WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?

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Based on works by
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari
With the same name

Do we still need philosophy? – I don’t know; it is obvious that philosophy as the history of thought, the history of human spirit movement from “darkness to opposition” has the right to exist and to be studied not in a less degree, than, for instance, Homer’s poetry, but is it still urgent? Is it possible, and more important, is it necessary to think in a philosophic way today”? – There is a phrase of junior Marx scandalizing the reader: “Philosophy and studying the real world corresponds to each other as onanism and sexual love”\(^1\). Of course, the phrase is addressed to the Left Hegelians, but what if the Left Hegelians, unwittingly, exhausted the philosophy, found its end? One may recollect Engel’s work written much later “Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classic German Philology”, where the end of the German philosophy is understood as the end of philosophy: as far as theoretical science appears – the philosophy of nature comes to an end, as far as history of philosophy appears – the philosophy comes to an end, and so on. It is obvious that Engels did not see the philosophy of advertising in his dreams. – It is not about the issue that the Left-Hegelians lacked courage, Bruno Bauer paid for his views by leaving the position of an assistant professor, which for the German of that time, as for you and me, means the same as a fire for another Bruno, Giordano, even if speaking more prosaically, they lacked an effective approach to the world; they replaced the study of the world with philosophy, with abstracts, for example, based on history. – But what are the philosophical texts now? The texts of Deleuze or Baudrillard? These texts are political and not entirely political, aesthetic and not entirely aesthetic, economic and not entirely

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economic, historical and not entirely historical, a number can be continued, but the main thing is mentioned, these texts cannot be attributed to anything definite and, therefore, they relate to the indefinite, to philosophy — philosophy finds its place where it is “not entirely”, in a certain gap, somewhere between. If Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari write about a nomad, then he is not exactly a nomad, not a historical nomad, just like the Mongol in Max Stirner, they write about a nomad, placing this nomad at the place of something else, something that they neither else nor already can call by a proper name. In the preface to “Anti-Oedipus”, Michel Foucault formulates the main question that occupied our co-authors, “how not to become a fascist, especially if you are a revolutionary?” and answers “to love not something settled, but nomadic”. The nomad is something political, but not politically expressed. – In a line of political, aesthetic, economic, etc., the cornerstone element, an element without which the line will not exist, is political, philosophy has always been the occupation of a political person, but a political person in a particular non-political state, that is, in such a state they, could not make politics for one reason or another. As we know, Cicero, was philosophizing in exile, obviously, he, like his descendants, found that it was much more useful and more pleasant to make an experiment than to describe it, but he agreed to describe, if it was not possible to make it. Again, philosophy is described by the word “between”, between Rome and exile, between exile and Rome. – Philosophy brings things in the midst of times to life, it is the midst that determines such a special attitude to the political: The political with a capital letter, which is interesting to do and about which it is interesting to write, has already ended, the political, which exists now not worth spending time on it, it remains to anticipate the new Political, which has not yet come – one is “no longer ...”, the other is “not yet ...”. After the French Revolution the Left Hegelians write, namely, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, their last joint book “What is Philosophy?”, it was published in 1991, – after the Russian Revolution, which for the most part is invisibly present in their book and only sometimes reveals itself, speaking its own language; both those and that ones write after great events and great defeats, in a very unpleasant time, if for no other reason than the writer himself is out of time, he rather belongs to the past or future than to the present, bygone or pending, timeless of the writing
person determines the timelessness of their language, the emergence of all these non-historical Mongolian nomads. When in Rome, Cicero speaks against Catilina, when in exile, he writes “in general”. – In philosophy, it is a common belief that timelessness is a virtue, but it is a virtue from weakness; in those moments when the history is being made, it will not come into someone’s mind to use an abstract, timeless language, to appeal to the nomads and the Mongols.

Young Marx has another far more famous phrase, which today is probably also scandalizing: “religion is opium for the people”. But this is its common representation, in its context it sounds a little different: “Religion is a sigh of an oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of soulless orders. Religion is opium for the people”\(^2\). It is not about the “conspiracy of the priests”, it is about the expression of a certain need, but the need of an oppressed creature, which is not capable of anything and desperate to free itself. – What, if taking into account all the above mentioned, the philosophy is the same sigh? Or, to be exact, a sigh of an oppressed but educated creature, the opium for the intellectual? – This idea is not so seditious, if taking into account, that, firstly, in the German classics, philosophy, religion and art were considered as different forms, but of the same thing, secondly, that philosophy often led to religion, it was the same on the days of Rome decline and on the days of the reaction of the 1910s. – There is a temptation to say “yes”, empty words and moralism have almost merged with philosophy, constantly and inevitably, but we can not ignore the special role that philosophy can play in its, actually its moment, the moment of pause – the reproduction of opposition by traditional means available to it, anxiety thoughts, this philosophy prepares the future, although, does not generate it of course. If Hegel is right and the owl of Minerva is flying out in twilight that is after the completion of historical action, – so, it is flying out for any reason?

I. – Agon or Anti-Habermas

In 1991, when the book “What is Philosophy?” was published, works of Jürgen Habermas came into fashion, who used almost Marx’s

language, but without Marxian fighting spirit, almost Marx, but tamed; it seemed that Jürgen Habermas took from Marx all the best, critical, and at the same time he did not lose his moral sense, his persistent notations about the advisability and usefulness of compromise, consensus seemed to be a powerful weapon against Marx’s intolerance, he moralized in the old German spirit, but no one noticed it. – It’s not that we all fall in love with a compromise, our love for compromise ends at the first objection, but a compromise as an idea, as a figure of speech, ideology, can finally be successfully opposed to those people who don’t believe in a compromise, I don’t even know why. There is no need to reach a compromise in practice, but you have to believe in it, a compromise is a matter of belief. – Jürgen Habermas believed in the compromise and taught this to others. – It is necessary to have this context in mind to appreciate the words of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari that philosophy does not tolerate debates, that it is neither “communication rationality” nor “world democratic dialogue”. Of course, we are talking about philosophy, but you have to be too insensitive to the political in order not to notice the political here. Not a dialogue, finishing in a constant consensus, but agon, rivalry, struggle, and someone’s victory. – On the one side, morality or better: moralism, on the other – awakening from it, a kind of return of vision lost after Habermas. – Of course, we are not used to Deleuze and Guattari’s word – agon, which they define in Athens spirit as “rivalry of free people, athleticism raised to the common principle” again, that is they use the same timeless language, the language, describing Athens and not entirely Athens, describing something else, apart from Athens. Whether to Athens or something else – but the word “agon” brings us back to something, it gives us back the time with all its timelessness, it gives us back history with all its out-of-historicity.

Jürgen Habermas describing his consensus referred to Julius Froebel, published in 1847 his book “The System of Social Policy”, in which, apparently, he anticipated Habermas to such degree that Habermas could no longer write, if there was not the old truth that the truth became truer after repetition. It is worth drawing attention to Froebel’s name, if

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only because it’s the same Froebel with whom our reader is familiar with in Engels’ work of “Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany”. That is, Froebel is the very happy man, happy not by philosophic happiness, who, having published a book in 1847, already a year later, in 1848, had a chance to test it in practice, becoming a deputy of the famous Frankfurt meeting, called “professorial”. – It is noteworthy that such different people, sharing views very little in some points, Engels and Bakunin, agree in the assessment of the Frankfurt meeting, they consider it to be truly German, truly professorial, truly talkative and truly incapable of action. – However, Froebel was even luckier when he became a member of the Assembly; he was sent by the Assembly together with Robert Blum to the insurgent Vienna. Robert Blum, whose, according to Engels, “plebeian nature won over uncertain political convictions”, understood that the fate of the German revolution was being solved in Vienna and took an active part in the defense of the city, for which was shot after conquest of Vienna. Froebel, having found the opposing sides in Vienna unable to compromise, left for Frankfurt to continue his investigations there. – Jurgen Habermas would have to explain what prevented Froebel, such a compromise connoisseur, from finding a compromise in Vienna and at the same time saving Robert Blum and the bridge over the Danube.

The issue is not that compromise is bad, but that it is only possible to find a compromise in works on compromise. When Habermas blames Marx and Engels during the period of the Paris Commune that having understood socialism as “the embodiment of certain morality,” they forgot about the forms of communication, the forms in which all involved in the issue have to “agree among themselves, come to the same opinion”, he is, above all, inaccurate, taking a step back, to Froebel, he describes Marx and Engels in unusual terms for them. If the young Marx could still say “the embodiment of concrete morality,” although, even the young Marx avoided putting moral concepts in the place of real movement, then, neither Marx nor Engels would not have said so in the period of the Paris Commune. It is not enough to say that Habermas himself puts moral

7 Хабермас Ю. Демократия. Разум. Нравственность. Московские лекции и интервью. М.: Academia, 1995, с. 43.
concepts about this movement in place of the actual movement, but he makes this replacement in all the texts concerned, as a result it appears that his opponents, Marx and Engels, lacked only a little thing, to rewrite from Froebel. However, Marx and Engels could not rewrite from Froebel, because, as we saw, Froebel “did not work”. – “Here we should see, as clearly as possible, one of the lines of philosophy that makes philosophy almost an abusive word, something shameful – moralization; a moral philosophy make us blind for the very best of reasons. Moralization is a disease spreading in the absence of a real activity, and if taking into account, that philosophy flourishes at such moments, at the moments of pauses between historical actions, it becomes clear why moralization is almost inevitable its companion, but it is a companion that does not prepare to action, but on the contrary grabs the hands, holds back, makes the action impossible even when its time has come. – The trouble with the Frankfurt meeting was not a lack of intelligence, but the fact that its mind was governed in the wrong direction, it was idle.

It is better to scandalize than to moralize. – People are likely to nod their heads, listening to the moralist, and, they are more likely to disagree with a brawler, but disagreement is just necessary, it sharpens the eyesight. – When Deleuze and Guattari write: “Didn't Socrates turn philosophy into a free friendly discussion? Is this not the peak of Greek sociability – conversations of free people? In fact, Socrates constantly generated something that made any discussion impossible – be it in the short form of agon (questions and answers) or in the long form of rival speeches”, Socrates did something that turned the conversation into a “merciless monologue eliminating one rival after another»

- then don’t we hear in this something that we felt when reading Plato? While reading the Platonic dialogues, didn’t we feel that with Socrates’ appearing the discussion did not flare up, but fade away? Yes, if we didn’t weigh the general opinion over us, we would have seen long ago, to what extent when Socrates took the discussion into his own hands, only his voice began to sound, and the others sometimes echoed. The point, of course, is not that Socrates acted badly; rather we act not well, subordinating Socrates to our concepts of the good. – The concepts of good, which the

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German burgher developed and Kant spread, were developed within the boundaries of the most limited practice, by people who, in fact, had no idea about the political because there was no political in their life. “You can because you must”, Schiller made fun of this ethic. – For example, you can tell the truth because you must do it. However, should Zeno tell the truth? Zeno, known to us as the inventor of aporia, participated in the political life of Velia city, being captured by a tyrant on suspicion of conspiracy, he named the tyrant’s bodyguards instead of his fellow conspirators, so he lied, but the tyrant believed him and executed his bodyguards and was killed by fellow conspirators. Zeno could tell the truth, strictly speaking, it was more difficult in his position not to tell the truth, but the great question was, did he have to tell it? From the point of view of any categorical imperatives any Greek does not look very good. – Not Zeno’s categorical nature, however, casts a shadow on his aporia, did Zeno himself think that there was no movement, or did he lie in favor of his teacher, and some say his lover, Parmenides, just as he did in favor of democracy? But it does not matter, the question posed by Zeno in his aporia “how to think the movement?” does not lose anything if Zeno has not spoken seriously, nor does it acquire anything if Zeno has not made jokes. – Socrates turns the conversation into a merciless monologue, not as a result of some regrettable intolerance, but because his conversation serves as a preparation for action, with all the seeming morality of Socrates’ conversations, his morality is subordinated to politics and political action. Did Socrates, so freely engaged in myth-making, believe in Gods?

Not a compromise, but agon – this is what follows from the very essence of the action. The agon is, as we already know, the rivalry of free people, – the rivalry for what? – for the opportunity or the right to change, to remake something, that is, the famous thesis of Marx about changing the world, is already implicitly present in Socrates, who really wanted to change, remake his own policy, – to capture something and remake, remake in his own way. But only one can capture something, not by virtue of their unsociability, but by virtue of the fact that something can be changed only in one way. A compromise, possible in a state of idleness, becomes impossible in action. – “This is the situation, – Deleuze and Guattari write, – constantly described by Plato: when any citizen claims
something, they will surely meet they rivals, which means that the ability to judge the validity of the claims is necessary. A carpenter claims a tree, but comes upon a forester, a coalminer, a carpenter who says: “I am a friend of the tree”\(^9\). – The only compromise that is possible here is “not to touch the tree!”, but this is a compromise of idleness that is good for the parties as long as none of them have the strength to capture the tree, for example, the carpenter and the coal miner leave the tree in the hands of the forester, their enemy, until they can capture the tree \textit{without} an ally. The forester wants the tree to grow, the carpenter wants to make a bench, the coalminer wants it to be charcoal, since the tree cannot be everything at the same time, then ... – A compromise is possible on the eve of the action, for example, the carpenter and the coalminer may agree that it is necessary to cut down the tree, but after they cut down the tree, their compromise will last until they clarify, including for themselves, their attitude regarding \textit{the future} of this tree that has \textit{already} been cut. The first periods of revolutions are the history of such compromises. To assume a \textit{lasting} compromise means to assume that the carpenter will make a decision that the best destiny for a tree is to become charcoal, and he will refuse of the tree in favor of the coalminer, that is, he will give up his art and himself, strictly speaking, this is not a compromise, but a coalminer’s victory gained as a result of the carpenter’s avoidance of the struggle. – The forester, the carpenter and the coalminer argue because of the tree if there is no an instance that can judge their dispute. It is interesting that Deleuze and Guattari give a \textit{non-}philosophic example with the tree: typical of Greek philosophers was rivalry \textit{because of a boy}, and we can read quite a lot about it in Plato’s “Feast”, that is, about the one who is able to judge, choose among rivals someone to whom \textit{he} will trust to change himself or his education, that is \textit{why actually the boy}, but the tree, unlike the boy, cannot judge and choose – whether it wants to be coal or a bench? – We argue if there is no the other-sided instance, which is on the other side of our dispute; any judge is inevitably in a certain position in relation to the tree, for example, the forester judges from the point of view of the highest justice seen by the forester’s \textit{eyes}.

We came back where we started – philosophy does not tolerate discussions – sure, we argue because of the tree, but there is no point to argue, in fact, our concepts, in this case, these are the images of the future tree “a bench”, “coal”, – are indisputable, the carpenter likes benches, and the coalminer likes coal. “Communication, – write Deleuze and Guattari, – always comes too early or too late, and conversation is always unnecessary in relation to creative work.”\(^{10}\). – Something we are doing now is unnecessary in relation to creative work, in this sense, Marx’s scandalizing phrase, which I used to start the article with, is correct; we are busy talking, because we are not busy creating, – we have already had either a collapsed bench, or burned coal, and the question “in what will we turn trees into, into benches or coal?” refers us either to history or to the future. – “Too earlier – too late” – this phrase is familiar to us, putting our conversation into between-the-time, or in twilight, when Minerva’s owl is flying out again; this is a conversation taking place not to make us asleep, its conclusions might lose any meaning at noon, a favorite image of Hoelderlin and Nietzsche, but they might have a certain value now, as something we worry about.

II. – Immanence, or Anti-transcendence

Moralization, or a conversation from the point of morality view, requires a kind of other-sided instance, being outside the conversation, the must-be world, or, using philosophic language, transcendental ones. On the contrary, agon as a rivalry, and we have seen it, reveals regardless of any external instance, removes it; agon is not immanence, something that exists, exists in some certainty and has the name of “immanence”, it, using the expression of Deleuze and Guattari, “reveals the plan of immanence”, actually agon is the creative work, the lasting creative work. – We are interested not in the fact that we received a bench, not the result, which is called “a bench”, but the process of its production, the very new “plan”, that new relationship, which was appearing and is appearing in the struggle for the tree-for-the bench and, in fact, for metamorphose of the tree into the bench; if someone gave out ready-made benches, we would refuse to take them. Therefore, a philosopher as a

lover, an admirer of wisdom, someone who does not possess wisdom, but pursue it, is in a winning position in comparison with God who possesses wisdom. To be more exact, here I have made an important mistake defined by the fact that I came from Plato, and I made it intentionally, with the purpose to have an occasion to say: wisdom as opposed to a boy (I allow myself this Hellenic liberty) can not be pursued, because it does not exist in that sense in which the boy exists, so it does not exists as something given, independent of our pursuit, the boy will not die if we lose our interest in him, although, it is possible that he will get sad, then it, wisdom, exists only in our pursuit, it is generated because we pursue it, and disappears, when we has just stopped its pursuit, – dead wisdom, left by us, is not wisdom anymore. – It is interesting that our eyes follow the process, they are captured by the process, but don’t pay attention to the result in the texts that I call philosophical. This takes place because we have never been satisfied with the results, or at least have not been satisfied until now. If the results were different, the process of creative work would not stop, creative work would last, and it would be noon, Minerva’s owl would not fly out, so a somnolent pause, which we would fill with conversation, would not start. – “Is that true that all efforts are useless, if suffering lasts forever, and revolutions do not experience their own victories? However, the success of revolution is in revolution itself, in the very vibrations, mergers and discoveries, which it gave to people at the time, when it was taking place, and which themselves represent the ever-arising monument like burial mound, where every new traveller brings stone by stone. The revolution victory is immanent and it lies in those new connections that it establishes between people, even if they are no more lasting than the material melt that forms it, and soon they give way to split and betrayal”\textsuperscript{11}. – In this passage, which I allowed myself to cite so extensively, Deleuze and Guattari discuss a possible monument to the revolution, a monument that would not be a tomb, but would wake up feelings again and again connected with the revolution. – It is about the process or the result? – It is likely that every result as a result, as something that is standing, completed, can be only dead, a tomb stone, the result only can exist as split and betrayal, not only because someone or

\textsuperscript{11} Делёз Ж, Гваттари Ф. Что такое философия? М.: Академический проект, 2009. С. 205.
we, as discussing something, strive for a split or betrayal, however, because there has been no split or betrayal yet, it is not becoming, but emerging. Deleuze and Guattari want to erect a monument not to the dead, but alive, – to the process, revolutionary immanence. – Before writing a passage that I have cited, Deleuze and Guattari cite a passage from Osip Mandelstam’s “Noise of Time”, the work “revealing a plan of immanence”, they quote Mandelstam’s considerations that we are acquiring the language under the sound of the century, it is a very interesting idea, if we consider that Mandelstam revealed in all his tragic power under the noise of the 30s, his youth experienced the distant thunderstorms of revolution (he did not ignore the school passion for the ideas of two leading revolutionary parties of the time such as the social democrats and the socialist revolutionaries), there were its sunset reflections on his death. However, a little further than the abstract cited by Deleuze and Guattari, Mandelstam writes: “Nature is a revolution – eternal thirst, inflammation (probably, it is jealous of centuries that humbly quenched their thirst in a family way, going to a sheep watering)”12. – Maybe, the centuries, travelling to a sheep watering, dreamt about eternal thirst and inflammation, and the sheep watering itself dreamt to turn into something like in Lope de Vega. Eternal thirst and inflammation is the very immanence, its ever-revealing plan. – The revolution, Mandelstam continues, is afraid of gaining something from the hands of others; we, as I have had an occasion to notice, have no interest in receiving a ready-made bench. – As for the monument, in Platonov’s “Chevengur”, that is, “Chevengur” by Andrei Platonov, a monument is being built in the true Deleuze spirit – two intersecting figures, a figure of eight – the symbol of eternal time, of eternal establishment – and the standing two-pointed arrow – the symbol of the infinite space. – “It can be said that immanence is the most urgent touchstone of any philosophy, since it assumes all the dangers that the philosophy has to face, all the condemnations, persecutions and denials that it undergoes. By that fact, it is proved that the problem of immanence is not abstract and not purely theoretical. It is not clear at the first sight, why immanence is so dangerous, but anyway, it is true. One can recognize the philosopher on

what he gives to immanence as a ransom – as a ransom for fire”¹³. I allowed myself to cite this, in my opinion, the great text by Deleuze and Guattari, rather extensively. The problem of immanence is not entirely philosophic, although it is expressed in strange words, and not entirely political, because it is expressed in strange words. The problem of immanence is a philosophical one within our context, that is, the problem of a political person, but in a specific state – detachment from politics; since they formulate it, being removed from politics, they formulate it as a speculative problem, since they mean future actualization; they formulate it – as political. – “Long live to immanence!” “Down with transcendence!” It is unlikely that slogans can be political. However, they can be slogans, I will use Marx’s word “season”, which he uses to define a certain inter-world, a certain garden, where the sage of Epicurus went to, so they can be the very slogans produced in this “season” – is that what Deleuze and Guattari do? At certain points in history, politics is born in the circles of the Left Hegelians or in version of Chernyshevsky. (I will ignore every kind of medieval heresy which Deleuze and Guattari refer to.) – The danger of immanence arises from here. And hence the fact that immanence is the touchstone of any philosophy. – Why is not philosophy a sigh of an oppressed, though educated, creature? The opium of an intellectual person? Since it does not introduce the transcendental. Since it decides to render immanence in its immanence only to itself, a world without instances external to it, a movement without a promised good result. If only you quit then it turns into a refined religion. Or the same things, but in political language. What does it mean to quit? – Introduce the transcendent, – God in the language of religion, the state in the language of politics. To quit in the language of politics is to recognize what has become, this does not mean denying the “revealing of the immanence plan” “in general”, but it means to refer this “plan” to its revealing to the past, once it was revealing and revealing and now it has won, it has won and stopped revealing; the “Marseillaise” became the anthem of the French Republic after 1871 – is it not the evidence of victory? Once philosophy has conceded, it turns into official wisdom, perhaps even completely liberal. (But the “Marseillaise” after 1871 is not

the same as the “Marseillaise” of 1793. And so on.) – And one more thing
to be considered: Deleuze and Guattari are not against the results, but the
result they are looking for should not deny the process; in their own
language, they formulate something that Hegel, after the French
Revolution, called the problem of “non-objective objectivity”, that is,
something of this kind that would be objective enough to exist, and not
sufficiently objective to be dead. – “To attach consistence not to lose
something from infinity”¹⁴, – they write using their strange, not less
strange than in Hegel, language.

III. – Who – Whom?

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari cite, as I have already
mentioned, an interesting abstract from Osip Mandelstam, so I will
follow them: “The birth-related tongue –tied language is over me and
my contemporaries. We learned not to speak, but to babble – and just
listening to the growing noise of the century and the whitening of the
foam of its crest, we acquired a language.”¹⁵ – It seems to me that the
tongue-tied language, which occupies a special place in the texts of
Deleuze and Guattari (probably, that is why they focused on this
particular abstract from “The Noise of Time”), is the best definition of
the language of philosophy, – the language of philosophy is tongue-
tied, philosophy hardly speaks. Everyone knows that the language of
philosophy is not like human one, philosophers are proud of it, but what
are they proud of? – The language of young Hegel, covered by the wind
of the French Revolution, is much clearer, more human-like than
Hegel’s old language; the language of young Marx is more foggy than
the language of Marx after 1848, that is, after the beginning of a new
cycle of historical action. The philosophy, appeared from the need of
between-the-time, as well as Mandelstam, appeared in the “indifferent
years of Russia”, still can’t speak, but only babble, strange and
understandable things only to it, and the philosopher, as a happy
mother, is proud that they alone understand the babble of their child
who already demonstrates superior intelligence; it, the philosophy, has
still to learn to talk with the century and, perhaps, having learned, it


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will cease to be a philosophy. And yet, a happy mother is right, that she hears superior intelligence in her child’s babble, this *intelligence is not yet able to speak, but already speaks to the future.* – “The revolution is so absolute deterritorialization that it appeals to the new land and the new people”[^16], – Deleuze and Guattari write in a high style. *The revolution* appeals to a new land and a new people. *Philosophy* appeals to a new land and a new people. – The *coupling* of revolution and philosophy, philosophy and revolution, occurs not only in *absolute deterritorialization*, but also in the *babbling* resulting from this deterritorialization, the new people are not yet able to speak, they are *inventing* their own language. – The experience of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, babble and invention of the language is given very well in Andrei Platonov’s “Chevengur”. – A new language is being *produced* along with a new relationship, as well as a participant in this relationship, a person. – Philosophy mumbles not from strength, but from weakness, it cannot think clearly until something that it thinks about is not started to produce, – its strength, if you like, is that it can babble about something before it starts to be produced; that is why philosophy values *every* coupling so much – hence the incredible interest in a couple of months of the Paris Commune; only by the fall of 1917 in its voice, the voice of the Paris Commune, childish notes appear (before that it speaks like an adult), but by the fall of 1917 its experience, the experience of this coupling, is clearly not enough for “The State and the Revolution”. – There are books that, according to the author’s plan, were not completed, but this was their *best* ending: “The State and Revolution” has an open end, an end revealing that something said was babble, and a new language must appear, must be produced (produced more in tune with the twentieth century, not natural, but human-made). – And here I am almost tempted to say: only utopias do not babble, but therefore they will not grow up, they are unhappy, just like a homunculus. But…

Deleuze and Guattari return their original meaning to utopia: *nowhere, which can be everywhere.* This is their “absolute deterritorialization”. – So, that is not the order of the new society laid out

in advance on the shelves, but something quite opposite. – In this nowhere, which can be everywhere, there is a coupling of philosophy and politics, sliding as tumbleweed on the surface of the earth; philosophy can couple everywhere and give such a valued and unique coupling. In this slide on the surface, in these couplings, the world loses its lines on the squares of countries; by the way, here the French cinema is to keep up with the texts, let us look at, for example, “The Chinese Woman” by Jean-Luc Godard, which represents the experience of the coupling of Paris students, Beijing radio and Russian literature. Something that we read or watch has been already there – in the disturbed Europe of 1848, Mikhail Bakunin commanded the battles in Dresden. – Marx and Engels begin their “Manifesto” with a ghost, a ghost wandering around Europe – what is that, if it is not an experience of perfect deterritorialization and perfect depersonalization? The ghost is trying its vocal cords in the “Manifesto”. – It is interesting that we have no one who speaks, and no one to whom they speak; there is neither the one nor the other, but both become and are produced in the process of speaking, although speaking alone is not enough, hence there is melancholy for couplings. The ghost must have a body, the vocal cords, which it tries in the “Manifesto”, there is its first corporal organ. Someone who speaks has not been produced yet, and Engels, with the sincerity of the German, complains that he, like his brothers, knows too little about the real world: our entire communism, he wrote more than once, philosophical, we have to learn the world. – The ghost finds a body in a coupling. – “Indeed, it is in utopia where the coupling between philosophy and its epoch is fulfilled <...> thanks to utopia, philosophy becomes politics and brings to a culmination the criticism of their age,”17 – Deleuze and Guattari write, understanding utopia as absolute deterritorialization. – It is interesting that in this thought I find an echo of my own, my thought about philosophy as a daughter of between-the-time, avoiding the pitfalls of refined religion and bureaucratic wisdom, thanks to the fact that despite everything, it continues to appeal to the future and ceasing to be philosophy at that very moment, when the future responds to its call and at that moment it acquires an intelligible

language, a political language. So, the ghost finds its body in the coupling, and the place of coupling is fundamentally deterritorialized. In other words, the old disputes on the subject “who will begin and who will finish” do not produce anything but idle talk, someone who will have to begin – will begin, someone who will have to finish – will finish, and no one will be relieved of responsibility. — “... we see the revolution as a plan of immanence, an endless movement, absolute hovering – but as long as these features combine with the most real struggle against capitalism here and now and stubbornly start a new fight every time when the old fight ends in betrayal” 

18 — the same Deleuze and Guattari write in the same work. — The same thing is with the result: we are for the result, but such a result that does not fall on the process as a gravestone; we are for a struggle here and now, if you like within the boundaries of a given national square, but such a struggle that does not produce national limitation. — And this is what Deleuze and Guattari describe with the word “nomad”, a word in which the political aspect pulsates, but which is still not political. — “I would describe it through Mikhail Svetlov’s Grenada, — Grenada, which shuffles everywhere and nowhere in incredible ways and establishes equally improbable causal connections between everywhere and nowhere when action here means change there.

“For everyone and no one,” — said Friedrich Nietzsche. — That is: to the new land and to the new people.

IV. — Some Conclusions

We have approached to the boundaries of philosophy, which are not crossed by philosophy. — Philosophy does not produce anything, it makes us capable of production, namely, as you will, and it produces us as those who are capable of production. Friedrich Engels in “Ludwig Feuerbach ...” writes that one thing remains for philosophy – thinking. What does it mean? Obviously, not the fact, that philosophy gives advice to physicists — such reading is grotesque. “We lack the resistance to real”19, — Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari write. To think is to resist, so, when Engels writes that one thing remains for philosophy — thinking, this

19 Ibidem. — С. 126.
means that one thing remains for it – resistance. – Philosophy, to the extent that it was worthy of its name, had always resisted, even in its form, that today we call “natural philosophy”. Philosophy, natural philosophy, did not discover a single physical law, it did not produce natural science, but, resisting the gods, it made possible the fact that scientists appeared one day. Resisting the gods, it resisted the present – at that time the gods were the real force. “Did not ancient Moloch rule?” – asked young Marx. It was not about explaining a physical phenomenon, but about the human right to explain these phenomena. Epicurus was probably the first to realize it, who did not explain physical phenomena, but it was enough for him to list possible hypotheses; he left explanations to those who would come after him, but he defended their right to come – phenomena, including celestial ones, belong to people, not to gods. In history of philosophy, it’s interesting not only that someone was thinking about the Sun, but that, while thinking about the Sun, he resisted. As my beloved Roman Titus Lucretius wrote:

“In those days, when in front of everyone,
The life of people dragged out miserably on earth
Under oppression of religion,
From the sky areas showed its head, looking from there
With the terrible face to mortals, defeated down,
Hellen dared to turn his mortal eyes for the first time
Against it and was brave to resist”\(^{20}\).

Did Epicurus have any chance to win? Who was stronger: the present or Epicurus? It is possible that Lucretius exaggerated Epicurus’ battle enthusiasm in a Roman style, so I will leave this aside. It is important that the philosopher decides to oppose the present when no one else dares to do it, but does not even feel the real yoke of it. Epicurus friends renewed the fight over and over again, and we find quotes from Lucretius notable marks from Michel Montaigne, Paul-Henri Holbach, Karl Marx and even from our friends, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. – Resistance is not rational, in this sense philosophy is not so rational, as we are used to believe, it is subordinated to its will, and it does not want

\(^{20}\) Тит Лукреций Кар. О природе вещей. М.: Художественная литература, 1983. С. 29.
to resign. What sense is in resistance if the present is powerful, the future is vague, and the past consists of defeats? Philosophy is stubborn in its own way. – “To wish war in spite all future and past wars, to wish agony in spite of all death, to wish a wound in defiance of all scars, in the name of becoming, not eternity”\textsuperscript{21}, – Deleuze and Guattari write and notice that this is how philosophy becomes a worthy of the event. “What are Deleuze and Guattari doing?” In the preface to their work, they notice that they were engaged in the search for “What is philosophy?” closer to midnight; and it is closer to midnight – the coincidence of their personal and public history, their personal old age and old age of all that received impulse in 1917. – If Noon is the time for action and time without philosophy, then Midnight is a time for somnolence, for some people, but for others, who cannot sleep, it is the time of the bravest dreams in reality – time for philosophy. If we did not fall asleep at Midnight, then we lost control of ourselves, carried away by the thought to that place – to the new land and to the new people. – The philosopher accepts the event; nothing is more stupid than to declare “I did not want this!”, accepts defeat, but does it not to give up the action, but to start over from the beginning. – To become worthy of the event does not mean to judge it, as if all the people of the past only lived for us to judge them; besides, the event gives us much more than we give to it by our praise or censure. – The whole value of the book “What is philosophy?”, as well as the whole value of philosophy closer to midnight, is in the fact that it supports our spirit, it tells us “despite midnight, despite all past defeats, no one must give up on themselves”. It is where “no one” replaces “me,” as in Odyssey’s famous answer. – Lucretius writes, when the invisible sword is already raised over Rome, when the Mind is about to be brought to the altar of either Cybele, or Isis, or Christ, and yet the struggle will be won by Lucretius. With his win – natural philosophy will become redundant. However, Lucretius himself will not become redundant as the one who teaches no longer the nature of things, but resistance. – Resisting, the philosophy preserves the dignity, the dignity of the person, the one who wants to hold the head high. It is necessary to understand that at midnight, when history consists of defeats, and the

present is empty, only philosophy and more poetry can give a person this right, or rather, they do not give this right, because it cannot be given – they, philosophy, poetry and a person take this right, they take it independently. – Philosophy lives for death and the death of nature philosophy is the victory of Lucretius; living for death, denying itself, philosophy becomes worthy of its event. And there is nothing more stupid than the philosophy that wants to be eternal.

**SUMMARY**

Do we need philosophy today? Today’s philosophy is multiplying greatly, as Ockham would say, over necessary; there is even philosophy of advertising. Is such eternal producing of philosophies a proof of their right to exist or, on the contrary, it appears that the existence of the philosophy has no sense any more? Since theoretical natural science arises – the nature philosophy comes to an end. Since the science of history arises then the philosophy of history comes to an end. Engels thought in “Ludwig Feuerbach” this way, adding: there is only one thing that is left for philosophy – thinking but what does thinking mean? What does “philosophical thinking” mean? To think is to resist, philosophy is nothing but resistance. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari in their book “What Is Philosophy?” give the lost meaning to philosophy, and at the same time, they give us, the readers, the right to resist the present, the right for dream and dignity.

**REFERENCES**


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