

CORRELATION BETWEEN ONTOLOGICAL IDENTITY AND LOGICAL IDENTITY

Kryzhanovska T. O.

*Candidate of Philosophical Sciences,
Associate Professor at the Department of Art Studies
and General Humanities
International Humanitarian University
Odesa, Ukraine*

The correlation between ontological identity and logical identity is a complex problem in modern philosophy and logic. Ontological identity is defined as the coincidence of objects or subjects in their basic characteristics or existence. On the other hand, a logical identity is defined as a statement that is equally true in all possible situations. These two concepts are key to understanding both the philosophical aspects of identity and the development of logical systems. Studying the correlation between ontological identity and logical identity requires attention to different approaches in philosophy, logic, epistemology, and epistemology. Identifying the commonalities and differences between ontological identity and logical identity can contribute to a deeper understanding of the nature of existence and the mechanisms of logical thinking.

The purpose of this work is to investigate the nature and peculiarities of the correlation between identity as an ontological principle and identity as a logical law.

To begin with, we will consider how the ontological principle of identity is understood in philosophy. «Identity is a philosophical notion used to express the relation of sameness that a thing bears to itself. In philosophy, to say that a thing is the same as itself means to say that it is identical to itself, whereby “thing” is understood both subjects and objects insofar as they are “in themselves» [2]. As you know, the principle of identity in ontology and the law of identity in logic can have their roots in the theory of identity, which originated in ancient Greek philosophy. This theory is related to the concept of the subject's constancy, which does not change over time, as well as to the search for an inner identity, its basis, which can be seen about in logical and ontological principles. Therefore, it is often difficult to determine which came first: ontological and logical principles or identity theory.

In ancient Greek, the term “identity” was expressed through the adjective “auto” (αὐτό), which translates as “the same”, and the pronoun “το αὐτο”,

which means “this”. Both of these words are equivalent to the Latin “ipse” meaning “himself” or “idem” meaning “the same”. The use of a demonstrative pronoun indicates that the subject or object is the same.

Identity can be considered in a wide range of meanings, as Aristotle pointed out. These meanings include true identity, rational or formal identity, numerical identity, specific identity, general identity, internal or external identity, causal identity, and primary or secondary identity [1]. However, it is worth noting that all these forms of identity can be reduced to two main ones: logical or formal identity and ontological or real identity. In the field of philosophy, the concept of identity is defined as the relationship that an object has to itself. The principle of identity consists of an ontological component, according to which each thing is identical to itself, and a logical component, which sees that for each entity, metaphysical reality and materiality are different aspects of a single reality. «Aristotle founded the first scientific system of knowledge on scientific conclusion (συλλογισμός) and scientific proof (ἀπόδειξις) which rests on “metaphysical truths”, which today, from the empirical perspective of science, looks absurd. However, Aristotle's “physics” and “logic” or “poetics” and “politics” are only a mirror of his “metaphysics”» [4, p. 36].

The principle of ontological identity expresses the idea that every object is identical to itself, as expressed by the Latin “ens est ens”. Some authors point out that this principle is revealed when applying the logical principle in time. To say that an object is identical to itself does not mean that a proposition is identical to itself, but rather deals with the nature of the real object. Thus, when something is said to be identical to itself in time, it means that it remains the same at any point in time.

According to Plato's teachings, identity is defined as the idea of unchanging being, given by the essence itself, which remains permanent, in contrast to temporary and sensuous things. Plato believed that ideas are more real than the material world and are the basis for everything that exists. This ontology of ideas leads to the important notion of their identity. According to Plato, ideas are identical with themselves and reflect the true essence of things. Ideas are absolutely identical in their purity and permanence, unlike the material world, which is only a reflection or copy of ideas.

Among the main concepts in Plato's metaphysical teaching, identity, sameness, and difference stand out. For example, Plato argues for the existence of separate forms based on the idea of supposed cases of sameness between different things. «If we insist on the logical priority of the concept of sameness to the concept of likeness in the argument, we can see why Socrates' attempt to avoid the first regress argument in Parmenides, the so-called third man argument, by insisting that instances of forms are ὁμοιώματα, is on the face of it feeble. For sameness, unlike likeness, is clearly a reciprocal relation. If instances of forms are the same as the forms, then the forms are the same as

their instances. One well trodden interpretative path is to say that Socrates is right to insist that instances of forms are images of the forms and that therefore they are mere likenesses of them; so, there are no grounds for saying that form and instance require another form “over and above” to account for their likeness. Reciprocal relatedness is precluded by imagery» [3, p. 307].

If we consider the law of identity, then it is based on the views that «every entity is identical with itself: x is x . This is presented as a logical tautology which states “if p , then p ”; and also: “ p if and only if p ”. Both statements contain a constant (“if... then ...” and “... if and only if...”) and a propositional variable “ p » [2]. The law of identity is not based on propositional terms, but on sets of members. For example, instead of saying “if the moon, then the moon”, where the term “moon” refers to the propositional variable p and indicates self-identity, identity logic might assert that “the moon is a satellite of the earth”, establishing a connection or equivalence between “moon” and “satellite of the Earth”. This is because identity logic works through different principles, such as the substitution principle of identity, which states that two entities are identical if what is true of one is true of the other, and the transition principle, which shows that if two entities are equal to the third, then they are equal to each other.

The Law of Identity is an imperative that we consider all evidence at its face value, to begin with. Aristotle expressed this first law of thought by saying “ A is A ”, meaning “whatever is, is whatever it is”. There are three ways we look upon phenomena, the things which appear before us however they happen to do so: at their face value, and as real or illusory. We can be sure of every appearance, that it is, and is what it is. (i) Something has presented itself to us, whether we thereafter judge it real or illusory, and (ii) this something displays a certain configuration, whether we thereafter describe and interpret it rightly or wrongly. The present is present, the absent is absent. Every appearance as such is objectively given and has a certain content or specificity. We can and should and commonly do initially regard it with a simple attitude of receptiveness and attention to detail. Every appearance is in itself neutral; the qualification of an appearance (thus broadly defined) as a “reality” or an “illusion”, is a subsequent issue.

That statement is only an admission that any phenomenon minimally exists and has given characteristics, without making claims about the source and significance of this existence or these characteristics.

The moment we manage to but think of something, it is already at least “apparent”. No assumption need be made at this stage about the nature of being and knowledge in general, nor any detailed categorizations, descriptions or explanations of them.

Regarded in this way, at their face value, all phenomena are evident data, to be at least taken into consideration. The world of appearances thus offers us something to work with, some reliable data with which we can build

the edifice of knowledge, a starting point of sorts. We need make no distinctions such as those between the physical/material and the mental, or sense-data and hallucinations, or concrete percepts and abstract concepts; these are later developments.

The law of identity is thus merely an acknowledgement of the world of appearances, without prejudice as to its ultimate value. It defines “the world” so broadly, that there is no way to counter it with any other “world”. When we lay claim to another “world”, we merely expand this one. All we can ever do is subdivide the world of appearances into two domains, one of “reality” and one of “illusion”; but these domains can never abolish each other’s existence and content [5, p. 7–8].

So, our brief analysis of the relationship between ontological identity and logical identity shows a very wide range of questions that we address in the ontological, epistemological, epistemological and logical plane. We are sure that this problem needs further detailed consideration and can provide interesting solutions regarding the relationship between concepts and their practical application.

Bibliography:

1. Aristotle. *Metaphysics*. Translated by W. D. Ross. URL: <https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.html>
2. Espínola, J. P. S. Identity. *Encyclopedia of Humanities*. 2023. URL: <https://humanidades.com/en/identity/>
3. Gerson, Lloyd P. Plato on Identity, Sameness, and Difference. *The Review of Metaphysics*. 2004. Vol. 58. No. 2. Pp. 305–332. URL: <https://eltondeaquiles.pucp.edu.pe/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Lloyd-Plato-on-Identity-Sameness-and-difference.pdf>
4. Ibrulj, Nijaz. Aristotle's First Philosophy as Analytical Epistemology. *The Logical Foresight-Journal for Logic and Science*. 2023. Vol. 3. No.1. Pp. 35–48. DOI: 10.54889/issn.2744-208X.2021.1.1.109
5. Sion, Avi. *The Laws of Thought. A Thematic Compilation*. Geneva, Switzerland. 2014. URL: <https://philarchive.org/archive/SIOTLO-2>