

Chalyi A. O.

Postgraduate Student

*State Institution "Institute of World History
of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine"
Kyiv, Ukraine*

ECONOMIC REASONS OF XVIIITH CENTURY OTTOMAN AND SPANISH EMPIRES DECLINE

Ottomans and Spaniards faced not just the mythical decline and stagnation but caused by exact reasons: **lack of industrialization (production with high surplus value), hush incorporation of Ottoman and Spanish Empires into World-Economy, lack of real and concise protectionism policy and ineffective fiscal system and policy.**

If we acknowledge standard view on economic growth for pre-industrial economies (and for XVIII century all economies were pre-industrial) was from 0.1 to 0.5 regarded as highly successful and up to 1% per year growth (for the beginning of industrialization) we will have numerous usually contradictory data's fro level of economic development of the Ottomans [1, p. 112]. As for the industrial (or rather handcrafted goods with high value) we can only assume that fro the 1815 and so on the rate of western domination increased each year, that only can lead us to thought that rather Ottomans mismanaged to organize production or western states were already on that level which was sky high for the ottoman economy [2, p. 65], keeping in mind, that for till 1760 European countries were slightly industrialized or bureaucratized enough to erect capitalism as a mode of production and whole economic system [3, p. 23]. While the Spanish economy only underwent extensive, as opposed to intensive, growth during the 16th century, even that was followed by a dramatic decline in the 17th century, before an 18th century recovery [4, p. 12]. During the XVIII stagnated with -0,1% per annum average, and began to rise only in the XIX with 0,3% averagely [5, p. 2]. And the rate of inequality (disparity in income of 10% of wealthiest and 40% of poorest spaniards) was 17 times as for England and France, which were richer than Spain [6, p. 8]. The Ottoman empire's economy stayed in global trends that began to shuffle in the 1760s [7, p. 177]. An infamous price revolution and its consequences for the Ottoman economy, stated by Ömer Lutfi Barkan had a lot been overestimated even if not fallible [8, p. 85]. The stagnation of commercial activities, mainly brought about by local unrest, reached its nadir during the last decades of the eighteenth century [9, p. 28].

As clearly Mehmet Genç mentioned: between the XVI and early XIX centuries the decisions on the state and economic matters were not solely based on a system of production and management of material wealth, but usually interconnected with political, religious, military, financial aims and operations, that was widespread whether the Ottomans or Spaniards did this [10, p. 175]. In Ottoman case this statement being highly debatable and Virginia Reeves-Ellington stated, that Immanuel Wallerstein made serious contribution into highlighting socio-cultural aspects of Ottoman incorporation, but economic consequences, emphasized as disastrous was lately debunked by economic historians Reşat Kasaba and Mehmet Genç [11, p. 11]. But still, As the Ottoman Empire became more integrated into world commodity markets, increased specialization took the form not only of rising exports of wool, silk and opium, but also of consumer goods like wheat, figs, raisins, olive oil, tobacco and even barley. Any rise in the price of traded consumer goods would have put more upward pressure on the prices of local consumer goods and thus on the nominal wage, eroding competitiveness with foreign producers in import-competing sectors. This would have been manifested by rising food prices relative to other products, by falling profitability in manufacturing, and by a decline in industrial output [12, p. 19]. In the Spanish case the mainstream view is that an absence of technological change was produced by anti-growth institutions and ecological constraints. While the Spanish economy only underwent extensive, as opposed to intensive, growth during the 16th century, even that was followed by a dramatic decline in the 17th century, before an 18th century recovery [13, p. 12]. The problem of foreign adversaries doubled by homeland problem – unskilled workers that tried to penetrate local markets outside the guilds, and that created the “gedik” (right to work and produce a kind of goods and practicing craft wherever craftsman wants and make it hereditary) phenomenon, that in realities in poorly or non-industrialized region gave some place to maneuver [14, p. 14–15]. Spanish colonial losses, diminishing of foreign trade with protected colonial markets due to war with England of 1796, ineffective economic policy, grabbing inappropriate liberal reforms and stepping in dubious ways of comparative advantage in agriculture ends Spanish XVIII century [15]. According to Adam Block, the system of free trade as practiced in the Ottoman Empire (more in the XIX century but its predecessors lived best life in the end of XVIII century) restricted every attempt at industrial expansion, impeded the development of its considerable resources, and created de facto foreign monopolies, thus contributing to the impoverishment of native enterprise [16, p. 20].

To sum up, Ottomans and Spanish faced in different manner of course, the same problems: they didn't provide industrialization as Britain or French or Low Countries and Belgium did, signed trade treaties, which they shouldn't

have signed, which drag their countries into world-economy that capsulated asymmetric trade (low surplus value goods in exchange of high surplus value goods) for years and decades to come, did not strict protectionism, as a tool to defend their economies as European tradition did, unveil quick and catastrophic fiscal policy, trying to gain “easy money” in favor of taming inflation and income-outcome balance.

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Ямпольська Л. М.

*кандидат історичних наук, доцент,
доцент кафедри всесвітньої історії*

*Харківського національного педагогічного університету
імені Г. С. Сковороди
м. Харків, Україна*

ІРАКСЬКИЙ КУРДИЗМ У ХХ – НА ПОЧАТКУ ХХІ СТ.: ПАРТИКУЛЯРНИЙ ТА ІНТЕГРАЛЬНИЙ ВИМІРИ

Розвиток країн Близького Сходу в міжвоєнний період і особливо після Другої світової війни позначився активізацією національних рухів з яскраво вираженими етнічною та конфесійною складовими. Основними причинами конфліктогенності на «фронтирних просторах», серед яких можна розглядати і етнічну територію Курдистану, стали етнонаціоналізм і штучна вестернізація, що супроводжувалися появою авторитарних режимів після краху світових імперій. Вірус етнонаціоналізму виступав у «прикордонних» суспільствах водночас як ідеологія та політичний рух етнічних меншин, переслідуючи основні завдання: право на територію, забезпечення автономії та самоврядування, визнання статусу своєї культури як рівної з загальнодержавною. Іракський курдизм ХХ – початку ХХІ ст. був яскравим проявом зазначених процесів.

Аналіз загального методологічного контексту націоналізму і зокрема курдського національного руху в зарубіжній (Б. Андерсон [13], М. ван Брюїнессен [14], Н. Деніз [15], М. Гюнтер [16], А. Махір [18], А. Мохаммад [19], М. Хрох [17]), сучасній російській (М. Лазарев [4; 5], І. Смирнова [8]) та українській історіографії (С. Наджат [7], Л. Ямпольська [10–12]) дає можливість акцентувати на його інтегральному характері. Підґрунтям праць цієї групи вчених є положення про «уявне