

SECTION 2.3.

TECHNOLOGIES AND METHODS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INFORMATION POLICY OF BOTH COUNTRIES IN THE TERRITORY OF UKRAINE

The 20-th century was the period when informational propaganda was actively used in political, economic and military spheres. During this period the totalitarian states sought to create a single common information space controlled by the country's leadership.

Concepts such as “information war”, “information aggression”, “information security” as it was known originated during World War II and the Great Patriotic War. There was a close connection of mass media with conflict situations. It should be noted that in armed conflicts a fight on an information field seemed not to be less important than directly military operations.

In our opinion the change in the information and military sphere took place just on the eve of World War II. The German military command has repeatedly stated that the cause of the defeat was not only the courage of the Soviet soldiers and the population but also influence on the consciousness of the mass media of both states as the U.S.S.R. and Germany. Then the existence of “information and psychological ensuring fighting” was recognized necessary to form through media public opinion that any military operations found support among its population. Methods practically do not differ from usual signs “public relations”. It is known to be the creation of quantitative and qualitative own point of view of advantage in media and the introduction of steady associations, schemes, myths that meet the interests of information campaign organizer. It was also applied by the Nazi government of Germany already during World War II and in occupied territories.

In the U.S.S.R. and Germany there were qualified personnel in the field of propaganda. It should be noted also, as that increased the experience far before coming to power. For example, political circles of the USA noted that Bolsheviks of 1918 carried out a great influence on the population of the Russian Empire. So, the Ukrainian army which totaled one million people under the influence of Bolshevik propaganda was demobilized within two months (Камінський, Дашкевич, 1998, 121). The Russian political scientist Mr. Pocheptsov explains the fact that “the slogans of Bolsheviks reflected the

interests of fighters of the Ukrainian army which consisted of vast majority of ordinary peasants. They wanted to work on earth in peaceful conditions” (Почепцов, 2001, 66).

In the military-political concept of Hitler’s Germany attention was paid the creation of information space not only in their own country but also in Europe and the territories of other countries occupied by the German army that

Thus, so that political concept, military strategy and tactics developed by the Hitler’s leadership of Germany would be realized it was necessary to exert a powerful information pressure on the German population space, first of all, and then the population of the territories occupied by German fascist army.

How the Nazi leadership of Germany understood the role of information and information space? It is possible to say with confidence. that they understood. Experience of flippant attitude information and propaganda led Germany to defeat in World War I. Therefore on the eve of World War II Hitler and his entourage paid much attention to the formation of propaganda bodies and information influence across the vertical of military and political leadership. It is proved by documents that the financial oligarchy of Germany financed the propaganda campaigns of Nazis.

In the 20–30s of the 20-th century the international community, in particular, Great Britain and the USA, already owned methods and technologies of impact on the consciousness of the population and its behavior. They created own information space using advanced communication technologies of that time.

Today, as well as seventy-five years ago, information space is, first of all, the sum of difficult information technologies which are a basis and the defining component of an industrial and economic complex of transnational communities which influence formation of world outlook processes in society (Shreyder, “the theory of communications”) (Шрейдер, Шаров, 1982, 71).

There are general models of influence within propaganda and counter-propaganda. They represent a modification to an information field to obtain results of their change in real living floor space. Such information field is used for the solution of social, political, economic, military tasks. Information space has particular importance during the war. For example, the fascist leadership of Germany during 1941–1944 understood the role of information which impacted on the consciousness of the population and and their willingness to fight.

From the very beginning of the political activities A., Hitler and the leadership of fascist Germany paid much attention to information impact on the mentality of the person. Having analyzed consequences of World War I they concluded that information, propaganda weighs not a less powerful in comparison with

well-armed army. Having come to power for the first time Nazis applied information impact on the population of other countries. At first, it influenced the population of Germany, then the European countries. A powerful information, and psychological influence laid down on the population of occupied territories of the USSR. Information influence was carried out by various methods. Information extended through news agencies, radio, including also that were located abroad through the German correspondents working in the different countries through foreign newspapers; by holding exhibitions in Germany and abroad; in the course of implementation of cultural exchange with the friendly countries in science, art, sport. (Панарин, 2006, 156).

A. Hitler noted that in the researches concerning political events he was always interested in propaganda activity more. "... To what extreme results propaganda can bring, it is correctly used, it was necessary to wish passionately only during the war of it. Unfortunately, everything needed to be studied in other directions as results of the activity of politicians were very "modest". It is necessary to refuse completely an old education system for the German soldiers and to deal more persistently with propaganda issues" (Hitler, 1953, 141). These words of Hitler demonstrate that he understood the need to use a propaganda, moreover. He sought to change an education system and education of Germany including military education to create such information space which would direct the activity of all the population of Germany and army to a victory.

Hitler considered that propaganda had to be the best means to influence people. "Propaganda – the fight tool, and in hands of the person who well knows this business, – the most terrible weapon. The propaganda has to be turned to masses. The art of propaganda is in forcing people to believe that this or that fact exists. The art of propaganda is to understand the feelings of broad masses. National feeling simple and monotonous. The people speak yes or no. Truth or lie! The people argue rectilinearly. The susceptibility of masses is very limited, the circle of her understanding is narrow, but the forgetfulness is very high" (Макаревич, 1993, 63).

For that time technologies of information space being formed on the ideological principles not only used by the Hitler's government. The Soviet Union where the ideology and mechanisms of its introduction were extremely developed was the most powerful in this regard. The methods and mechanisms were developed by the government of the Communist Party which controlled information flow both in the USSR and beyond its limits made society undoubtedly closed.

In considering an arsenal of means and mechanisms of information space and concrete methods of impact on public consciousness we could analyze the

basis of method's transition from simple and primitive forms to more difficult and graceful ones.

The method of psychological impact on the population of occupied territories, guerrillas, fighters and officers of the Red Army was one of the mechanisms which played an extremely important role in the formation of information space.

As a famous Russian political scientist V. Krysko thinks "the social systems of government are carried out through providing information and psychological impact on the object" (Крысько, 1999, 121).

Psychological influence is a way to influence on people (on certain individuals and groups). It is directed to change of ideological and psychological structures of their consciousness and subconsciousness, the transformation of emotional states, stimulation of certain types of behavior with the use of various ways of the obvious and hidden psychological coercion. Complex using of various ways of the hidden psychological compulsion of people in the form of the system of psychological operations, various propaganda campaigns is considered to be widespread means of political struggle, in particular, during the war (Прокофьев, 1999, 97–99).

During active fights and occupation of a part of the territory of the USSR psychological influence seemed to be existed by various methods and the main means wholly. They affected consciousness and subconsciousness of the population. Firstly, there were actually psychological methods as belief, suggestion, informing, encouragement, coercion, punishment, example method. Secondly, psychological impact was carried out with attraction of military means. Thirdly, the adverse psychological climate among the population of occupied territories which undermined the credibility of the enemy. Such as special forms of psychological influence were used: verbal, publishing, graphic, broadcasting forms.

So, at once from the beginning of the war against the USSR the Supreme Command of Wehrmacht issued "The Directive for Front Propagandists". In it it was emphasized that "in planning propaganda actions on the enemy it is necessary to define accurately what purpose of propaganda campaigns will be; a circle of people to perform these actions; place and area of the forthcoming actions; main methods of influence and main theses; technical means of distribution of information materials; optimum time of holding propaganda campaigns. In the Directive the basic principles of propaganda impact on the enemy were represented:

1. "It is not necessary to use difficult, tangled, artificially constructed designs. The more simply, more clearly, contents, higher its efficiency.

2. The person naturally is an emotional subject, therefore, it is much more effective to address her feelings.

3. Propaganda's texts have to be logically thought over but they are not necessarily logically stated.

4. Repetition is an important mechanism of propaganda. Successful propaganda is necessary to adhere to a thesis until conditions of a psychological situation change.

5. It is very important to make use of already existing experience for an increase in efficiency of front propaganda" (Крысько, 1999, 125–126).

As far as the principles of information propaganda in the USSR there were ideological and political restrictions to use information space.

It was the prerogative of the Soviet government. It was brightly shown in information processes that took place in the Soviet society. That's no doubt that there was the characteristic phenomenon for any totalitarian political regime of the 20-th century.

Without seeking to absolutize the value of information control in the formation of totalitarianism we will note that the great influence on its formation was made by various factors Including direct state violence, traditions of the Russian statehood, etc. However, information monopoly attempts to establish control over processes that proceeded in society. And this fact happened to have played a significant role in the tragic period of 1941–1944 in the history of the U.S.S.A.

According to plans of A. Rosenberg who sought to use the population of occupied territories of the USSR, in particular of Ukraine in fight against Bolshevist Russia, there was put a question to create the information space before the Ministry of National Education and Propaganda, the Ministry of East Occupied Territories and Head Department of Imperial Safety of Germany.

It's important to study the main directions defining the information space of Hitler's Germany in occupied territories of the Ukrainian SSR and mechanisms and methods applied the government of the Reich to the distribution of the power.

On occupied territories the Department of Military Propaganda of Wehrmacht which coordinated the main propaganda strategy with Goebbels dealt with problems of military propaganda. The ministry of national education and propaganda became the largest and most influential authority authorized to control all other ministries.

At the headquarters of the Supreme main command of Wehrmacht in April 1939, the Department of Propaganda was created. In its structure there were special military units as propaganda companies. According to Instruction No. 51/39 to their competence, the solution of the following tasks entered: conducting propaganda among the German population and the military

personnel, conducting propaganda in a front-line zone and among troops of the opponent. By the beginning of World War II, the Wehrmacht already had at the order 14 companies of propaganda (Панарин, 2006, 157).

Propaganda companies were staffed with persons who had to own equally well as journalistic (literary, radio – photo or cinema) skills, and any military weapon. The last circumstance was an especially a great value when publicizing actions of pilots, tankmen, seamen of torpedo boats, etc. As, for example, the crew of the warplane was not able to afford the luxury to take aboard any superfluous the person who would be only the observer of events which took place. But at the same time, it was not necessary to imagine a business in such a way that companies of propaganda worked only in shooting and other divisions. Each company of propaganda was applied to the whole army. The military personnel of these companies acted individually or as a part of compact groups. They were located far from other direct employees on service.

Companies of propaganda were designed to serve not only mass media of the Reich but also “to carry on propaganda directly in parts and connections of Wehrmacht, to provide psychological processing of troops and the population of the opponent...” (Орлов, 1985, 31).

“Till June 22, in general, there were 19 companies of propaganda (the twelfth ground forces, the fourth the Air Force, 3 companies in the fleet and 6 platoons of war correspondents in Troops of CC). Besides, each of the three groups of armies (“North”, “Center”, “South”) had besides also on a battalion of propaganda. They were engaged in the edition of newspapers, conducting radio-propaganda, display of movies...” (Жуков, 2000, 7).

After an attack of the German army on the Soviet Union also the population of occupied territories of the USSR fell within the scope of their propaganda. Such changes in the activity of companies of propaganda are explained by the fact that their divisions had amplified and became an almost independent type of military force since 1943. This authority was under the observation of the Ministry of national education and propaganda. Propaganda companies used leaflets, newspapers as a form of propaganda (Панарин, 2006, 283).

Instructions were developed by Department of the Ministry of East Occupied Territories. They determined the content of information and propaganda activity of structures of Wehrmacht in the territories of the Ukrainian SSR occupied with fascist army. they pursued the next aims: ensuring moral and psychological impact on local population by political and cultural propaganda by means of the press, broadcasting and cinema; implementation of propaganda campaigns which had to influence moods of

the population for the benefit of the Reich and the German administration on places; information and cultural support of the troops which are in a zone of activity of propaganda structures (Дашичев, 1973, 196).

In the occupied territories of the USSR in the structure of the Ministry of the Press and Propaganda headed by the major Kranz there was created so-called “Russian committee” under the direction of the imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs Ribentrop in the summer of 1942.

Thus, in the East propaganda and the press in which there were the main mechanisms of formation of information space, organizationally were under supervision at once of several structures which were on hand directly Wehrmacht and to Rosenberg’s ministry, and indirectly – to the Ministry of National Education and Propaganda and a number of other Nazi departments. In different territories the level of propaganda activity it was not identical. It, of course, could not but affect its efficiency. The propaganda of Wehrmacht differed in the greatest “irrelevance” and illegibility. The crucial importance as its products fell into hands of the population and enemy quicker than any other was attached to it. Cards and posters for distribution among the population of occupied territories were made rather skillfully and quickly. At the same time, not all soldiers of Wehrmacht supported methods that were applied by their government against civilians and it complicated a propaganda campaign. (Жуков, 2000, 8).

A total number of these troops of propaganda during the period from June 1941 to April 1942 was about 15 thousand People whereas the average contingent of “a propaganda company” made – 115 people (Орлов, 1985, 132).

Distribution of the German press, leaflets, holding small conversations among the population of occupied territories was the main objective of companies of propaganda: “The power of the Third Reich”, “Only Germany will help Ukraine to get rid of Bolshevik slavery”, “Work in Germany makes the Soviet person cultural” and many others.

It will be interesting to consider examples of propaganda leaflets which were distributed by members of propaganda companies in the occupied territory of Ukraine of 1941:

“Peasants and workers!

Who Adolf Hitler?

Ask about it the German soldier who exempted your homeland from Bolshevik animals!

Ask about it the German worker to whom he gave work, bread, and wellbeing again, that is all that it was deprived earlier...

Ask about it the German peasant who can leave the earth in inheritance to the son and the grandson now... And all of them will answer you:

Adolf Hitler is the embodiment of force, power, kindness, justice...” (Гогун, 2004, 345).

Analyzing such pathos cards and appeals it should be noted that very few people from inhabitants of occupied territories trusted them. But a difficult life, especially the Ukrainians, and belief that other best living conditions could have been created a good basis for fascist propaganda.

In preparation for a propaganda campaign, special attention was paid into the training of the German agents and the foreign organizations of the National Socialist Party. So, for example, for propaganda in the Soviet Union agents from among the former Russian citizens who were for one reason or another forced to leave before the war the USSR prepared. Under the leadership of national socialists they prepared analytical materials for bodies of propaganda, defined weaknesses of the Soviet society, developed recommendations on information and psychological impacts on the staff of the Soviet Army and the population of the areas occupied by fascist army taking into account national psychological peculiarities, traditions and culture (История ВКП(б), 1938, 317).

The use of the former Soviet citizens was caused by the realization of the purpose of Wehrmacht to demoralize the Soviet Army and to give the population of occupied territories to full disappointment in the Bolshevik mode. Not only cards but also periodic material prepared for this purpose and used: books, photos, movies, put on the Soviet political figures). At the same time information of the Soviet newspapers issued in a borderland, large-circulation editions of the enterprises and the departmental periodical press appearing big circulations, broadcasts, etc. was exposed to processing. Since the end of 1940, the leadership of Hitlerite Germany begins to show great attention to the internal life of the Soviet Union, trains agents already from among the German experts for obtaining important information on the economic and political situation of the USSR (История ВКП(б) 1938, 317 – 318).

Carrying out the task, bodies of propaganda were guided developed by department of propaganda of Wehrmacht and given out in the first half of June, 1941 “By instructions on implementation of propaganda during implementation of the plan Barbarossa”. “Instructions...” defined organizational, political, psychological bases of activity of bodies of propaganda and contained ideological and political installations. Among them were also such: an enemy of Germany is not the people of the Soviet Union but only “yids-Bolshevist” with the functionaries and the Communist Party; the German Wehrmacht came not as the enemy of civilians, it, on the contrary, seeks to exempt them from tyranny of Councils; each attempt of resistance will be ruthlessly suppressed; it is not allowed to propaganda to

nominate the idea of creation of the national states (disintegration of the Soviet Union to the certain states) for the economic reasons dissolution of collective farms it is not planned yet (История ВКП(б), 1938, 317).

Information and psychological impact on the population of occupied territories from the Hitler's government were periodically weakened because the Soviet power also applied not less effective propaganda, military, police and psychological remedies.

From the very first days of the war Soviet leadership created organizational and information mechanisms that complicated the activity of the occupational guide to the introduction of own ideological and political theories and strengthened the information and ideological field which already worked at the territory of Ukraine. The information and ideological field which was created in Ukraine by Soviet leadership was used for impact on the consciousness of the population, introducing the socialist ideas and propagandizing hatred to everything the capitalist world.

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the ideological sphere of the USSR had already become a core of the Soviet information space being formed in the country. Methods that were applied by the government of the All-Union and Communist Party (bolshevik's) were considered by Party's leadership on places the most effective. Although many ideological campaigns looked absurd and compromised the existing way of life in public consciousness. It is interesting that such methods suppressed a considerable part of the Soviet people, estimated operations of ideologists of the Communist Party, characterized them as absolute nonsense (Цыбмал, 1995, 35).

Despite the activity and importance of the Soviet propaganda, nevertheless, a considerable part of the population understood what happened in the state and could analyze consciously events and realities of the Soviet life.

Despite of it, the traditional direct way of psychological impact on consciousness which relied on the belief of people was one of the methods used by Hitler's administration in occupied territories of Ukraine and it was turned to their mind. Rational arguments, logic were applied. This method was used by both the Hitler's administration, and the Soviets.

Let's take an example of this method in the USSR. The application of rational arguments of logic was characteristic of Marxism where the thesis "life was the starting point of an explanation defines consciousness". At the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the country appeared before a terrible accident: danger of loss of statehood and transformation of the population into slaves. At the same time the society was driven to extreme despair by own government and its policy of collectivization, repressions against "enemies of

the people” and Famine-Genocide. Despite of it, the leadership of the USSR and Soviet Ukraine, in particular, understood that it was necessary to fight back the enemy and not to allow occupation of the country by the fascist army. And as the major task in this context was the idea to build such information space in which everyone realized need to save the socialist homeland and its gains.

A necessary component of carrying out such explanatory work turned to the reason for people and consciousnesses was an accounting of real conditions. At the same time, it is important to understand the distribution of forces, the real interests of people to carry out the analysis. At the same time it was necessary to consider a condition of public consciousness, that was to give accurate, noticeable, clear slogans: “Our right cause! The enemy will be broken! The victory will be for us” and “All for the front, all for a victory!” and others. A characteristic example – events of civil war, we will remember Furmanov’s “Mutiny”: “How to take it in hand, this rebellious crowd? it is necessary to act firmly, surely as strong and without the slightest concessions, fluctuations. This the first: firmly and without being given generally. And the second not to release for one moment from under an inquisitive look all crowd, together with observing it from all directions and in all manifestations... thirdly, here that: know, then there lives the crowd: the most essential knowledge in its interests. and in them speak... Then, fourthly look on faces, all in eyes, catches at proper words, guess on movements... If did not strike the right note, business was gone... in – the last, so to speak, on separation олько two words: when no measures and means help... – I will descend from a tribune, from a barrel, from a box, all the same from what, I will descend as safely as ascended there... perishes under fists and butts, the agitation. So did that and from your death, there was an advantage” (Фурманов, 1985).

The principles of accounting of a real situation were widely used also by leaders of Nazi Germany. The characteristic example is given in the book by M.I. Burtsev “Enlightenment” devoted to propaganda fight against the fascist army in 1941–1945 Hitler then told: “We brought up youth against which the whole world, youth rough, exacting, cruel” (Бурцев, 1981, 24).

But in that time the cruelty generated another feeling. The German soldier was sentimental. He thought about the future of his family and he did not understand for what future he would have to die. The Soviet card with the image of the snow-covered field, corpses of the German soldiers became the proof of it for them, already froze, and on this background close up the child, cries; and under the drawing only three words: “Fater ist tod” (“The father is killed”). Most of the German soldiers held in hand this card as the admission

in captivity (Кочергин, Коган, 1980, 20). As we see, this method was a very effective tool in the belief of soldiers of Wehrmacht.

In the period of the Great Patriotic War both sides paid a lot of attention to the distribution of leaflets in the back of own army and temporarily occupied territory. The Soviet leadership understood that at the front soldiers did not less need for cartridges, clothes, food, resting. They waited for information and moral support. This fact seemed to define moral of soldiers.

The maintenance of such cards and posters caused the Ukrainians to dump Bolshevik domination and to support the German army in the release of their territory. The posters and the cards, told about what merciful German soldiers to children, etc. (Немецкая пропаганда на территории СССР, 2013).

Placing differently semantic accents in several leaflets devoted to the same question both the German and Soviet propaganda managements considered psychological features of various groups of the military personnel and the civilian population of the opponent. Printing registration of a card promoted strengthening its emotional actions. Reproduction in leaflets of photos, copies of official documents increased their persuasiveness. Contents of the leaflet consisted most concisely so that it was easily perceived even at forcedly fast reading. Thanks to a small format, it was easy to be hidden, transferred, kept as the admission in captivity.

For drawing up cards and other types of propaganda by the German propaganda structures various methods and receptions were used. Rational arguments when for explanatory work the real interests of people and public consciousness, in this case, this population of occupied territories was used and his desire to live and to manage freely in the independent country was applied.

Granting selective information was the following important method which was applied by the Nazis. It was formulated by simple phrases and repeated many times. Thus, the person subconsciously absorbed this information. The card which was released in April 1943 agitated for a transition to the party of Germans and the introduction in the Russian liberation army. It was used such method when its name repeated in the leaflet of 12 times (Лисичкин, 2005, 41–43).

A large number of propaganda materials for strengthening of ideas of “a liberating mission” of the German army was given by the Ministry of National Education and Propaganda together with the Ministry of East Occupied Territories. The whole series of cards were directed to discredit the leaders of the Soviet state and the command structure of the Red Army. Among them, there were cards about Stalin and his government (Горун, 2004, 64–65).

In the first months of the war in Kyiv, the *Ukrainskoye Slovo* newspaper, (later “A new Ukrainian word”) which editor was K. Shtepa was issued. The newspaper had to cover all events which positively reflected the activity

of the German occupying authority and “to expose” Bolshevik policy. Along with political messages and publications articles about the cultural life of Kyiv and the policy of the German authorities were published in the newspaper (Верба, 1999, 27–29).

To strengthen a negative impression about the activity of the Soviet government, the Nazis government distributed comical images. They were also in local newspapers, and on cards. So in the “Volyn magazine” there was the caricature where Bolsheviks was shown as a hungry wolf who looked up at a basket (Ukraine which lifts the German cross) (Волинь. Часопис для Волині, 1943. 2).

The caricature became one of the most widespread levers on the population of occupied territories even if at first sight the person was not engaged to see and read on the picture, over time this picture had been already renewed in the memory at the level of subconsciousness. Caricatures were in the majority of issues of any newspaper published in the occupied territory of Ukraine. The issues of the Vinnitskiye Vesti newspaper published on Vinnichchin from April to July 1941 (Вінницькі вісті, 1942, 3; Вінницькі вісті, 1942, 3; Вінницькі вісті, 1942, 4, Вінницькі вісті, 1942, 2; 4; Вінницькі вісті, 1942, 2; Вінницькі вісті, 1942, 4).

In the first months of the war of Hitler’s Germany with the USSR a considerable part of the population of occupied territories of Ukraine believed that now having exempted from the Bolshevik mode they would be able to create the independent state where they would be owners on the earth. The German propagandists tried to maintain an exact balance between the absolute truth, half-truth and a lie (you should not forget that there is also “white lie”) on this problem. And this balance depended on the present provision and events at the front because the population of occupied territories recognized the real policy of the fascist leadership very quickly.

In such and similar situations the German government sought to influence the local population to form his morale in the necessary direction.

Knowing how the population of Ukraine treated the process of collectivization and sought to have its plots the Hitler’s leadership convinced the population of occupied territories that the fascist army had fought for a new order to change an old system, a communistic arbitrariness. There was the next slogan: bread, instead of hunger and poverty.

As an example we offer the text of one of the most popular German leaflets – as addresses to citizens of the Soviet Union, fighters and commanders of the Soviet Army, especially peasants:

“Citizens of the Soviet Union, fighters and commanders of the Red Army!”

The German army fights for a new order, instead of an old system, a communistic arbitrariness; bread, instead of hunger and poverty.

Return of landowners-capitalists it will not be allowed. Though the war continues.

The country yards and personal plots which were still in private use of collective farmers are transferred to the full possession to peasants and will not be assessed with taxes and requisitions... (Окорокв, 2007, 96).

Thus, having considered the desire of peasants, their serious condition owing to the “managing” of the Bolshevik power, the German occupational administration tried to turn the population of occupied territories on the allies in the fight against the Soviet Union.

Totally in the German leaflets, unlike the Soviet, the main focus is concentrated on the personality which is on the fact that for each person it “I” am the most important in life that she does not care about grandiose losses of the country, failures at the front. Generally the German propaganda hoped for the natural law of self-preservation, aspiration of the person to survive at any cost, to settle safely in any conditions. The Soviet power, addressing the population, fighters, and officers of the Red Army, focused on the rescue of the socialist Homeland and its gains.

Other principles of information space formation gave the chance to get much more deeply into the consciousness of the person. Together with rational ways of impact on consciousness there were ways to call irrational actions. They carried out destructive action, suppressed a rationale and to force people to serve the purposes of those who established them. In this direction, in due time big practices were made by Goebbels’s Department.

During the almost entire period of occupation Hitler’s ideologists and the occupying authorities applied a direct way of impact on the consciousness of the Ukrainian population. From the protocol of a meeting of Hitler with Rosenberg, Lyammers, Keitel, and Goering of July 16, 1941, about further plans concerning Ukraine and its territory we see that there were to develop concrete principles concerning policy in the occupied areas. Here Hitler agreed with Rosenberg that a victory would be received quicker if the German army had the support of the local population. He also agreed with the opinion that in each commissariat it was necessary to develop the attitude towards the population. In Reykhskomissariat Ukraine, according to Rosenberg, it was necessary to put in action “cultural guardianship”, it is necessary to wake historical consciousness Ukrainian, to create in Kyiv favorable conditions for education... (Косик, 1998, 172).

Implementing the program of influence on the local population the German administration addressed to historical consciousness of Ukraine

Almost in each journal number “Vinnytsia Messages”, articles about the famous Ukrainian figures and national avengers who fought for the freedom of the Ukrainian people were published. In the same articles the fascist army was compared to fighters for its freedom. In many articles, Mikhail Grushevsky’s activity (Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 2), Ivan Gonta Philip Orlik (Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 2), Nikolay Hvylevy (Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 2), Ivan Kotlyarevsky (Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 3), Lesya Ukrainky (Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 3), Boris Grinchenko, etc. (Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 3).

Continuing the political line the Minister of East Occupied Territories A. Rosenberg during the stay in Kyiv addressed consciousness Ukrainian. He delivered a speech in which he explained a place and tasks for the Ukrainian in new Europe and said that the Ukrainian culture would be revived be with the assistance of the Germans. It was noted that traditions, customs, native language, dances, freedom of religion should be renewed. The German power took responsibility for a cultural revival of Ukraine. Respectively and Ukrainians had to become consciously and readily on service of the future destiny (Нове Запоріжжя, 1942, 1).

To influence on consciousness of the population of occupied territories more effectively the occupational administration used the most modern levers and well-known communication technologies: opened movie theaters, adjusted and supported work of theaters where performances of the famous Ukrainian directors with the heroic past of the Ukrainian people – the performance “The Zaporozhets Beyond Danube”, “Taras Bulba”, etc. were put (Волинь. Часопис для Волині, 1941, 4).

From the chronicle of the “Vinnitskiye Vesti” newspaper, we see the work of the “Vinnytsia radio station” which program was made so that works by the Ukrainian poets and composers as often as possible were distributed. During the day, for example, on October 3, 1941, works by the Ukrainian composers performed by symphonic and wind orchestras sounded, sang the Ukrainian theatrical chorus, read the best samples of the Ukrainian poetry and prose (Вінницькі вісті, 1941, 4). Such reception made an impression at the local population that the Ukrainian culture revives, so behind it would revive also economic life.

The method of a big lie was a favorite method of Goebbels. It was applied among troops of Wehrmacht and the military of the Red Army and in occupied territories, it is successfully applied and reasonable A. Hitler in due time. Studying Goebbels’s activity in the context of propaganda the historian V. Lisichkin concluded that the propaganda machine of Nazi Germany staked on what in the USSR the population got used to trust politicians and therefore, dissemination of any false information will be perceived by people positively,

with trust (Лисичкин, Шелепин, 1999, 24). To open true plans concerning the fate of the population of occupied territories the Hitler's government had no intentions, therefore, the outright lie became the main instrument of Nazi propaganda.

This principle of creation of information society became one of the most important in the policy of the Hitler's government in the occupied territory. A large number of the examples recorded in magazines and newspapers of the period of occupation demonstrates to it. So, in the "Volyn magazine" of September 21, 1941, we learn how the German leaders resorted to bald open lies and misinformation of the population. In the diary "Soldatenzeitung der Ukraine" the positive characteristic Ukrainian allegedly was given. The author, the famous expert on the Ukrainian traditions, Gekel, reported about the Ukrainian and state traditions, big Ukrainian princely the state, eternal fight of the Ukrainian people against the Moscow and Polish aggressors which repeatedly encroached on independence of Ukraine. "That the Ukrainian people, certainly, cost to fight for freedom of Europe per the present on side of Germany" (Волинь. Часопис для Волині, 1941, 3). So, the German soldiers were given it seems manuals, to be respectful to the Ukrainian population, to help to fight for the rights and freedoms.

One more graphic evidence of occupational lie was the campaign of children school training. At the beginning of August 1942 in all occupied areas of Ukraine entering Reykhskomissariat Ukraine it was proclaimed a set of children of seven-year age for training at high comprehensive school. Lists of children were made and it was noted them compulsory education (Державний архів Сумської області, фонд 1955, оп. 1. спр. 12. 1. 1, 2, 19, 26, 61). It would seem, here it, the real educational policy, at last children had an opportunity to study in the native language. But we see the real policy which was pursued by Hitler already on Erich Koch's reaction that in Ukraine not only 4-great national schools but also a set of other schools and gymnasiums for which he did not grant permission work. He noted that when in Germany the growth of education stood still and even the vital professions such as a doctor, could not have necessary development. It was not important at all whether in Ukraine education which could plan the German authorities only in 10 years will increase (Чайковський 1990, 168).

As a result of such a policy which testified to the present plans of fascist Germany the order of a Reykhskomisar of Ukraine Koch about closing in Ukraine schools and institutes and about sending teachers and pupils for forced labor to Germany was published on October 24, 1942. At the same time, he demanded that, except 4-great national schools, there was no school to which it did not allow. Paid attention to that, as 4-great schools could work

only when he was convinced of their need (Немецко-фашистский оккупационный режим (1941–1944 гг.), 1965, 169).

How the Ukrainian children studied, we can judge by memoirs of V. Kachanov, the pupil of Akimovsky elementary school of the Zaporizhzhia region. He remembers that during occupation neither he, nor other Ukrainian children could study. Only the German children studied. He remembers only as the occupying authority concerned his mother in commandant's office to beat her. And on February 1943 they were expelled from a home (Державний архів Запорізької області, фонд 1676, Оп. 2, Спр. 3, 3).

At the same time about not to lose arrangement and to create illusion free public life the occupying authority promoted formation of regional centers of Land committees which had to be engaged in agricultural works and train experts for work in large-scale enterprises. So, in. The first was exactly created by the Regional Land Department of District Administration. At once after creation the Department started to found the circles of "Rural Owner" in each community on all areas. For this purpose, the Regional Land Department gave out and distributed in all regional land departments of an area the document of such contents that allegedly once, in far times. Ukraine was a granary of Europe. The people of Ukraine became unfortunate. They were removed into place and brought together to ethnographic vegetation, the slave.

Bolshevist collective farms finally destroyed the Ukrainian peasantry. Modern times have come. It is created by our independent lives... There is a wide field for the device of various courses. The main purpose is to teach farming to develop it. On those courses, farmers learn about new in agriculture, livestock production, engineering science, gardening, truck farming, poultry farming, and other industries (Волинь. Часопис для Волині, 1941, 3).

Information which is contained in sense of this document was partially truthful and therefore drew attention of the local peasantry, but further and there was an outright lie which purpose was a formation of opinion about "the big future", about obtaining qualification, about creation of appropriate working conditions – all that the Ukrainian peasants aspired for a long time to.

Departments of Propaganda which were not only in each area but also in each area, the city made a maximum of efforts for strengthening information and psychological impact on the population. What only they did not resort to. In one of newspapers "Volyn" of December 18, 1941 article was written where the Ukrainian students continuing the general historical way with the German youth studied at the universities of Germany long ago. In the German higher education institutions such famous Ukrainian figures as, I. Khmelnytsky, I. Paletika, V. Stefanovich, S. Todorovsky and many others

studied. G. Skovoroda always known to respect the Germans more. For confirmation of these words there was the small statistics submitted such: in a summer semester, 1941–1942 academic years 464 students from other countries, among them 319 Ukrainian studied at the German universities. This number increased at the expense of students from Volhynia and Galichina (Волинь. Часопис для Волині, 1941, 3).

Demonstrating to the Ukrainian population aspiration of the German administration to bring it out of darkness and to give the chance to reach in the cultural and educational level of what the German people already had and the best way was the purpose of such publications to prove it, showed results of cooperation of the Ukrainian and German people throughout several centuries. It should be noted that such information completely contradicted that educational policy which was pursued in occupied territories by Erich Koch.

That's no doubt that both sides were not frank. The soviet leadership tried to show the Germans as the real monsters and confirm the above-stated indications. The German leaders constantly reminded about negative sides and the Soviet collective-farm system, and they not bad managed it as for this purpose there were serious reasons. It would be desirable to note the consequences of the occupational policy of 1941–1944.

In the periodical press and cards constantly compared former life Ukrainian to what it would be in the future, noted how badly they lived of Bolsheviks and which bright future could be for them in future with the assistance of the Germans. The thought that Bolsheviks according to plan organized hunger in Ukraine was in large quantities imposed, their policy was directed to extermination of the Ukrainian nation. To the Ukrainian people the feeling of uncertainty imparted. "It deprived of any human dignity. Had all aspirations of the personality to be limited to such an extent only to calm the physical hunger" (Волинь. Часопис для Волині, 1941 379, 2).

The population of occupied territories convinced that the Soviet Union prepared for the approach for the whole world. Having built powerful army, made various weapons all possible forces for a campaign were mobilized for the West. (Сумський вісник, 1941, 3). Streams of misinformation were directed to the population of occupied territories, still doubted, to support the occupational mode and to create the appearance that in the future Ukraine would become an independent state.

In the conditions of war it was necessary for any psychological influence the truth and its certain volume. In this background also necessary portions of false data were allowed. But the method of "the partial truth" became the most effective, it consisted of the differentiation of described events, allocation of true, but isolated facts and their identification with an event. In more general

formulation of the question – creation based on the facts of false information structure. Such difficult educations received the name of political myths (Бурцев, 1981, 27).

Such an obvious example is the message of the Kharkiv Regional Commissariat about the strategy of the Red Army at retreat from the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. Propagandists noted that the Soviet troops, receding, destroyed everything on the way that nothing remained to the population which could not leave the territories occupied by the German army (Державний архів Харківської області, фонд 2984, Оп. 1. Спр. 7, 41). It is necessary to recognize that partially this information was truthful. Many miscalculations and mistakes which were made by Soviet leadership and the Red Army at retreat became a reason for the German propaganda and propaganda. People who witnessed such retreat of the Red Army were already easy to be convinced of anything.

From articles that contain in the “New Ukraine” newspaper issued with the assistance of the occupying authority we see that with the arrival of Hitler’s army Kharkiv prospers happened to restore a spiritual life. Authors of articles claimed that people should watch a performance moving daily gather to watch a performance With the assistance of the German command which cared for the spiritual life of residents there were put 18 elementary schools where about 3 thousand were studied to work. There were opened 6 regional libraries (Державний архів Харківської області, фонд 2984, оп. 1, спр. 7, 59).

A famous Ukrainian historian A.V. Skorobagatov wrote about a true life realities in the Kharkiv region. He noted that the occupational policy on the Kharkiv region differed from the policy in Rekhskomisariat of Ukraine radically. It took place when the government of this territory was transferred to the commander-general field marshal Walter von Reichenau (Скоробагатов, 2004, 66–68). Before the occupation of the Kharkiv region the German troops were already strongly exhausted in the fight against the Soviet Army, broken the plan of “lightning war” and to that Reichenau demanded further draconian measures in the fight against the Soviet guerrillas and underground workers (Державний архів Харківської області, 60–61).

The Wehrmacht established a new order in Kharkiv with extreme cruelty. In the first days of occupation on balconies of houses and cable columns of the city 116 people were hung up. It was terrible to go outside, everyone was suspected of cooperation with Bolsheviks (Харьковщина в годы Великой Отечественной войны, 1941–1945 гг. 1965, 552).

So, from the first days of occupation against civilians the Nazis it made cruel repressions. So intimidated the population and showed what waits for those who would not carry out the order of military authorities.

Life in the occupied Kharkiv was very heavy. Lack of food, an opportunity to earn a living, or to somewhere exchange something edible, a curfew – all this affected opinion of Kharkiv citizens of rather new power. And even opening and work of theater or attempt of the occupying authorities to begin academic year did not make people more favorable to military authorities in the city (Скоробогатов, 2004, 279–280).

Throughout all war, the Hitler's government tried to create information space not only in occupied territories. During war it was important for the fascist leadership of Germany to support the trust among the German population that was an inexhaustible source of military forces, illusions of constant victories and big achievements of invincible German army. People manipulation through information influence was possible because there was feedback. All schemes of information influence worked in German society on the eve of and during World War II because grew consciousness of many people. Here, certainly, a role was played not only by the principle of submission of information, and, first of all, a difficult economic situation of the country and each German citizen in particular.

German society existed also a powerful tool of realization of receptions and methods of creation of artificial information space – the mass media (MM). Rather figuratively the founder of the Society of Krishna told about the action of media:

“Now for anybody, not a secret that using mass media it is possible with unprecedented to create skill a veil of deception and illusion so nobody will be able to distinguish the truth from a lie, reality from fiction” (Лисичкин, Шелепин, Боев, 1997, 37).

Support of the German population was also necessary also because of most of the printing products, transfers of broadcasting and movies for the occupied areas created in Germany.

Fixed assets of dissemination of information were as it was already noted, radio, the German information bureau, and the press. Therefore the first task which faces the Hitler's government in occupied territories of Ukraine, in the shortest possible time to restore broadcastings and printing houses of the regional, regional press as most effective remedies of formation of information space (Панарин, 2006, 154). The population of Ukraine was in the specified information space, daily scooped information from the press, broadcasts, from screens of TVs. Being often in the world of the symbols which are torn off from reality, they went even against own interests. The reality faded into the background. In this sense of people became dependent. Several ways of effective information actions were fulfilled. Occurred so-called “brainwashing”. Mind zombies of people was carried out. It was

created obedient to the person, the people turned into manageable weight (Дичев, Бийчанинова, Берестенко, 1993, 68).

A very interesting and productive method was also the method of a declaration of ideals in using appeals. According to the political scientist Mr. Pochepstov a considerable part of people especially in the rural zone almost did not read books. It gave the chance to impose to people thought in the form of slogans. A slogan had to be short, attractive and expressive one (Почепцов, 1998, 62–63).

It should be noted that the majority of headings of articles in the occupational press had the character of slogans, for example, in the Vinnitskiye Vesti newspaper – “The peasantry – the vital force of Europe” (Вінницькі вісті, 1942, 1), “Germany wins on all fronts” (Вінницькі вісті 1941, 1), “Awakening to new life” (Вінницькі вісті, 194, 3). Such slogans aimed to show to the population of occupied territories what aims are pursued by Hitlerite Germany according to the solution of the Ukrainian question.

Also the method of a denial of information influence of the opponent was actively used. This method was rather often used by all Departments of Propaganda of the Ministry of East Occupied Territories and Wehrmacht. It consisted of content that the German propaganda tried to deny that information which got to the population of occupied territories through the Soviet channels are banned: newspapers, leaflets, radio, etc. So, for example, when the German citizens listened to the “Swiss” radio stations or BBC Frich as known for the Germans as the radio commentator discredited completely propaganda efforts of allies (Герцштейн, 1996, 241).

A similar situation developed when the German occupational administration disproved the Soviet messages and tried to show information from a different angle of sight. For example, we will provide a fragment to the political article in the “Wolhynien newspaper”, Nr. 25 (53), vom 29 Maerz 1942, Rowno. An article can be considered as one of many responses to Stalin propaganda in which crimes of the fascist mode are reflected in occupied territories and the real aspirations of Hitler. In the article, it is said that all efforts of Soviet leadership to break force at the head of which there is a big European Adolf Hitler were vain. “Nothing surprising as on flags which unite the whole of Europe in the fight against Asian Moscow of the user also the family is clear to Europeans appeals” (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, фонд 2, оп. 1, спр. 103, 29).

To deny information of the Soviet press that the German government broke the nonaggression pact signed by both parties in August 1939 occupational administration in newspapers, in particular in the “Volyn magazine” of December 25, 1941, proved that treason happened from Stalin.

Proofs that representatives of the Soviet party circles showed to the American correspondent V. Kerel that Stalin used were provided the contract is signed thoroughly to be prepared for war. In the article it is noted that it is Stalin war and its purpose – to destroy the European people (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, 2) This strategy of Stalin was confirmed in other publications “Moskovia against Europe” in which the opinion that the Russian monarchs with HVIII of a century sought to take and divide Europe is leading. In confirmation of it the example is given: the partition of Poland three states of 1772–1795, the initiator whom Russia (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, фонд 2, оп. 1, спр. 103, 2).

The famous historian A. Necreech considered that the non-aggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union was used by Stalin for strengthening of the Soviet Army in war with Finland. According to him, Stalin planned participation of the USSR in the large-scale European war, but at the same time he was afraid to face the union of the leading capitalist states and first of all was afraid of change of front England and its conspiracy with Germany against the USSR (Некрич, 1995, 325–327).

The former officer of GRU V. Suvorov considers that Stalin used Hitler to begin the war in Europe. But this thought only confirms the existence of the Soviet doctrine which provided warfare in the territory of the opponent. Suvorov notes that Stalin prepared for drawing a preventive strike and even time was defined (Суворов, 1990, 175). Therefore there was enough information which gave a reason to the German leaders to speculate on this thought.

In the “New Zaporizhia newspaper” of August 19, 1942, we read an article about how Bolsheviks justify with a lie the real situation at the front. As the people do not want to support Soviet in the authorities in, she somehow to hold the positions, almost in each construction from fronts tells about the achievements and victories over the German army. Actually “received nothing for all the time of approaches, and only small huge losses in manpower and military equipment (Нове Запоріжжя, 1942, 3). In the same newspaper, we read also about losses of the Red Army and words about losses of the German army in northeast loops of the Don arch.

An active development of propaganda naturally generates counter-propaganda. It is one of the methods of information and psychological impact on people of the occupied Ukrainian territories. According to the same G. Pochepstov, counter-propaganda is a response to communicative actions of the opponent, for example, a denial of this or that information that goes from the opponent. Opponents, Hitler’s Germany and the Soviet Union actively studied

propaganda and propaganda activity and messages of each other to prevent their mass impacts on consciousness Ukrainian (Почепцов, 2001, 68).

First of all, it should be noted that the leader of Fascist party Adolf Hitler and therefore the considerable stream of propaganda of Soviet leadership was directed against it was one of the main objects of propaganda. The Hitler's team in the counterpropaganda activity worked on a problem of publicizing of activity of Hitler and Stalin in a foreshortening, convenient for them. So in one of the brochures "Adolf Hitler and children" who extended on the occupied territory in the fall of 1941, it was said:

"Cut off for long years from the rest of the world by Bolshevik executioners, you could not know the naked truth.

Constantly lied to you and inspired that the German people hate Adolf Hitler, across Germany blood flows the river and that the world does not know the cruel despot.

The Jewish propaganda especially sought to blacken the person Fyurer and it is clear that Jews also hate him as it is loved by the German people...

We will try to show you how the people of Germany and especially children love Fuhrer and as he loves children and the people...

Adolf Hitler will destroy the devil system of the Bolshevism and on your Homeland and will give to your people the world, happiness and an order" (Гогун, 2004, 342).

All these words were followed by photos with the image of Hitler who communicated with children and worked on the solution of global problems.

In the German policy also using of anti-Semitic moods was not new. To receive the favor of the local population the German leaders in occupied territories imposed a thought that in all vital difficulties, in the period of the Soviet power Jews and Bolsheviks were guilty. In the directive of the Supreme Commander of Wehrmacht in September 1941. It was said: "Fight against the Bolshevism demands ruthless and vigorous actions first of all against Jews who are the main carriers of the Bolshevism" (Коваль, 1999, 164).

Similar example "Address to the population of occupied territories of Reykhskomisar Erich Koch's Ukraine: "England is your enemy as there is it the enemy of all European people. This war was imposed on Europe by England! She is an ally of the Bolshevism! It has to be beaten because the world and wellbeing can come only when the victory over England is won. Put your gratitude of Germany and your contribution to fight against England the work..." (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, фонд 57, оп. 4, спр. 185,1).

In propaganda also the Soviet power adhered to the same principle. So, the address to fighters of the Red Army, the guerrilla and the population of

temporarily occupied territories was published in the “Communist newspaper” No. 174/6654 of July 23, 1941: “Beat mad fascists! The impudent enemy perfidiously attacked our native Homeland, the blood-thirsty fascism wants to enslave our freedom-loving people, our home ground... fascists open wide to fall to the ground of the blossoming Ukraine, to its forests and the rivers, to riches of our people. We will not allow it, we will not assume that the mean enemy scoffed at ours of honor and freedom. By fire and sword we will expel the Hitler swine from the cities and villages...” (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, фонд 3206, оп. 2, спр. 72, 10).

From this, the important principle of military propaganda follows: any attacks to the country and her leader, any propaganda, discredits the power, only enhances the commitment of those who else not quite identify themselves with the state system. This problem cannot be solved even by the cleverest and skillful propaganda. It can solve only a military victory. At the adverse course of fighting such is propaganda, in general, it is doomed to failure. “Extremely low efficiency of propaganda of the Red Army on the German troops in the first two years of war of Hitler’s Germany against the USSR is explained by these reasons. In this case, information influence faced also a rejection of hostile propaganda, and strong nationalist sentiments... If the level of a moral and political condition of the opponent is insufficiently high, and fighting develops unsuccessfully for it, then psychological influence has every chance to be productive” (Крысько, 1999, 90).

This fact is confirmed after the defeat of the German armies near Stalingrad when weakened and is disappointed the German soldiers with the whole parts and divisions were given in captivity.

One more significant fact from the report of guerrilla connection of the colonel Melnik in villages of the Rivne region where nationalist groups of bulbovets and Banderovites spread provocative rumors about that, as if the Soviet guerrillas destroy civilians, the population sometimes fled from the village to the forest at our approach.

All population is hostile against Germans, traitors of the Homeland. In many villages which we passed the population addressed guerrillas with complaints to criminal acts of police officers, heads and those who served the Nazis.

The moral and political spirit of most of the peasants became sharply hostile the “German invaders” (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, фонд 4620, оп.3, спр. 112, 74a-75.).

The concept of Nazi policy in occupied territories of Ukraine provided, first of all, the creation of the powerful information space placed at service to the “Third Reich” and directed to a clear victory in this war. The main

objective of information space is to win the favor of the local population to the occupying authority and its support in the fight against the Soviet Union during an initial stage of the war.

REFERENCES

1. Камінський Є., Дашкевич А. 1998. Політика США щодо України. Витоки. Концептуальні основи. Практична еволюція. Київ : Політична думка.
2. Почепцов, Г.Г. 2001. Информация & дезинформация. Москва : Эльга.
3. Шрейдер Ю.А. Шаров А.А. 1982. Системы и модели. Москва : Радио и связь.
4. Панарин И.Н. 2006. Информационная война и геополитика. Москва : Издательство “Поколение”.
5. Hitler A. 1953. Hitler's Table Talk 1941–1944. Trevor-Roper. London.
6. Макаревич Э. 1993. Германия: программирование человека. Диалог. Минск: РУП “Початкова школа”. № 4.
7. Крысько В.Г. 1999. Секреты психологической войны (цели, задачи, методы, формы, опыт). Минск: Харвест.
8. Прокофьев В.Ф. 1999. Тайное оружие информационной войны. Москва : СИНТЕГ.
9. Орлов Ю.Я. 1985. Крах немецко-фашистской пропаганды в период войны против СССР. Москва : Изд-во Московского университета.
10. Жуков Д.А. 2000. Власовцы и нацистская пропаганда. Москва : Яуза-пресс.
11. Дашичев В.И. 1973. Банкротство стратегии германского фашизма: Исторические очерки. Документы и материалы. В 2 т. Т. 2. Агрессия против СССР. Падение «Третьей империи» (1941–1945 гг.). Москва : Наука.
12. Гогун А. 2004. Черный PR Адольфа Гитлера: Документы и материалы. М.: Эксмо, Яуза.
13. История ВКП(б). 1938. Краткий курс. Под редакцией Комиссии ЦК ВКП(б). Москва : Политиздат.
14. Ortwin Buhbender. 1978. Das tötende Erz. Deutsche Propaganda gegen die Rote Armee im zweiten Weltkrieg. Seewald Verlag Stuttgart.
15. Цыбмал В.И. 1995. О концепции информационной войны. Информационный сборник «Безопасность». Москва : Фонд национальной и международной безопасности. № 9.

16. Фурманов Д.А. 1985. Чапаев. Мятёж. М.: Правда. Сайт «Военная литература». Доступ 27 июля 2015 <http://militera.lib.ru/prose/russian/furmanov2/03.html>.

17. Бурцев М.И. 1981. Прозрение. Москва : Воениздат.

18. Кочергин, А.Н., Коган В.З. 1980. Проблема информационного взаимодействия: философско-социологический анализ. Москва : Наука.

19. Немецкая пропаганда на территории СССР. 2013. Москва. Военное обозрение. Доступ 30 июля 2015 <https://topwar.ru/30938-nemeckaya-socialnaya-reklama.html>

20. Лисичкин В.А., Шелепин Л.А. 2005. Война после войны: Информационная оккупация про-должается. М.: Изд-во Алгоритм, Изд-во Эксмо.

21. Вербa I.B. 1999. Кость Штеппа (окончание, на укр. языке). Український історичний журнал. № 4. Київ : Інститут історії України НАН України.

22. Волинь. Часопис для Волині. 1943. 7 жовтня.

23. Вінницькі вісті. 1942. № 30.

24. Вінницькі вісті. 1942. № 33.

25. Вінницькі вісті. 1942. № 39.

26. Вінницькі вісті. 1942. № 43.

27. Вінницькі вісті. 1942. № 44.

28. Вінницькі вісті. 1942. № 47.

29. Окоороков А. 2007. Особый фронт. Немецкая пропаганда на Восточном фронте в годы Второй мировой войны. Москва : Русский путь.

30. Косик В. 1998. Україна Другій світовій війні у документах: Збірник німецьких архівних матеріалів. Львів: Львівський національний університет ім. Івана Франка. Т. 2.

31. Вінницькі вісті. 1941. № 13, 28 вересня.

32. Вінницькі вісті. 1941. № 18, 10 жовтня.

33. Вінницькі вісті. 1941. № 22, 19 жовтня.

34. Вінницькі вісті. 1941. № 31, 20 листопада.

35. Вінницькі вісті. 1941. № 36, 7 грудня.

36. Вінницькі вісті. 1941. № 38, 14 грудня.

37. Нове Запоріжжя. 1942. № 67 (81), 7 липня.

38. Волинь. Часопис для Волині. 1941. 1 вересня.

39. Вінницькі вісті. 1941. № 15.

40. Лисичкин В.А. Шелепин Л.А. 1999. Третья мировая война. Москва : Институт социально-политических исследований АСН.

41. Волинь. Часопис для Волині. 1941. 21 вересня.

42. Державний архів Сумської області (далі – ДАСО). Ф. 1955. Оп. 1. Спр. 12.
43. Чайковський А.С. 1990. За нами Большая земля: Помощь советского тыла в организации народной борьбы против фашистских захватчиков на временно оккупированных территориях Украины, 1941–1944 гг. Киев: Вища школа.
44. Немецко-фашистский оккупационный режим (1941–1944 гг.). 1965. Сборник статей. Под редакцией Е.А. Болтина. Москва: Политиздат.
45. Державний архів Запорізької області (далі – ДАЗО). Ф. 1676. Оп. 2. Спр. 3.
46. Волинь. Часопис для Волині. 1941. 7 вересня.
47. Волинь. Часопис для Волині. 1941. 18 грудня.
48. Волинь. Часопис для Волині. 1941. 28 грудня.
49. Сумський вісник. 1941 р. № 14, 4 грудня.
50. Державний архів Харківської області. Ф. 3077. Оп. 1. Спр. 7.
51. Державний архів Харківської області. Ф. 2984. Оп. 1. Спр. 2.
52. Скоробагатов А.В. 2004. Харків у часи німецької окупації (1941–1943). Харків: Прапор.
53. Державний архів Харківської області. Ф. 3086. Оп. 1. Спр. 1. 39 арк.
54. Харьковщина в годы Великой Отечественной войны 1941–1945 гг. 1965. Сборник документов и материалов. Харьков: Прапор.
55. Лисичкин В.А., Шелепин Л.А, Боев Б.В. 1997. Закат цивилизации или движение к ноосфере. Экология с разных сторон. Москва: ИЦ Гарант.
56. Дичев Т., Бийчанинова А., Берестенко М. 1993. Информационный Чернобыль. Советская Россия. Москва: Военная мысль. № 6.
57. Почепцов Г.Г. 1999. Информационные войны. Основы военно-коммуникативных исследований. Ровенский институт славяноведения Киевского института «Славянский университет». Ровн: Волинські береги.
58. Вінницькі вісті. 1942. № 54.
59. Вінницькі вісті. 1941. № 28.
60. Вінницькі вісті. 1941. № 14.
61. Герцштейн Р.Э. 1996. Война, которую выиграл Гитлер. [перевод с английского]. Смоленск: Русич.
62. Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України. Ф. 3206. Оп. 2. Спр. 86.

63. Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України. Ф. 3206. Оп. 1. Спр. 103.

64. Некрич А.М. 1941, 22 июня. 1995. Москва : Памятники исторической мысли.

65. Суворов В. 1990. Ледокол. Кто начал вторую мировую войну?: Неофантастическая повесть-документ. М.: АСТ.

66. Нове Запоріжжя. 1942. № 75 (89). 19 серпня.

67. Коваль М.В. 1999. Україна в Другій світовій і Великій Вітчизняній війнах (1939–1945 рр.). Київ : Видавничий дім «Альтернативи».

68. Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України. Ф. 3206. Оп. 1. Спр. 103.

69. Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України. Ф. 4620. Оп. 3. Спр. 100, 112.