

SECTION 4.
INFORMATION CONFLICT AND ITS INFLUENCE
ON THE MORAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION
OF THE POPULATION IN THE REICHSKOMMISSARIAT
“UKRAINE” AND IN THE ZONE
OF MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

Needs of working in the conditions of the new information mode forced both Germany and the Soviet Union to create a special system of informational and analytical activity. Considering that both states had totalitarian mode this process considerably became simpler and accelerated. The formation of the information space became more active in Germany. As far as the Soviet Union the process of foundation of information space I was began in the 17–20th years of the 20th century and was caused by Bolshevist ideology.

In occupied territories tasks of the formation of specialized system institutions and divisions, various military, propaganda organizations and analytical services started developing from the first period of the occupation. Informational and analytical services appeared to be in all spheres and began activities in Germany and much earlier in the Soviet Union. Their main aim was to concentrate and process powerful information flows for the purpose of the political and economic problems connected with influence on the population of occupied territories.

There were certain differences between the German and Soviet information and analytical services and conditions in which they were forced to work scurried about. The Hitler’s leadership had an opportunity to create in occupied territories libraries and to deliver necessary books and newspapers, to distribute necessary information also directly through broadcastings and cinema. The Soviet leadership worked only through “partisan movement” and “Soviet underground” from among local population by way of the distribution of leaflets and brochures. The Soviet leadership hoped that the “Nonaggression Pact” signed 1939 would constrain Hitler’s army from aggression. A evidence of that there was a document prepared and addressed to Stalin by G. Zhukov with the assistance of S. Tymoshenko and A. Vasilevsky. There was one copy. It is told: “I report on your discretion of a reason according to the plan of the strategic expansion of Armed Forces of the

Soviet Union on a war case with Germany and its allies". But, according to G. Zhukov, Stalin was very careful and therefore regarded this document for an attempt to provoke Germans (Король, 2002, 27–28).

The fascist leadership of Germany understood that completely it was impossible to hide large-scale military preparations from the attention of the Soviet and the other countries researches, therefore. It was examined carefully and prepared the plan of actions on their covers. Disinformation was carried out by the government's administration: "Ministry of National Education and Propaganda", "Ministry of East Occupied Territories" and "Ministry of Foreign Affairs". Hitler, Goering, Goebbels, Ribbentrop directly participated in the development of these actions.

The German propaganda made the first great progress in 1940 in the period of the occupation of France. Several months prior to invasion into France Germans began to use actively so-called "black" transmitters giving them for the French radio stations. Through these stations there were spread critic information about the French government to form the uncertainty and panic moods among the population and the French army. As a result of such active promotion before the German troops, the moral and combat spirit of the French army was undermined and they could not show serious resistance to the opponent (Daugherty, Janowitz, 2001, 671).

After the conclusion of the "Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact" on August 23, 1939 in the structure of the German propaganda concerning the USSR, there was a cardinal reorganization. Misinformation of soviet leadership was the main objective of this reorganization. According to the specified purpose Goebbels gave the instruction to abstain from open attacks to the Soviet Union. "The opponent needs to be held in information disinformation about plans of Germany" (Панарин 2006, 152) The "Ministry of National Education and Propaganda" established cruel censorship on all materials where there was any information about the USSR and demanded from mass media to show restraint in publications about Russian achievements. In the confidential instruction of Goebbels of January 30, 1940 it was spoken and about expediency to place in periodicals any "positive materials about Russia... because thanks to policy of last years readers are ready absolutely in a different way and would be absolutely confused by sudden change of the direction of contents of publications in the press" (Панарин, 2006, 152). This statement, one of the biggest mistakes of the USSR and a victory of the German propaganda and diplomacy.

Such information policy brought invaluable benefit to Hitler's leadership. The Soviet Union responded to it by own means of anti-fascist propaganda. Attempts of separate newspapers to give an objective assessment to events

which took place in Germany were exposed to sharp criticism. A last plea in misinformation of the country was the statement of agency "TASS" of June 14, 1941 in which it was said about "obvious senselessness" massed in foreign the seals of rumors about "proximity of war between the USSR and Germany". It was claimed that "rumors about attempt of Germany to begin attack on the USSR are deprived of any bases". But, despite unwillingness to go for confrontation with Germany in the spring of 1941 in Moscow there was decided to apply some "veiled" anti-German actions. In March in "Award meeting" Stalin gave awards authors of the feature film "Alexander Nevsky" (1938). It was the first Soviet movie which carried anti-German orientation. In April 1941 when there was a tension in the Balkans and there was an article about S.N. Eisenstein's creativity in the "Pravda newspaper" (Невежин, 2007, 265).

In March 1941 agency "TASS" began a direct preparation for informational wars against Goebbels's department. The corresponding materials were collected (excerpts from the book "Main Kampf" by Hitler, an article about Nazi "New order" in Poland and Yugoslavia, etc.). As a part of "TASS" there was a new edition of promotion led by Y. S. Hanson. At first, it worked secretly, officially developed the activity only after June 22, 1941.

For fascist Germany became obvious that the Soviet leadership had understood a situation which developed in the East of Europe and therefore stirred up the information and propaganda activity even more. 1940 became the year of extreme activity in propaganda activity of Germany on the Soviet Union. From the end of the year the German departments, carried out propaganda activity against the USSR, began active work on collection of information for the benefit of holding promotional campaigns: materials of the Soviet military newspapers of border military districts and other periodic literature, even large-circulation editions of the plants and departmental magazines were processed illegally receiving.

Those who well knew political, social and economic and cultural features of the people of the USSR, Russian and Ukrainian, in particular, were involved. They prepared analytical materials for propaganda, defined especially weaknesses of the Soviet military personnel, opened obvious problems of the Soviet society, developed recommendations on information and psychological impacts on the staff of the Red Army and the population taking into account national and psychological features, traditions and culture. Army intelligence known to all "Abwehr" banished on the territory of the Soviet Union with intelligence agents and saboteurs (except for the main objective, they had to spread the rumors compromising materials about the country leaders and the command structure of the Soviet Army) specially

trained agents propagandists – the former emigrants, were fluent Russian, Ukrainian in languages and languages of other people of the USSR and also emissaries propagandists of various national organizations. So, one of “Abwehr” schools directed the first agents propagandists in February 1941, the second – in May 1941 Having received a task prior to military operations “to pave the way” for psychological actions against the fighting structure of the Red Army and the population, they began to act in border military districts. Agents for the performance of the tasks hired the persons offended or dissatisfied with the Soviet power, distributed through them leaflets, rumors, brochures with incriminating evidence of the Soviet government, promoted kindling of national discord and other (Панарин, 2006, 153).

At the end of 1940 the “Department of Propaganda prepared the Directive in the operation “Barbarossa”. It also became the main document on the organization and conducting a psychological war against the USSR. In the Directive there were defined the purposes of propaganda, its forms and methods. On June 6, 1941, it was sent to troops.

The USSR also understood the international situation and therefore much attention was paid to the strengthening of ideological and political work among the staff of the Red Army and the population. In particular, on May 13, 1941, at a meeting of film committee of the USSR V.V. Vishnevsky proposed certain measures which according to him should be immediately carried out for comprehensive preparation of cinema for a war. Vishnevsky stopped on an image of the enemy in a future war. He emphasized: “In skilled, skilful hands of writers and directors of film editors, materials will turn into propaganda military movies” (Невежин, 2007, 286).

All types of promotion applied by the USSR actively affected the consciousness of the population. So, conversion propaganda influenced valuable reference points of people with the purpose to change their setups, attitude, thoughts and views, concerning country policy. During 1941–1945 the Soviet military and political leadership tried to convince the population of Germany and fighters of the German army that war from the German army was unfair and aggressive. It was announced that the Soviet Union did not show any aggression to the population of Germany. But, unfortunately, the propaganda of Hitler’s leadership was so powerful that a considerable part of the staff of the German army until the end of war remained under the influence of fascist ideology.

Allies of the USSR used also propaganda of intergroup contradictions on the basis of religious, social, professional character for disunity of the opponent. Propaganda’s content was being formed in the state circles. It could be the next example. The English propagandists dropped leaflets from the

plane over Germany and that period a gauylyayter Erich Koch filed to the German people a petition for danger which threatened Hitler by the side of the opponents in Germany too. With such cards English propaganda tried to convince the population of Germany that not everything was so good in the leading circles of the “Third Reich” because the Hitler’s leadership stated (Панарин, 2006, 159–160).

Captivity propaganda was the most widespread. It was used by both the German leaders, and the Soviet power. There was a straight line psychological impact on the consciousness of people directed to the formation of positive feelings in relation to surrender as reasonable and safe an exit from the current situation. The specified type of propaganda acted on the territories of Ukraine occupied by the fascist army. The set of leaflets with the corresponding content was distributed. As a rule, such cards were divided into two parts. In one it was told about a bad life in Ukraine under the power of “Bolsheviks” or what sense to shed the blood for the sake of Bolsheviks if the German army won anyway. In another part the admission according to which it was promised all fighters, officers of the Red Army and political commissars who would come over to the side of the German army of war and peaceful life to their relatives (Гитлеровская пропаганда юдофобии в прокламациях и карикатурах, 2005, 106–107). Similar addresses were also to commanders of the Red Army. The Hitler’s military authorities convinced that their situation was hopeless and the fight was useless: They were promised: “You pass to Germans – there you are waited by good attitude and food and also fast homecoming” (Окроков, 2007, 30).

Trying to resist the information attack from the German occupational administration, the Soviet propagandists distributed the leaflets not less actively. Their contents were a bit different. So, in leaflets of the Central Committee of RC(b) for the Ukrainian youth there was said that all remembered how the Soviet people always dealt shortly with traitors. There was given an example, taken from famous literary Ukrainian heroes as Andrey’s treason – the son of “Taras Bulba” – and punishment of the father over it (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, 200).

In the following card of the Head political department of the Red Army turned to the population of temporarily occupied territories. It was said: “Who will go to Germans – that will die”. It is noted that the German army promptly receded under attacks of the Red Army, the Soviet power would not punish those who remained in the villages and the cities occupied by Germans. The head political department urged the population not to trust the German and the Soviet power and the Red Army had only one purpose: to clean the Ukrainian

land from Hitler's army, as soon as possible to exempt its population from fascist bondage and to return quiet and joyful lives. Those appeals urged not to succumb to fascist provocation: "Make everything that Germans did not pursue you violently. You remember, companions. The business of Germans it is hopelessly lost. The Red Army successfully clears the Soviet land of fascist aggressors... Wait for arrival of your native Red Army and all means help it with the fight against Hitler. Do not allow Germans to take out the bread and to take away the cattle. Destroy bridges and roads on which Germans will run. Set fire to the German ammunition and food warehouses. Help guerrillas to beat fascist robbers" (Советская пропаганда в годы Великой Отечественной войны: "коммуникация убеждения" и мобилизационные механизмы, 2007, 492). Actually such propaganda was a lie and hypocrisy too. It is known that the people who remained in the territory occupied by the Fascist army or escaped from the German captivity were pursued the Soviet punitive machine ruthlessly (Сборник законодательных и нормативных актов о репрессиях и реабилитации жертв политических репрессий, 1993, 94–96). In this occasion there are many opinions, historians differently assess a situation in the conditions of war and operation of orders and resolutions of Stalin. Administration of "People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs" concerning the persons which left in due time the German environment and remained in the occupied territory or were prisoners. So "About members of traitors families" we see Resolutions of the State Committee of Defense No. GOKO-1926ss of June 24, 1942, actions were applied by the Soviet power to prisoners of war and their families.

Firstly, to establish that full age members of families of the persons (the military personnel and civil) condemned by judicial authorities or the Special meeting at People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR to a capital punishment according to Article 58–1 "a" to CC RSFSR and the relevant articles of the Criminal Code of other federal republics: for espionage in favor of Germany and other countries which were at war with us for transition to the enemy, treachery or assistance to the German invaders, service in retaliatory or administrative organizations of the German invaders in the territory occupied by them and for attempt of high treason and treacherous intentions, are subject to arrest and exile to the remote regions of the USSR for a period of five years.

Secondly, to establish that arrest and exile to the remote regions of the USSR for a period of five years are subject also families of the persons who are in absentia condemned to a capital punishment by judicial authorities or the Special meeting at People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the

USSR for voluntary leaving with occupational troops at release of the territory occupied by the opponent.

Application of repressions concerning members of the families listed in Paragraphs 1 and 2 was carried out by societies of People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs on the basis of sentences of judicial authorities or decisions of the Special meeting at People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR. As members of the family of the traitor could be considered to be the father, mother, the husband, the wife, children, daughters, brothers and sisters, if they lived together or were in his dependence by the time of crime execution or by the time of mobilization in army from the beginning of war (Сборник законодательных и нормативных актов о репрессиях и реабилитации жертв политических репрессий, 1993, 93–94).

Such attitude towards fighters and to their families of the Red Army got to captivity was confirmed by the shorthand report of interrogation sent to the "Chief of the Central Headquarters of the Soviet Partisan Movement at the Rate of General headquarters T. Ponomarenko. In the shorthand report of interrogation of the aide-de-camp for special instructions at the chief of staff of the movement A.D. Rusanov, it was noted that the former prisoners of war who came over to the side of guerrillas often were disarmed, sent to the back and destroyed. Sometimes, if there was a need, they would be left in guerrilla groups. But after the war they would be able to be checked waited by department of "People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs". Here A. Rusanov gave evidence that families of the Red Army men who were taken prisoner were pursued only if it was known that he was taken prisoner there and if it was considered the missing person, then the family was even supported (Безыменский, 1981, 418). The attitude of management towards prisoners of war was confirmed by order No. 270 of August 16, 1941. It was already mentioned above where it was said: "Commanders and political workers, which the during fight break signs of distinction from themselves and escape to the back or given in captivity to the enemy, to consider malicious deserters whose families are subject to arrest as families of deserters which broke the oath and betrayed the Motherland. All higher commanders and commissioners must shoot deserters on the place from a division" (Король, 2002, 49).

For the purpose of maintenance of patriotic feelings among guerrillas by the Political administration of the Red Army there was given the order to hide carefully true situation in the Soviet Union. Nobody had to know about hunger in the rear of the USSR and the compulsory mobilization of women and teenagers, people's losses and terror. For these reasons "Guerrillas movement" seemed to appear in the Soviet territory as a result of the arrival of the Red Army away. All possible measures were done to isolate Partisan's

movement from other mass of Red Army with the aim not to get truth information from guerrillas who stayed in the German rear long time and had read the Nazi opponent's literature, learned about the true situation in the USSR and Stalin's criticism and the Bolshevism. The Soviet leadership recognized the danger of the situation in the Soviet Union and tried to avoid discontent among partisans and the population of the territories occupied by the German army. "Only an insignificant part of guerrillas – Soviet party workers and the staff of "People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs", – which were specially sent to German rear for the purpose of underground work, sent to other occupied areas for propaganda activities" (Білас, 1994, 420).

The best specialists were involved. Among them, there were A.S. Scherbakov, L.Z. Mekhlis, M.A. Suslov, G.F. Alexandrov. They fixed mechanisms of fast a collection of the necessary information and its processing but often figures and materials which were collected were not true. So, for example, "the Message of the Soviet Information Bureau" prepared by A.S. Scherbakov gave figures of fighting losses. That digital material of messages was not true and consisted in the propaganda purposes. In the last release of the book "Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945". it was noted that losses of Germans in November 1941 in-ground forces were only 750 thousand people (Никулина, Сорока, 1999, 56–60). The following data presented in M.I. Meltyukhov's researches: was that Germans before the war with the USSR had only 3899 tanks and 4841 planes (Мельтюхов М.И. 22 июня 1941 г.: цифры свидетельствуют, 1991, 18). Thus, we see that A.S. Scherbakov's article "destroyed" military equipment of the military adversary approximately twice.

Insufficient knowledge of the enemy – fascist Germany was one of the main reasons for failures of the Soviet promotion among troops of the enemy. A large number of specialists "germanists" of the various profile was for this purpose involved and each hostile connection was accepted fields.

The work began among the population of the Soviet areas occupied by fascist troops. In the directive SNK USSR and Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) of June 29, 1941, to the party and Soviet organizations of front-line areas in Stalin's speech on July 3, 1941, it was indicated the need to explain to workers their situation; to organize uncompromising fight with everyone: alarmists and spreaders of rumors (Бутырин, 2006, 3–4). For the dissemination of this and other information there were given newspapers Pravda, "Communist", "Izvestia", "For the Soviet Ukraine" in the rear the Soviet Army and also other central periodicals. Among the listed periodicals, regularly there was printed a "Vesti Iz Sovetskoy Rodiny" newspaper. It appeared big circulations in the Russian, Ukrainian and

Belarusian languages for the population of Ukraine and Belarus. It was delivered to the occupied territory by planes and extended underground workers. It should be noted that this newspaper disturbed occupational administration very much which applied a set of means to its destruction.

In one of the special messages of fascist occupational administration, it was noted that the Soviet leadership used psychologically active actions and means of propaganda comparison with an initial stage of war. The special attention was given to newspapers leaflets which were regularly dropped from planes (Всенародное партизанское движение в Белоруссии в годы Великой Отечественной войны (июнь 1941- июль 1944), 1973, 247). The newspaper made the real threat for occupying authorities. The fact that, except satirical materials there were also drawings and documentary photographs which illustrated fight of guerrillas and courage of the Soviet soldiers in fights for Homeland freedom. Regular informing the Soviet people who appeared in occupation about events at the front and in the country, about world situation strengthened in them the confidence of quick freedom, promoted strengthening and activation of the guerrilla fight against the fascist army.

From the Order of the People's Defence Commissar September 5, 1942 "About problems of the guerrilla movement" and from the report of the Ukrainian Headquarters of the partisan's movement we can see that guerrilla groups of Fedorov, Saburov, Kovpak, Melnik and other "partisan" heads gave out and distributed among the population of the occupied areas of Ukraine newspapers and leaflets. Only Saburov's group issued more than 102 names of newspapers, leaflets and bulletins with a general circulation of 156183 copies. For strengthening of printing promotion directly 56 portable printing houses, more than 350 libraries and mobile movie theatres were brought. (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, 23).

From November 1942 to April 1, 1943, it was published and widespread in temporarily occupied territory 103 newspapers in Ukrainian with a general circulation of 8100000. Besides, 1980000 are newspapers ("Communist", "Soviet Ukraine", "For Soviet Ukraine"). Planes with newspapers and leaflets went along such routes: Kharkiv-Poltava-Sumy, Nezhin-Kiev-Vinnitsia-Priluki-Vorozhba, Kyiv-Zhytomyr-Chernihiv, Kharkiv-Dnepropetrovsk-Zaporozhye-Stalino-Lugansk, Kupyansk-Kharkiv-Poltava, etc. (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, 24).

Very effective results were yielded by mass and political work among the population during raids of guerrilla on the rear of the enemy. The Communist Party organized meetings, extended political literature. For example, from the shorthand report of a propaganda department meeting, from the report of

guerrilla groups, we see that with the population of occupied territories discussions were led and then there were given answers to a set of questions. The population, according to heads of guerrilla units raised many questions. People had a keen interest in problems of a political situation as in the rear and at the front. It demonstrated that the population of occupied territories did not trust messages from newspapers of the occupying authority (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, 3)

Work of “underground” was fragmentary as most the organizations were destroyed by occupational troops. With the participation of the “Kiev city underground” secretary Rudchenko in October-November 6 underground district committees were arrested. The former secretary of Kyiv regional committee and a city town committee of “Komsomo” Kucherenko, the instructor of the regional committee of LKSM of Ukraine Pustovoytov, Aristarkhova coherent of an underground city town committee were traitors. 36 figures of the Kyiv administration in an underground were arrested. On the way of treachery there was also a secretary of the “Zaporizhia underground regional committee” Mosiyevich, He told about the structure of an underground and revealed the second secretary of regional committee Osipov, coherent Moshchenko, secretaries of underground district committees and itself continued to work for the enemy under the pseudonym “Konstantin” (Чайковський, 1994, 20).

Guerrillas provided underground political workers with the central and local newspapers, brochures and leaflets. As a result of it, counteraction to fascist propaganda in large settlements became more expressed, especially during 1943–1944 (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України). Evidence of that what work was done by the Soviet leadership and “Guerrilla units in occupied territories were reports and information certificates of the propaganda content, mass agitation activities on areas in February-March, 1942. (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, 4–7).

“Guerrillas” widely applied various forms of verbal promotion. On numerous memoirs of participants of the “guerrilla, movement” there were mass meetings and even small demonstrations. So, for example, a broad success among the population received the meeting held on February 1942. In villages of the Sumy region – Dubovichi, the Gorozhanla, Gerasimovka, Shilinka – Putivlsky guerrilla group (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, 180).

The Ukrainian youth of temporarily occupied by fascist aggressors territory actively participated in the edition of brochures and leaflets (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань України, 15).

Only from January to September 1942 it was given out and widespread special issues “Communist” with a circulation of 6 thousand, 31 card. Leaflets went to the occupied areas for the purpose of their distribution through Political Departments of Southwest and Southern fronts. Cards in large quantities extended mainly in Stalin, Kharkiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia, Voroshilovgrad regions. Except for cards, it was planned to distribute also brochures and newspapers (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, 95–96). Because a considerable part of political departments was liquidated, it became impossible.

The “Komsomol organizations” of the occupied areas included a youth which conducted active counter-propaganda in the back of the opponent. Such groups which bore personal responsibility for timely delivery of literature were organized on the occupied territory (Центральний державний архів громадських об’єднань України, 8, 11, 15, 23, 45).

According to the administration of “Wehrmacht” an important role in the dissemination of this or that information was played by an emotional spirit of the population which promotes the formation of the new power. commitment. Therefore the staff propaganda and troops of SS built the actions, considering first of all a moral and psychological condition of the local population. “Employees practically of all divisions with success used knowledge of psychology and policy, skillfully forwarding behavior of people to the necessary course. The success of Nazi propaganda was provided also with the ruse of the most modern materials and means of dissemination. In the Soviet propaganda activity was insufficiently equipment, materials and personnel. Only correspondents of the army newspaper “Krasnaya Zvezda” and the government newspaper “Izvestia” had planes. Correspondents work interfered because of institute department selfishness (Советская пропаганда в годы Великой Отечественной войны: “коммуникация убеждения” и мобилизационные механизмы, 2007, 32).

Nazi propaganda was carried out generally through periodicals, an air, motion picture art, exhibitions and also the distribution of small printed materials (leaflets, brochures, posters) on city streets, the enterprises, in educational institutions and so forth. Its large-scale character is explained by the application of similar methods in Germany which effectively affected public opinion. Defining the main propaganda objectives and the purposes of use of periodicals in temporarily occupied territory”, Reykhskomissariat’s leadership issued the special directive. In it, it was said: “The Ukrainian and other newspapers issued in “Reykhskomissariat” – an exclusive lever on the population promotion and policy, by order of “Reykhskomissar”. They do not

serve the national and cultural purposes of the population or even religion... Everyone their line has to help military occupational authorities with the implementation of a great mission of the Fuhrer in the creation of new Europe” (Коваль, 1988, 157–158). The German leaders cared for that anti-Soviet propaganda captivated all space of the occupied areas and prevented the distribution of anti-Nazi propaganda.

For counteraction, to enemy propaganda, the special broadcasts prepared toward “underground newspapers”. About it on September 16, 1942, at a meeting of Council of military-political propaganda of the Head Political Department of RKKA the issue “About Work among the Population of the Occupied Regions of the USSR” was discussed. It was offered to develop measures for improvement of work of broadcasting for the population of temporarily occupied areas (Партийное подполье в Белоруссии, 1941–1944: Страницы воспоминаний, 1984. 132, 236).

In this regard there was set the task to make the program schedule for all “Guerrilla Radio Committee”. Their contents had to include the following questions:

- the materials characterizing situation at the front, statement of the message of “Sovinformburo”, special messages of “Sovinformburo”, losses of fascist troops;
- the materials characterizing the situation in the Soviet rear;
- fighting of “Partisan movement” of Ukraine;
- commenting of information obtained from abroad;
- articles exposing a lie of Hitler’s propaganda;
- cards for the edition in “Guerrilla Units” (Ивлев, Юденков, 1988, 71–72).

Time for carrying out these or those transfers for “Reykhskommissariat’s” population Ukraine and zones of military authorities was accurately determined.

Soviet counter-propaganda could not solve completely all problems of war conditions. It could not capture all citizens of the occupied by the fascist army territory. The technical base of the Soviet propaganda on temporarily occupied territories was much weaker than German due to the lack of a possibility of legal activity. Newspapers and leaflets which were distributed by dumping from the plane not always got there where they were most necessary. The guerrillas had to make leaflets for distribution among the local population.

Thus, information and ideological opposition between fascist Germany and the Soviet Union was not less powerful and significant, than armed struggle. At the level of information space, there was a fight for influence on soldiers of the Red Army and the population of the territories of Ukraine occupied by the fascist army. Informational opposition amplified counter-

propaganda from nationalist forces, in particular, OUN, UPA and considerably weakened positions of both parties. Both Hitler's occupational administration and soviet leadership applied all methods, means and methods of information fight possible at that time, resorted to various dirty technologies, often discrediting themselves. Both opponents intimidating the population and promising it the desirable, used aspiration of the Ukrainian people to peaceful work and creation of own state. The severe morale psychological state of the population of "Reykhskomissariat Ukraine" and zones of military authorities became a consequence of information opposition of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. It was formed in the conditions of difficult military opposition between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Difficult financial and economic situation of the population of the occupied areas had a great influence on it that led to the aggravation of a number of social problems.

Political passions of the most part of the population of occupied territories shared between three main forces, had opposite views of a political situation which developed. One part of the population was suppressed and did not represent the future under Nazi occupation, another – small frank hoped that the new power would bring a contribution to the development of the Ukrainian society and revival of culture. The third part of population would like to live in the independent Ukrainian state promised by Nazi power. Big regional differences were also peculiar to political sympathies. In the East, as it was already noted, a certain part of the population stood in opposition to occupational administration, cooperated with guerrillas and underground workers; in the West, where liberating traditions were still alive, the population, the intellectuals and peasants, wished for restoration of own state and solution of the land question.

The great influence on consciousness and moods of the population of Ukraine made carrying out within the 30th years of the policy of "military communism", violent collectivization, mass repressions, cultivation among the population the concept "enemy of the people" and prosecutions of all who fell under this category (Куманев, 2005, 143).

The events which were taking place in 1941 became the tragedy of improbable ranges that put the people and the Soviet Union on the edge of a chasm. The German tank columns which were followed by motor-infantry and were supported by aircraft managed to do irreparable harm to the Soviet troops in a short time. It is necessary to tell the German plans of fighting were implemented with some advancing. So, it was planned that boundary fights will last not less than four weeks (Загорулько, 1980, 7). By information, which Ukrainian historian V. Y. Korol gives us... "they ended in favor of the German

side by July 10. In total for the first three weeks of war the Red Army lost 850 thousand soldiers, nearly 3.5 thousand planes, over 6 thousand tanks, 20 thousand mortars. Catastrophic defeat received more than 100 soviet divisions. Germans took away a half of the warehouses located in the territory of these districts including strategic importance. Germans took in warehouses 5 400 000 from a total 7 600 000 rifles. 191 thousand from a total of 240 thousand machineguns. It became the captivity reason of 329 thousand soldiers and commanders in the first two weeks of the war” (Король, 2001, 5).

The consequences of the first fights happened to be obvious because famous Soviet specialists engineers, officers of the Red Army were repressed even on the eve of war. In the first months of war to arrange production of new planes, specialists prisoners who were not managed to be shot or tortured yet were brought together in special scientific center-TsKB-29 where worked the famous aircraft designers and engineers – “enemies of the people” A. Tupolev, D. Tomashevich, R. Bartini, V. Petlyakov (about 30 people including from Ukraine) (Король, 2002, 14). Most of the minds of the large industrial enterprises in Ukraine were also repressed including the management of Azovstal, Krivorozhstal and others. It led to the fact that the majority of progressive engineering developers including the military sphere were not placed at production. Repressions on the West Ukrainian lands, the deportations of the civilian population which were carried out by the Soviet power led to the fact that a part of the population of Ukraine did not wish to struggle with aggressors. Therefore along with heroism of the Soviet people cases of panic escape from the battlefield of the whole military divisions of the Red Army were observed. (Костенко, 2002, 39). One more important aspect which influenced the population of occupied territories was forced the withdrawal of the Soviet troops Receding, the Soviet troops made an awful impression. Without any control, without observing leaving tactics, fighters mixed up broke into separate groups of badly armed, demoralized people who tried to leave. Not all managed it, but the majority that got on the territories occupied by the German army lost any hope and trust to soviet leadership.

The trust to Soviet leadership was lost also by inhabitants of temporarily occupied territories, in particular, Kyiv where after the withdrawal of “Bolsheviks”, in cellars of People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs several hundreds of disfigured corpses with shot wounds were revealed, injured by something heavy. Among them, locals recognized the Ukrainian engineers, actors, famous in Kiev, etc. No less terrible spectacles were seen in the “Lukyanovsky prison” and in other premises of Kiev. There a large number of corpses of the tortured people were found. Not less awful events followed

evacuation and of other cities. Some days before Odessa invading all criminals were released.

The last two-three days prison was protected by the strengthened groups of "People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs". "In the middle of the prison, there was some vanity. For the second day after the entry into the city of the Romanian army in numerous cellars of prison was revealed a large number of corpses" (Пігідо-Правобережний, 2002, 105, 107). When Germans found cruelly killed people they showed them to locals as the eloquent proof of the Soviet policy. It did not add the authority to the Soviet power.

A week after the beginning of the war, the considerable territory of Western Ukraine was occupied. Residents of these lands were confused and therefore the first had to adapt to new conditions. In the "Report of the 213th Security Division of Wehrmacht" of July 27, 1941 it was said that the Ukrainian population of the West Ukrainian lands at first apprehended arrival of the German troops as a relief from "Bolshevist" domination. Polish population also not refused to cooperate with the new power. But later the situation changed. Doctor of Historical Sciences of the Sorbon University (Paris) and Ukrainian Free University (Munich) Vladimir Kosik in the researches explains that Ukrainians had a long-awaited opportunity and conditions for the creation of own authorities and security. According to Nazi invaders, their political "will" began "to wake up". At first, Ukrainians really showed readiness for cooperation with the German authorities. But over time, when the German troops moved ahead further in occupied territories and decreased, the aspiration of the population of Western Ukraine to independence raised more. Most brightly this desire was shown at residents of such cities as Lutsk, Rivne, Kovel, Ostrog, etc. The same V. Kosik noted that after "Germans decided not to allow Ukrainian to make autonomy in General Governorship", they met rather serious difficulties in the relations with the population of the Western Ukraine, but "in East direction territories from the Soviet-Polish the population in the first weeks of war accepted Germans as liberators" (Косик, 1998, 181–182).

The important role in moods of civilians of the most part of the Ukrainian lands played "agrarian question" and the policy of the occupying authorities in the agricultural industry. Most of the peasants were hostile in relation to the German authorities in the first months of war and showed readiness for cooperation. A considerable part of Ukrainians expected that Germans would bring improvements in social life. Also, increased people agreement with proclaimed private property law (Ніколаєць, 1999, 44–45). Innovations of enemies in the sphere of agricultural industry were not always approvingly perceived in all territory of Ukraine. For example, in the territory of Donbass

the German agrarian reforms met huge mistrust. The following was the main argument in this case: “Communists promised us so much, and so often deceived us, and Germans also only promise” (Ніколаєць, 1999, 54).

Political moods of the Ukrainian intellectuals in the occupied territory were not a less important factor. The analysis of agents special messages of “People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs” in the years of war allow to draw a conclusion of political moods in scientific, technical and creative layer. Intellectuals that already divided at the beginning of the war in two categories. Those who loyally treated the Soviet power and those who became puzzled from constant losses and starving.

Great efforts were required to the leadership of the USSR to recede from the administration mainline, about the leading role of the Russian people and to proclaim that the Soviet people were the citizens of the multinational state. At the same time, the country leaders urged Ukrainian and other people to protect the “Motherland” and its achievements. The reaction of the population of occupied territories to such changes in the policy of Soviet leadership was different. The behavior and political views of people depended on many factors: territories of accommodation, age, education, life experience, etc.

Most of the population of the” Left bank of Ukraine was loyally adjusted to the Soviet power. Most of the locals did not expect change from the German authorities, but at the same time, each person had own feelings, the aspirations which influenced his relationship to the events happening on the front line and the areas of Ukraine occupied by the fascist army. Each person had a miscellaneous attitude towards the enemy and to the Soviet power. In the first days of war the resident of Kiev Anna Trukhan wrote in the letter to the son: “You can give that feeling of hatred to German clique which started this war... Firmly I believe in the wise leadership of our country. I’m happy that I could grow up the defender – you, the sonny. Be quiet, firm, you know well what to protect...” (Рибченко, 2008, 252).

Such mood of the woman was explained by the existence of ideological stereotypes. All life she faithfully worked for a “Bolshevist system” and trusted in its strong ideals which she gave to the son.

But among inhabitants of the “Left bank”, there were those who after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops had absolutely other feelings. Among them there was a writer Arkady Lyubchenko who was pursued more than once by People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops. He noted: “It was feeling of freedom, independence. There are no meetings, plenums, conferences... It is not necessary to hurry anywhere – you are free. It is not necessary to report, does not prevail over you awful despotic and bureaucratic fists – you are free! Nobody interferes with your private life,

do that you want and as you want. Free! Nobody watches you though. But still, as a habit continue to look around, speak with lowered a voice, uncertainly, as the conspirator. Long-time I did not believe that it is already another reality, I can dispose of myself and the time as I want. Very pleasant feeling!" – he wrote in the diary (Рибченко, 2008, 253). Such feelings were short. As soon as the German administration began to show the true intentions, to kill people in large quantities, to send youth violently to Germany, to force to work for the sake of the "Third Reich", etc., people began to understand a true essence of activity of the Hitler's authority, and with it and to get rid of free life hopes and future welfare of the family and Ukraine.

From the report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany from August 31 till September 15, 1941, about a political and economic situation in Ukraine we see that the population of the Ukrainian SSR did not show a big political activity. Only an insignificant part pins hoped for the arrangement of the Ukrainian territory on arrival of the German army. In the report, it was also noted that Ukrainians expected, first of all, improvement of the financial position, realizing in what awful poverty they lived earlier. The population of "Eastern Ukraine" also did not show resistance. Moreover, the "Wehrmacht² was satisfied with the support of the local population in the organization of public life and local authority (Косик, 1998, 322).

Change of a situation at the front and in moods of the population of occupied territories was confirmed by the Report No.191 of the Chief of the "Security Police and Security Service" ("SD") on events in the USSR. The report defined the heterogeneity of the local population mood. It was shown that the Ukrainian intellectuals and student's youth gathered hoping for the future independence of Ukraine. It should be pointed out the characteristic fact that a considerable part of the population did not have enough belief in a final victory of Hitler's Germany over Soviet. They waited for a breakdown in the confrontation of two sides in order Ukraine would become independent. As far as a rural population the question about the "Land law" was in the first place. Political problems interested them much less. The population of the Central and Eastern Ukraine more depressed by the shortage of food and a question of survival in the conditions of occupation. In this part of Ukraine, a large number of the Soviet activists blowing up the power of the German administration which had not fixed on places yet.

The negative attitude of the local population to the occupying authority since the end of 1942 had been caused also by the destruction of their housing and personal plots. The greatest damage to a dwelling stock was caused in villages of Left-bank Ukraine. So, in 197 areas from 10295 rural settlements,

the fascist power burned and destroyed 6226 country estates. Destruction of countryside estates was caused by a variety of reasons: The discontent of peasants who arose because of robberies and violence, the manifestation of disobedience from the local population, a failure to follow orders of occupational administration, evasion from labor service, departure to Germany and many other things (Перехрест, 2005, 138–139).

The occupational policy of a Nazi government during this period was shown in two directions: robbery of the local population and its operation; the exile of people from own houses and their mass export for work in fascist Germany. On “East lands”, during 1942 all population: old men, women, pupils of schools were mobilized for forced labor. Corporations and factories made products only for Germans. Officers occupied places of the Ukrainian citizens and took them to hard work in Germany. It revolted the local population very much. People, as soon as could, evaded from sending for forced labor, disappeared, ran in guerrilla groups. The Ukrainian children peeled and hungry, wandered through the streets, and children of ethnic Germans – went out of town rest. The population was hostile to the Germans (Сергийчук, 2005, 54–55).

Miscellaneous was a moral and psychological condition of the population of Donbas, Poltavshchyna, Dnepropetrovshchina, Voroshilovgradshchina and the Kharkiv region. Not all Soviet citizens of this region of Ukraine believed that the German authorities would bring long-awaited freedom and independence of Ukraine. The situation was complicated also that the Soviet power continued to pursue political prisoners, and from the beginning of war began to shoot them. The number of death penalties to political criminals sharply increased from 1649 people in 1940 up to 9011 people in 1941 and 23278 people in 1942. (Попов, 1992, 28).

According to the “Guerrilla groups”, the moral and psychological condition and mood of the population of the Rivne, Zhytomyr and Kiev regions were such that the most part of the population looked forward to the Red Army. Even those who at the beginning of war waited for the arrival of the German army damned it and were ready to cooperate with guerrillas to bring closer arrival of the Soviet troops (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України. Фонд, 72).

During the war, both soldiers and civilians suffered from terror of two sides. “About 8000000 Soviet servicemen and 20000000 civilians were killed, died of diseases, hunger and other reasons connected with war” (Шевьяков, 1991, 9–10).

The moral and psychological condition of the population was influenced also by the policy of Hitler’s Germany and occupational administration by training

and culture. At the first months of the attack, the occupational administration opened initial educational institutions, various professional schools, gymnasiums and other educational institutions but the real policy of Nazis was shown in November-December, 1941 (Добров, Бистра, 2003, 57–58).

The real aspiration and plans of fascist Germany on educations of the Ukrainian population were quite reflected in Hitler's words that "the general education is decomposing poison. Everyone will have their own education level. Broad masses of slaves would be blessed to be illiterate" (Нюэль-Нойман, 1996, 13).

The policy pursued in temporarily occupied territories by Hitler's administration led to the fact that in all territory of "Reykhskomissariat Ukraine" and in a zone of military authorities began closing of all educational and educational institutions, stage-by-stage restriction of intellectual potential of the population of Ukraine and its opportunity to receive through some education. According to the historian Y. Y. Gritsak, during the German occupation in the territory of Ukraine 32930 schools, professional schools, technical schools, higher educational institutions and research institutions, 19200 libraries were destroyed and plundered. The majority of literature was taken out to Germany – 50 million. Books (Грицак, 1996, 30).

With the arrival of the fascist army on the territory of Ukraine and "Reykhskomissariat's Ukraine" the occupying authority allowed and even encouraged opening of the educational organizations, theatres and museums. It was caused by a variety of reasons. First, theatre put performances for the German soldiers, and, secondly, it was one more mechanism of dissemination of information among the population about helpful German state and its administration. Theatres were often used as the place for messages and the announcement of various resolutions and orders of occupational administration. Besides the loyal policy of Hitler's leadership to the Ukrainian theatrical activity, authorized commissioners carried out constant actions for inspection of actors and production directors on political reliability. As a result of such actions not only educational institutions but also theatres headed by the loyal to "new order" authorities. Most of the population watchfully treated visits to the theatre, tried to avoid them more often. Theatres in Zhytomyr, Sumy, Konotop, Dnipropetrovsk, Nezhin, Chernihiv, Mariupol, Kharkiv, etc. which worked in the first months of the Great Patriotic War in November-December, 1942 began to be closed or used only for Germans.

It was proved by publications in the monthly propaganda edition of OUN "Vilna Ukraina". In the article "Across Ukraine" which appeared on September 8, 1943, it was noted that "the German terror did not stop. Germans burn down villages. It is burned northern areas of Kyiv region. Lately, Hitler's government in Kyiv destroyed all manifestations of the

Ukrainian culture, all monuments... Cultural and educational life almost does not exist. Theatres and cinemas keep the German shelves only to catch the local population and to send to Germany...". A similar situation took place in Kirovohrad, Dnipropetrovsk, Kamyanets-Podilsky and in Lutsk (Державний архів Рівненської області, 14–15). Bright picture of the real cultural policy of the German occupational administration and its influence on a moral and psychological condition into the Ukrainian population was shown also in the brochure of OUN "For Independence". Here we read that in Kirovohrad cultural life faded. Newspapers appeared only in places of "Gebitskomissariat". The Ukrainian intellectuals, students and youth of school age which were not taken out to Germany had to be expelled for work. The work mode was toughened, frequent audits of food and reserves of grain were carried out.

The activity of occupational administration led to the fact that a considerable part of residents of the occupied areas began to think and compare the Soviet mode to existing. It directed to that Ukrainian citizens began support of Guerrilla movement. The "Nationalist Organizations" began the open fight against the occupying authority and troops of "Wehrmacht". In spring of 1942 in the Polesia forests of Rivne there were first paramilitary groups which would act as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA). Generally, in this military organization, there were active participants of the Ukrainian liberation movement and youth which threatened for work to Germany (Поліщук, 1998, 152–153).

Reports of propaganda of battalions analyzed the population attitude to religion, that the occupying authority created favorable conditions for activity of all faiths and received the favor of local population (Титаренко, 2005, 168–169). The revival of religiousness of the population of Ukraine under Nazi occupation was explained by the fact that at the time of political and economic problems when the faith in the power was lost, the person needed to hope for himself or for God. It was quite natural that in the conditions of Nazi occupation and hope for protection from the Soviet power people even more often began to address God. It should be noted that religious liberty of inhabitants was possible for two main reasons: tolerance towards believers from the German authorities and partial liberalization in the field of religious policy from the Soviet power. Except for the main faiths, during the German occupation actively began to carry out the promotion among the population various religious trends which activity was banned earlier. The historian, Y. Zinko claimed that revitalization of religious life, especially "Protestant Christian Communities" became an important consequence of the war in the USSR and Ukraine. (Зиновьев, 1991, 251). Representatives of various

religious trends carried out own promotion among the population. It was frequent even without the intervention of the occupying authorities. In the mentioned already German “Instruction on questions of carrying out the German policy in Ukraine”. It was said that in questions of religion it was necessary to show tolerance (Муковський, 1996, 54). Church attendants had an opportunity to begin the process of revival of religion.

“Reykhskomissar of Ukraine” E. Koch influenced religious processes in Ukraine published the order which consisted of plans for separation “Orthodox Church” into several confessional associations.

Adhering on the religious controversy he ordered that the Ukrainian autocephalous church being under Influence of “UAPT” should be supported. For years of Soviet power it was completely destroyed. In period of Nazi occupation the autocephalous church was restored gradually. In Western Ukraine a certain part of clergy and believers, especially Greco-catholic, supported the idea of creation of the Ukrainian state. Hoping for the support of the occupying authority metropolitan A. Sheptitsky addressed on July 5, 1941 clergy and believers with the letter: “At will of the Almighty and Gracious God a new era begins in the life of our Motherland. We welcome the invincible German army which had occupied already the whole edge with pleasure and gratitude for liberation from the enemy. Everybody who feels Ukrainian and wants to work for the benefit of Ukraine let’s forget about any dismantling”. Lets work in unity and consent on the restoration of destroyed by “Bolshevik’s our economic, educational and cultural life” (Вільне слово, 1941, 1). Similar moods dominated also among Autocephalous Ukrainian clergy at this time.

The youth who were sent to Germany incited against the German occupational policy. The assistant commissioner of the Sumy’s Guerrilla Komsomol organization wrote in the report that the youth was disappointed in the occupying authority, nearly one and a half year it was forbidden to gather, sing the Ukrainian songs, to dance national dances, to speak loudly. With great desire, they came to evenings and discussions which were led by guerrillas, listened about achievements and victories of the Soviet Army (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, 180–183). As a result of such policy, a considerable part of youth ran away to guerrillas and participated in performances against Hitler’s army, realizing consequences of Nazi domination on the Ukrainian lands.

Peasants were undeceived that agrarian reform would be undertaken and they were revolted that their land and property again were given to the new owners. On the general order No. 1 of July 9, 1941 collective-farm the cattle, cars, the arable land transfer to the German occupying authority. Besides, all

collective-farm property, peasants managed to stretch after the departure of the Red Army. It was demanded to return to appropriate authorities (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, 131–132). Awful situation and hopes of peasants for the better life, independent managing which was scattered in ashes became a reality of life. That time they ignored instructions of the German administration, A thicket helped guerrillas and waited for the arrival of the Soviet army.

At the beginning of 1942 position of the Ukrainian peasantry in the territory of “Reykhskomissariat Ukraine” and moods of the population worsen. The occupying authority felt strengthening of resistance. Most of the population was dissatisfied with the policy of the German occupational administration because of the increase in the prices, frequent arrests in the cities, sending workers to Germany, the shortage of food. In the German report of May 31, 1942, it was noted that in Eastern Ukraine the population actively showed the discontent and even more often it was possible to hear the words of damnation towards the German occupying authority (Косик, 1998, 233).

Considerably the moral and psychological condition of the local population in the fall of 1943 worsened. From the report of the commander of “Security troops” to the commander of the operational rear region of a group of “The South” armies of September 4, 1943, we know about worsens moods of the population. By the end of 1943. – beginning of 1944 resistance of the local population to the occupying authorities amplified. The youth which forced to go to Germany run away to forests. The orders of local administration were not carried out (Історія застерігає, Трофейні документи про злочини німецько-фашистських загарбників та їхніх пособників на тимчасово окупованій території України в роки Великої Вітчизняної війни, 1986, 151–152). From the information report of “OUN” in Kirovogradshchina, Nikolaev and Umanshchina in the fall of 1943 we learn that most of the population was adjusted bolshevism. However, they were afraid of the approach of the front and evacuation in Living in a moment. The fear of the German repressions was more than in other territories. In villages, many disappeared and did not go to Germany. Lots of talks about guerrillas, however, were not always favorable (Сергійчук, 2005, 301).

Analyzing a situation which developed at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, it is necessary to tell that short-sighted policy of the Stalin mode within which genocide of own people was carried out led to the fact that from the beginning of war against Nazi Germany, the Soviet people showed mistrust to the Soviet power, but also there were not mass actions against Hitler’s.

By the end of 1941 beginning of 1942 Stalin and Soviet government understood the need for special information space in the territory of the USSR, on occupied territories. What would convince the population that only the Soviet leadership was able to create necessary conditions for a victory against the fascist army and development in the future of the state? Soviet leadership managed to create such information space thanks to which actually the victory also became indisputable. Fight of two conflicting military opponents led to considerable pressure upon a moral and psychological condition of the population of occupied territories. Therefore, the behavior of inhabitants of “Reykhskomissariat Ukraine” and zones of military authorities was different.

The problem of effectiveness of German propaganda is considered to be extremely important. Influence of the German propaganda was during certain periods of war and in different territories of occupied Ukraine. Strengthening or weakening of influence depended on the activity of the Soviet propaganda. Impact on the consciousness of ordinary Ukrainian depended on what attitude to the Soviet power the population of the occupied territories expressed during the pre-war period.

It is difficult to define the influence of information space quantitatively. It is rather behind the morale of the population, physical and a sort of their occupations. The Western Ukraine population the intellectuals and military caring had the idea of creation of the independent state. They were ready to cooperate with Nazi invaders. Rather Central and East regions, the intellectuals only partially supported the occupying authorities trying to survive somehow under trying conditions. The rural population underwent the influence of Nazi propaganda only because believed in the destruction of a collective-farm system, receiving own ground and opportunity to have an independent economy. It seemed to be an absolutely insignificant part of the population that Germany as the European country would help Ukraine to lift economic and social development and to lift culture to a high level. A certain part of the Ukrainian society, really, cooperated with the German occupational administration. It is known that in each settlement there was created Ukrainian auxiliary police. Its main objective was the organization of laborers and supervision of it, direct participation in executions. Ask ourselves a question. Is there any population in the world which during war did not cooperate with the purpose of protection of own life or maintaining statehood during war?

If you turn to address Jewish documents showing the position of Jews, they can confirm the participation of Ukrainian in punitive actions. It is not confirmed by indications of the “Ynzattsgrupp” operating in Northern and Central Ukraine. In the territory of “Reykhskomissariat Ukraine” in one of the

reports, it was noted: “almost anywhere the population was not involved in actions against Jews”. In another report it was written that “the population almost has no anti-Semitism and racist ideological character” and “that for repressions against Jews the Ukrainian population lacks leaders and a spiritual heat” (Косик 1998, 157).

Summing up, it should be noted that the influence of the German information space on the population of occupied territories was huge. It is proved also by measures which were applied by the Soviet power in the freed territories. “Regional committees of the Communist Party” of Ukraine undertook to restore a cultural and educational network of institutions in the shortest possible time, earlier functioned in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. 2Regional committees” trained lecturers and speakers on gatherings of youth. Active work among pupils of schools and factory educational institutions was carried out. In those areas where recently there were German periodicals there was adjusted issue of large-circulation Soviet newspapers that period.

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