Soviet Information Bureau and propaganda leaders, of A.S. Scherbakov in particular, showed that German military units were destroyed almost two times more than it was in reality.

Similar technologies were also used by Nazi propaganda. Wehrmacht Supreme Command spread the information on the occupied territories about the huge losses of the Red Army and downplayed self losses at the front. This information was distorted to maintain the morale of soldiers and to hide the true figures of Wehrmacht losses on the Eastern Front. Propaganda departments made stories about “the Red Army defeat”, about the number of captured Soviet soldiers. With the help of misinformation, the enemy tried to influence the Soviet soldiers, on the population of temporarily occupied areas of the Soviet Union and the global public opinion.

To somehow counteract Nazi propaganda, the Soviet leaders launched counter-Informbureau: only during the first six months of the war there were published over 15 major materials (1941–1945. Публицистика и очерки

военных лет, 1982, 74). In its publications the Informbureau disclosed methods of counting enemy losses of Soviet tanks, planes, guns and more. The collection contains many other data that make an undeniable interest to historians.

The influence of the ideological concept of the party on the activities of the Soviet Informbureau leaders was deliberately determined. The situation of that time forced the editors and reporters to carefully follow certain rules, such as: the Soviet system – the fairest system in the world, all the Soviet – the best in the world, the Soviet people – the freest, the proletariat of other countries certainly oppressed etc. Deviation from established ideological postulates led the person, accused in it, to the rank of enemies, and then – to the repression. It happened with a group of employees of the Jewish Antifascist Committee. When its influence on the international community increased, the committee was dissolved at the end of 1948, and many employees were arrested. They spread the blame of anti-Soviet information. Military Collegium condemned 13 people to death (В комиссии Политбюро ЦК КПСС, 1989, 38).

Studying Sovinformburo work during the Great Patriotic War, we can conclude, that:

- 1) Soviet Informbureau had become a powerful tool of counter-propaganda of the Red Army and the population of the occupied territories;
- 2) the formation of an information space on the occupied territories took an important role in the activity of the Soviet Information Bureau, where all the messages were delivered in newspapers or leaflets;
- 3) Foreign political propaganda and dissemination of information “from the first hands” to the United States, Britain, Turkey and other countries was an important aspect of its activity;
- 4) the materials of Sovinformburo during hostilities served as an information and advocacy function, so that all materials tested and controlled by main political administration of the Red Army to follow the ideological and propaganda requirements.

In general, it should be noted that the materials, that indicate the activity of the main body of Soviet propaganda – the Soviet Informbureau, make it possible to expand scientific research on the World and the Great Patriotic War and answer important questions. They help to explore the methods and mechanisms of Soviet information space on the occupied territories of the German army.

Messages to the areas, temporarily occupied by German fascist invaders, were broadcasted through Ukrainian radio stations. Thus, the most popular among them was the station of Taras Shevchenko. It should be noted that the broadcast was intended mainly to working-age population of temporarily

occupied areas of the Soviet Ukraine, in particular its most active representatives – guerrillas. Broadcasting was based mainly themed, namely:

- Systematic coverage of the heroic struggle of the multinational Red Army, including sons and daughters of the Ukrainian people, who fought in its ranks for the liberation of all temporarily occupied Soviet lands from the German yoke;

- Show selfless labor on the home front, inspired by high noble aim to defeat the German invaders;

- A wide and systematic show of Stakhanov work on evacuated enterprises and collective farms, further development of Ukrainian science, culture and art in the Soviet rear;

- Show courageous struggle of Ukrainian people’s avengers – partisans behind enemy lines, unfolded under the slogan “Ukraine has always been and always will be the Soviet state”;

- Systematic coverage of the terrible Nazi hordes on the occupied Ukrainian lands, exposing their man-hating program extermination, enslavement and Ukrainian people’s transformation into German ones, the destruction of national culture and science with its historical and cultural relics (В комиссии Политбюро ЦК КПСС, 1989, 1).

Particular attention was paid to radio message created already during the war: “Soviet Ukraine”, “partisan” radio station by Shevchenko and others. These stations were used by the Soviet government as mechanisms of propaganda-agitation direction. Their activity on the occupied territories of the Nazi army was especially active (Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 23).

The overall volume of Ukrainian Radio Committee was 19 hours 35 minutes daily, which included: 6 hours 25 minutes of Moscow relaying transmissions, 12 hours 35 min of personal broadcast. The propaganda and agitation department was given 2 hours and 28 minutes per day (the rest of the time was used to create the desired mood of the population) (Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України, Фонд 1, 2).

Radio broadcast of propaganda and agitation departments was based on appearances, speeches and orders of Stalin and others. Promotion of these documents, the impact on the Soviet people on the occupied regions of Ukraine and directing them to fight against the German invaders – all these issues covered all leading positions in broadcasting.

During 1942 the department of propaganda and agitation has announced about 2 thousand papers, correspondence, individual notes, out of this amount – more than 1,500 original articles and correspondence.

The majority of radio programs were dedicated to the famous Red Army heroism, wisdom and courage of the Soviet people. In order to fulfill this task, special articles were ordered and organized the systematic performances on the radio to the people on the front. The articles were about some combat operations of units, departments, military units of the Red Army, the heroism in the fight against the German invaders. Among them there were such programs: “The power of Stalin’s prediction”, “noble, lofty goals Patriotic War”, “Infinite heroism of Sevastopol people calling on the exploits”, “In the name of the motherland”, “For you, Ukraine” and others (Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 3–4).

A large number of transfers was devoted to the Communist Party and its leaders – Lenin and Stalin. The Party was shown as the only power that organized the Soviet people in the struggle against the Nazi invaders. Such programs constantly emphasized that the Soviet people always win just because of its great leader Stalin.

On November 23rd, 1941 “Latest news” radio station resumed its activities which continued to broadcast radio programs in Ukrainian cities from Saratov. During 1942 this radio station daily broadcasted six editions of the latest news, two issues of “News from the fronts of World War II”, two issues of “guerrilla news”, two issues “the newspaper” (Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 8).

The “Ostanni Visti” newspaper was focused on such issues:

- Official reports;
- Soviet Informbureau messages;
- TASS correspondents’ and central newspapers’ messages;
- the information from abroad about struggle of oppressed peoples against Nazism, about mighty coalition of great powers – the USSR, the Great Britain, the USA;
- Message from the World War II fronts;
- News from the Soviet motherland (Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 11).

Printed and visual materials were not as operative as radio programs, and therefore could not fully perform its functions.

To defeat the enemy in the information confrontation, Chief Political Department of the Red Army also stepped up its activities in countering German advocacy attacks. On August 19th, 1941 all military councils and fronts’ chiefs were sent the directive “About the work among with the population of the occupied areas and the party-political leaders of the guerrilla movement” (Бурцев, 1981, 104). This step of the Soviet government testified that the outreach military policy factor was of great importance to defeat the

enemy. According to this directive, in the Main Political Department of the Red Army and in front political directorates there were established relevant departments, and in the political department of the army – similar departments. Their main task was to conduct information flows and propaganda among the population of the occupied areas and the guerrillas, to improve the experience of information warfare. These departments existed in the structure of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army till September 1942, and then referred to created headquarters of the guerrilla movement.

According to the directives instructions, the departments of party-political work among the people and the Red Army, which worked on Soviet territory occupied by the enemy, assigned certain responsibilities:

- to send their representatives to the enemy lines to guide the work of the occupied areas of the Soviet political management and guerrilla movement;
- to publish special literature (monuments, cards, addresses, etc.) and distribute them among the population of the occupied areas, among guerrilla groups formed by local people distribute “News from the Soviet Motherland” issued by the Chief;
- to organize daily radio broadcast for the population of the occupied areas;
- to provide central and local periodicals to the occupied areas through its daily delivery to nearby areas with specially selected people and drop it from the aircrafts to remote locations (Русский архив: Великая Отечественная, 1997, 24).

The issue of leaflets and bulletins started on August 18th, 1941 in Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian. During the war 681 different newspapers were published with a total circulation of about 510 million copies, including in Ukrainian – 112 newspapers (about 35 million copies). These types of printed campaign expressed the situation on the Soviet-German and other fronts in the Soviet rear and on the occupied territories etc. Thus, one of the bulletins dated January 22nd 1942 stated: “Dear brothers and sisters from Soviet areas, temporarily occupied by German troops! Hitler’s soldiers hide from you the fact of the defeat of German troops and spread false messages about our country. Do not believe fascist dogs!” Postcards call all learn the truth about the Red Army and the real events occurring at the front, from Soviet newspapers and leaflets (Чайковский, 1990, 301).

The bulletins contained the events, which took place in the front and in the rear of the Soviet army at this time. There was the review of foreign press about the defeat of German forces at Moscow, reports on the status of military production in the countries – allies of the USSR, the activities of the guerrillas and their subversive activities and so on (Чайковский 1990, 302).

To increase the informational confrontation and reduce the pressure of Nazi propaganda on the population in the rear and on the occupied territories, the Soviet management started the rapprochement with the Russian Orthodox Church. Stalin, realizing tremendous unifying and spiritual, ideological role of the Russian Church (and it was the outlet for the entire territory of the USSR), initiated the restoration of the patriarchate. Before this, the huge funds collected to help the church in front of armored columns, aviation equipment etc. were a motivative factor. On the first day of the war, Metropolitan Sergiy blessed the Soviet people in his message to “defense of the sacred borders of the motherland.” The next step in this policy was the closure of anti-religious periodicals. The “Union of the Godless” was also dissolved. Its editor was Yemelyan Yaroslavsky (Hubelman). In 1943 Stalin agreed to elect the patriarch. It was the Metropolitan Sergiy. Since then the church has began to actively use “moral justification for war” conducted by the Soviet Union against fascism (Советская пропаганда в годы Великой Отечественной войны, 2007, 20).

By strengthening its position in the information space, the State Defense Committee formed Command Headquarters of the partisan movement at Central Headquarters on May 30th, 1942. P.K. Ponomarenko was a head of the CPSU (b) Belarus. In accordance with the directives of the Main Political Directorate on September 28th, 1942 the Political Department was founded and connected to the Central Staff of the partisan movement, headed by B.I. Malin, the secretary of the CPSU (b). The main task of this administration was to widespread deployment of agitation and propaganda work among the population of lands temporarily occupied by the Nazis. At the same time the Political management gave orders to all its structural subdivisions to organize oral propaganda and counter-propaganda, and also publications and distribution of printed leaflets etc (Волковский, 2003, 392).

The protocols № 6–10 of the subterranean meetings of Communist Party (Bolsheviks) dated 29th January – 30th April 1943 we can see that the leaders of Bolshevik subterranean organizations performed a strong agitation and propaganda work among the population on temporarily occupied regions of Ukraine. They carried out not only the dissemination of information about the plight of the population and its slave labor, but also to ensured by the collection of materials from the occupied areas for processing and using information as a weapon against themselves as occupiers. The members of the subterranean studied, systematized these materials in order to use them for counter-propaganda (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, фонд 1, 117–124)

Not remained aloof and Komsomol governing bodies did not remain asside. The Decree of the Central Committee of Komsomol about measures of Komsomol organizations on the temporarily occupied areas we can see which activities they performed among the local population: they widely spread printed and oral propaganda aimed to strengthen the faith of young people in the victory of the Soviet Union, they increased production of leaflets on practical issues of guerrilla warfare, they popularized folk heroes, destroying traitors etc (Русский архив: Великая Отечественная, 1997, 112).

The political management of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement performed the party-political work in guerrilla groups, constantly stuffed propaganda materials, hardware behind enemy lines, sent propagandists, journalists, typists and printers, while the supply of arms was very limited.

In June 1942 to explore the experience of advocacy of all units in the structure of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, military-political propaganda Council was created, whose task was to scientifically generalize study of scientific political propaganda and on this basis identify ways and means to increase its efficiency.

On July 4th, 1942 the Council of the military-political propaganda legislated directive, which contained instructions for managing work on a specific materials and its application differentiation related to the specific characteristics of the existence of enemy units and formations. To firmly root the idea of inevitable military defeat of Nazi Germany and its allies in soldiers minds, advocates emphasized the growing strength of the Soviet Army, the intensity of the anti-Hitler coalition and boundless faith in the victory of the people of the Red Army (Волковский, 2003, 393).

The Soviet leaders made a big bet on partisan advocacy. It was due to some reasons: firstly, the partisans were more affordable to settlements that were already controlled by the Nazis; secondly, part of the guerrillas could move relatively freely along the occupied territories, introducing themselves as residents of this or that settlement. It was almost the only opportunity for the Soviet leaders to influence the local people.

For the German command guerrilla movement and the movement of resistance to Soviet territory was completely unexpected. German leaders have had to study forms of guerrilla struggle, its character already during the war.

The information space played a significant role in the activities of guerrilla units on the occupied territories, which was formed directly by the USSR government, the was aimed to influence the minds of the population on the occupied areas by German fascists.

Partisan movement for the Soviet Union, especially for the Russian people, was not a new phenomenon. It is known that in the USSR in 1920–30s a lot of work was carried out to prepare guerrilla warfare in case of a possible attack of the enemy. Hundreds of partisans of civil war were specially trained, sabotage agents developed special emphasis in case the guerrillas could make them on their own from scrap materials behind the enemy lines. But before the beginning of World War II major trained guerrillas were repressed. No one else was involved in the development of subversive technology, even the establishment of such technology was not ever raised (Салата, 2007, 71).

The formation of the guerrilla movement in this war was not provided in advance. The issue before the war was not studied at all. Soviet doctrine, as mentioned above, claimed that in case of aggression of the enemy the Soviet army could strike crushing retaliation and the enemy would be defeated yet on its territory. In 1939 this doctrine was focused not only by all the combat strength of the Red Army, but by the population of the USSR.

Only the Soviet-Finnish War, which ended in shame for the Soviet Union and significant losses proved that the use of subterranean subversive and intelligence activities and the creation of special units that would use guerrilla warfare tactics were necessary.

In fact, not only the leaders, but also the Soviet people were not prepared to conduct guerrilla warfare. Timothy Strokach words prove this fact (who was appointed a head of the Ukrainian Partisan Movement Headquarters in June 1942): “Our people morally was not prepared for possible defeat at the front, for a possible hard war, for a possible hard clandestine subversive activities in the enemy lines, which require special training” (Безсмертя. Книга Пам’яті України. 1941–1945, 2000, 222).

But despite the lack of specific experience, before November 1941 the guerrilla movement spread almost along the entire territory of Ukraine, which was occupied by German fascist invaders. The government faced the task to control the activities of guerrilla units and vector it to the support of the Red Army.

With the assistance of the Information Office, headed by Lavrentiy Beria, the occupied territories, with guerrilla groups, particularly in Ukraine, in July 1941 the information space started its formation. Its main objective was to inform the partisans with the news from the front and carry out propaganda campaign aimed at “unconscious” citizens who fell into guerrilla groups in different conditions.

With the assistance of the agency, there were developed a number of measures and mechanisms that ensure the creation of the necessary information field.

One of the most powerful tools were newspapers and radio. Thus, to provide the necessary information, the locations with the partisans were dumped a large number of newspapers from the aircraft which were published in the rear. Among them: "Partizan", "Red Partisans", "Bolshevik" and others (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, фонд 1, 40).

Ukraine party management developed measures that helped to spread the necessary information among the guerrillas and the people, who remained on the occupied lands. They included:

1) "For Soviet Ukraine" newspaper was planned to be published and dropped behind enemy lines in circulation of 100 thousand copies. In addition, till 10.11.2014 such newspapers as "Communist" and "Bolshevik" had to be published behind the enemy lines;

2) extra 28 mobile printers ("F" – 2; comrade. "K" – 2, comrade. "C2 – 2, comrade. "P" – 1, comrade. "L" – 2; comrade. "B" – 1, comrade. "B" – 1) were delivered for publications of newspapers, postcards and leaflets by Sovinformbureau till December 1st 1942. Plus extra 22 printers till January 1st 1943;

3) to deliver 30 radio stations till the end of the year;

4) to drop off the aircrafts 100 libraries to the guerrilla groups;

5) Increase the publication of leaflets, in appeal to the Ukrainian population. In November-December, it was planned to publish least 45 titles, including 10 illustrated. Most of the cards were spread among partisan groups, having created a network of agents to the distribution of newspapers and leaflets among the population. Use maximum capabilities to supply printed materials to the Right Bank regions of Ukraine;

6) to organize day-time radio broadcastings subterranean and partisan newspapers published behind enemy lines, and also for guerrilla groups;

7) to publish a series of pamphlets about the struggle of the Red Army and the guerrillas and distribute them among guerrilla groups;

8) to issue a series of small essays about life and work of the Soviet people in the cities of Moscow, Leningrad, Tula, Kalinin, Kuibyshev, Saratov and others (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, фонд 1, 47–48).

Chief Political Department of the Red Army paid particular attention to leaflets distribution: during June 1941 – November 1942 the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the CP (B) U Komsomol Central Committee and the Political Administration of South and South-Western Fronts have printed such publications for the population of Ukraine on the occupied territories:

– “Communist” newspaper – 155 issues of total circulation 1340 thousand copies;

– “Communist” leaflet-newspaper – 535 thousand copies;

– “Soviet Ukraine” newspaper – 185 issues of 435 thousand copies;

– “Soviet Ukraine” leaflet-newspaper – 120 thousand copies;

– “For Soviet Ukraine” newspaper for guerilas – 141 issues of circulation of 23 thousand copies. Totally delivered around 25 thousand copies (Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 41).

The management was worried about leaflets supply to the occupied areas of Ukraine, as they made it clear about what was really happening on the fronts and disclosed the policy of German occupation government on Ukrainian lands. The articles revealed the true plans of the enemy, its cunning plans and the criminal actions of the German administration. Most of the leaflets were left by the Red Army soldiers while retrograding. There were 25 issues in total of total circulation of more than 26100 thousand copies. Among them – 10 issues of illustrated leaflets, they were more attractive to the population of the occupied territories. Their circulation was 10 000 thousand copies. A considerable number of leaflets were dropped from airplanes – 140 issues of total circulation of 251616500 copies (Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 42).

The main Political Directorate of the Red Army the leaders of guerrilla groups organized systematic permanent notification of the population on the occupied regions of Ukraine about the domestic and international position of the USSR; spoke about active and productive work of Soviet citizens in the rear, spread the Nazi propaganda, printed articles, wrote correspondence and other materials which later spread in the rear of the German invaders (Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 26). There were various leaflets’ headlines: the situation at the front, Nazi atrocities, appeal to different segments of the population, exposing traitors etc.

Thus, the Soviet government has made every effort to control mood and behavior of the population, especially on the occupied territories. Newspapers and leaflets had become a necessary means of maintaining information space, which was formed in those regions with the help of the developed countries and the leaders of the Communist Party of methods and technologies.

The proof of such policy of the Government is the memories of O. Saburov, the “Hercules” partisan unit Commissioner: “In the first weeks of the war partisans had only small homemade receivers. With the help of them, partisans listened to “Latest news from Moscow”, then copied by hand and distributed among the population”.

The proof of the management and contents of radio programs, which were in air for guerrillas and the population on the occupied territories, was radio inquiry about managing radio programs for partisan newspapers, propagandists and agitators of guerrilla groups of Ukraine. The document stated that radio programs contained:

- Materials, which described the situation at the front. Special messages of Soviet Informbureau, data about losses of Nazi forces; the morale state of the German army and armies of German allies;

- Materials, which characterized the situation in the Soviet rear: increase the production of weapons, ammunition, food (factories, farms); Soviet people's patriotic movement; unity of the Soviet front and rear;

- Information about Ukrainian guerrillas military actions and other occupied territories;

- A commented information from abroad. Chronicles of the anti-Nazi struggle of the peoples of the occupied European countries by Nazi Germany;

- Articles which reveal the lies of Nazi propaganda, leaflets for publication in partisan detachments (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, фонд 1, 11).

There was also founded "Guerrilla truth" newspaper, which included printed materials, broadcasted by the Soviet Informbureau which were later distributed among the partisan units and people on the occupied territories (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, фонд 1, 7–9).

For example, S. Kovpak union raided from the Bryansk forests to the Right-Bank of Ukraine. Going in the raid, the guerrillas preparing a huge number of leaflets with pictures, which were in their possession (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, фонд 1, 13).

Commissioners of guerrilla groups and political instructors often conducted interviews by their own with local people. Sometimes partisans hung leaflets in villages conquered by the Nazis directly on their windows for ads. The invaders did quickly notice that it was not their newspapers (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, фонд 1, 15–16). These "tricks" of the guerrillas made it possible to disseminate the information in the most remote parts of the occupied territory.

One of the commissioners of guerrilla group proved that they often spread information that refuted the provocative materials in response to a provocation of German newspaper.

A special theme was developed in all newspapers which were published for the guerrillas. For example, front-line journalist Georgy Rzhанov said: "Guerrillas listened to Moscow. They have known about news of intensified guerrilla movement throughout Ukraine from messages of the Soviet

Informbureau, about the establishment of the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement at the Supreme Command, which would conduct this movement. Almost every night guerrillas listened to special programs created for them and the population of the occupied territories” (Салата, 2007, 74).

In the first place the Soviet Informbureau issued latest messages. Anchormen announced morning and evening live arches to partisans. Then, there were messages “The last time”. Sometimes it was possible to broadcast the material which could wind up the Nazi propaganda.

Along with the official reports of the Soviet Informbureau they tried to give the best information about the guerrillas, which appeared in the national press and in which their activities were positively characterized by population on temporarily occupied territories.

Broadcasting all necessary information to partisan newspapers fully justified itself (Радио в дни войны, 1975, 52).

At the beginning of the war, with the assistance of guerrilla groups there were published 270 subterranean books! The usual place of publishing office: house, vehicle or just a shelter in forest, turning into a kind of club – cell of concentration and distribution of information. Farmers and the youth from the surrounded villages came with the guerrillas to read the latest reports from the war fronts (Радио в дни войны, 1975, 53).

In addition, leaflets were replicated in many partisan groups. For example, according to incomplete data, in S. Kovpak group during the second half of 1942 there were published 900 thousand copies, and in groups A.Saburov and A. Fedorov – 800 thousand and 400 thousand copies (Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 28–29).

Thus, we see that one of the priorities in the activities of the guerrillas was campaigning and advocacy on temporarily occupied territories. It included: preparation of wall newspaper, leaflets; dissemination of information broadcast by the Soviet Information Bureau; hanging leaflets, slogans, appeals on the trees in the forest. They criticized the false reports of Nazi propaganda, and others (Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 36).

Political control was given instructions for the organization of “Soviet Ukraine” radio station to the population of the occupied territories of Ukraine and the guerrillas who operated deep behind enemy lines. In June 1941 the Political Berau of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine legislated resolution about the format and frequency of issued “Communist” and “Soviet Ukraine” papers. Subsequently there was legislated about the format and frequency of such publications as “Komsomolets Ukraine”, “Stalin tribe” and others (Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України, фонд 1, 28).

In order to strengthen the activities of Soviet agitators and propagandists, the circulation of "People's agitators" magazine was increased from 120 thousand copies to 150 thousands. In this magazine soviet propagandists could find detailed instructions of the methods and techniques of propaganda and informational influence on masses in general and on individual in particular (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, фонд 1, 2).

There were systematically organized special programs which had the task to convey the experience of guerrilla warfare to some other units (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, фонд 1, 17).

A powerful tool for partisan political education and increase of their responsibility to the people was military oath regarding hard work on strengthening discipline and organization in groups and education of hatred for the invaders (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, фонд 4620, 179).

Various forms of verbal propaganda were widely used. According to numerous memoirs of participants of guerrilla warfare, the forms of work were sufficiently well-known: there were mass meetings in the liberated villages, conversations of partisan agitators, intermittent rallies and meetings during combat conversion unit.

In these cases guerrilla units used forms of political work, customary for Soviet people, such as rallies, demonstrations and even military parades in the days of revolutionary holidays. For example, the resonant response took place in Dubovichy village during parade on February 23rd 1942 by Putivly combined detachment (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, фонд 4620, 180–181). A large number of local residents took part in parade. This action demonstrated support to the Soviet regime.

According to the decree of Defense Commissar of the USSR dated September 5th 1942 "About the tasks of the guerrilla movement", to the decree of CPSU (b) dated October 2nd 1942 and to the decree of the State Defense Committee of the USSR dated November 11th 1942, Partisan groups of A.F. Fedorov, A. Saburov, S.A. Ковпак, K.S. Melnik etc. were spread published newspapers and leaflets, which were distributed among local people. O. Saburova squad had published more than 102 titles of newspapers, leaflets, newsletters by total circulation of 156,183 copies (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, фонд 4620, 18–23).

During 1942 CC CP (B) U and political department of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts have delivered 222 million copies of different publishings behind the enemy lines in total. Most of the printed materials had little impact (Ивлев, 1988, 58).

Only in January 1943 they have sent 13 kinds of leaflets to the occupied territories of Ukraine.

During the whole war they were distributed about 400 million newspapers, leaflets, appeals and other printed materials on the territory of Ukraine.

Equally active was publishing in Crimea, where the information space was in quite tough conditions. Here, since May 1942 to February 1943 there were published 35 issues of the newspaper "Red Crimea" total circulation of 735 copies. They were sent to the rear of the enemy (Ивлев, 1988, 61).

For the manufacture and distribution of printed propaganda directly into the units there were delivered 56 portable printers (including 21 body printers). During short-term typing courses there were taught 37 people (later 8 people were sent in to the front). 350 libraries, mobile cinema unit (which could serve more than 10 thousand people) were packaged and shipped to guerrilla.

Since November 1942 till April 1943 103 issues of leaflets have been published in Ukrainian. Total circulation was about 8100 thousand copies. 1980 thousand copies of magazines and 300 thousand of brochures ("Communist", "Soviet Ukraine", "Sovetskaya Ukraina", "For Soviet Ukraine") were also published (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, фонд 4620, 24).

To distribute the necessary information, the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) outlined such tasks to the leaders of guerrilla groups:

- 1) to deliver 50 portable printers to guerrilla groups;
- 2) to organize broadcasting the information for the newspapers, flyers and other printed publications on the temporarily occupied Soviet lands through "Soviet Ukraine" and "T. Shevchenko" radio stations;
- 3) to increase the publication of leaflets for different social groups with a call to go to and strengthen the guerrilla fighting against the German invaders;
- 4) periodically to dispatch active guerrilla groups for meetings, lectures and reports to partisan detachments.

To fulfill task list on the activities of Ukraine guerrilla groups, CPSU (b) requests to allocate Ukrainian Partisan Movement Headquarters:

- Weapons, ammunition, clothing, equipment, medicines and food;
- Radio of the following types: "RAO" – 1 pc. "RAF" – 2 pcs., "Jack" – 30 pcs., "Sever" – 100 pcs., "CA-I" – 100 pcs., "RPM" – 25;
- The receiving equipment such as: "Seagull" – 5 pcs., "Hamer-Lund" – 3 pcs., "A-5" – 5 pcs.;
- 50 pieces of portable printers (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, фонд 4620, 53–54).

As noted above, lectures, conversations and other forms of communication with the people who carried out the guerrillas played an equally important role in the information space created on the occupied territories. So, judging by reports,

in Sumy, there were held 698 meetings, attended by 73 thousand people, organized by members of guerrilla groups. In July-August 1943 there were held 392 meetings in 104 towns, under command of A. Saburov in 104 towns, which attended more than 40 thousand people (Богатырь, 1963, 263).

In 1944 the activists of the 1st Ukrainian partisan division had more than 1600 meetings in political topics with the residents of Rivne, Volyn and Lviv regions. Activists unions under the command of M.V. Taratuto in September 1943 – February 1944 have organized 1100 interviews. The guerrillas under command of S.O. Olesiyenko covered more than 900 settlements in 36 regions of Zhytomyr, Kamenez-Podolsk, Rivne, Ternopil and Volyn regions (Григорович, 1983, 89).

The propaganda activities of guerrilla groups was directed not only against the Nazi army. The Ukrainian national movement was also its ideological opponent on the occupied territories. According to the famous historian J. Armstrong, Soviet partisans opposed the Ukrainian national movement, searched for information about the Ukrainian conscious, preparing various provocations, eliminated a number of Ukrainian patriots. Since 1942 each squad of Soviet partisans had a special department of the NKVD, later called “SMERSH”. One of the major tasks of partisan movement in Ukraine was the disruption of life of local civilians struggle with nationalist forces that spontaneously arise during people’s resistance to invaders and operated without the control of the Soviet government (Armstrong, 1964, 29–32).

Wehrmacht management faced extremely difficult tasks on the occupied territories. Its main reason was constant counteractions of Soviet information flows. Forming the information space on the occupied territories of the USSR, the Nazi management leadership, on the one hand, had to justify and disguise the colonial policy, which was based on exploitation, hunger and mass murders, and on the other – had to stimulate the occupied areas for cooperation. German propaganda was based on anti-Semitism, and Bolshevism and on the opposition of individual nations and nationalities of the Russian people. As the Wehrmacht management paid great attention to the information during the war, enemy propaganda was well organized and the number of the invaders increased. Even despite the fact that the Soviet government also used the various campaign activities, the number of defectors during the 1943–1944 still remained high. Thus, according to the historian L. Naumov, the number of prisoners amounted to 994 thousand people, and those, who was considered deserters – 376 thousand people. Overall, he estimated, 1.8 million people returned from captivity (among them wounded and injured) (Наумов, 1996, 429–435). As to the population of the temporary occupied territories, the German information space had almost no support.

Hunger, exploitation, deportation, persecution and mass extermination of Jews and representatives of other nations left no illusions about the future structure of social life. People were increasingly convinced that to survive in combat was more real than to serve for the Wehrmacht

Wehrmacht leaders believed that people's emotional state played an important role in the dissemination of any information, which finally led to the formation of commitment to the new government.

According to psychologists, an emotional injection was necessary to maintain a permanent human interest in propaganda, and to make information more easy to remember, to penetrate into very consciousness. The het-up person carries out rash acts much easier. This is what mainly pushed for the leaders of the Third Reich. In addition, very emotional excitement alters human behavior, even daily one. As a rule, a person can feel the body mobilizing, the surge of power. These forces were successfully used by politicians of both totalitarian states, skillfully guiding them to the proper direction (Горун, 2004, 25).

The Soviet government struggled to create powerful information space on the occupied territories. Although official propaganda was not fully trusted by the population, true-to-life stories seemed to be told by farmers from the occupied areas. They were sent to the villages, not yet occupied by Hitler, to tell stories about their life during the Nazi occupation, so they could call on farmers to greater diligence during harvesting.

The German army, as already noted, measured its success or failure by the number of defectors. Reports of many agencies were filled with figures showing the growth of production, an increase in personnel, materials, vehicles, media etc. At the same time, Soviet propaganda industry did not provide a sufficient number of equipment, materials and personnel. For example, only reporters from "Red Star" newspaper and "News" governmental newspaper possessed aircrafts. The Central Committee did not inform TASS about editors' mistakes. TASS device was extremely ineffective. Sometimes it took months for the device to make decisions, but not minutes as it had to be (Советская пропаганда в годы Великой Отечественной войны, 2007, 32).

In total, in November 1943 – January 1944 in Donbas, there were published 34 newspapers, which attracted best propaganda promoters to work on the publishing office. Particular attention was paid to the materials that reflected the political topicality. Local departments of the Communist Party carried out an active mobilization of party organizations, communists and Komsomol members at the elimination of Nazi propaganda (Державний архів Вінницької області, фонд Р-6022. 28).

Thus, in terms of World War II, there was formed information space on the whole territory occupied by the German army – Reich Commissariat “Ukraine” and in the area of military administration and throughout the Soviet Union, by the Communist party leaders and the government with the help of specially developed methods. Its main task was to keep the faith of the population in communist ideas, by any plea unite the people to fight against the Nazi invaders, destroy-insurrectional subterranean formation, which, although opposed the invaders, but constituted a great danger to the Soviet regime.

A considerable information flow was aimed at guerrillas and people on the occupied territories. Soviet government and the Communist Party managed to develop strong mechanisms and means of information dissemination and its transformation into information space. Guerrilla groups were mainly used more as a means to spread necessary information to the population of the occupied territories and as a tool to combat enemy forces and the regime and all entities whose ideas contradicted the current communist regime. Despite a great amount of losses, the results of the war shows, that these methods were very effective.

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