

CHANGING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE: IMPLICATIONS FOR UKRAINE

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International peace and security architecture has always been a changing landscape. For centuries new wars terminated fragile peace agreements and treaties as well as alliances were mainly about acquisition of territories and division of spheres of influence. International peace and security mechanism established in the United Nations Charter after century-long attempts to prohibit the use of force failed repeatedly and culminated in its collapse in the eyes of Russia's open aggression against Ukraine thereby reminding us that peace and security is more a promise than a guarantee.

The list of threats to international peace and security has expanded and their nature has changed. Russia's war in Ukraine reminds that the war has returned to Europe in all its forms and manifestations: in addition to conventional, it is also cyber and hybrid, including a strong machine of propaganda. From legal point of view, the nomination of threats to international peace and security belongs to the United Nations Security Council under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter [5], and in its resolutions it recognized as this type of threat various country-related international and non-international armed conflicts in a region or trespassing regional dimension (border crossing fights of armed groups, civil wars, situations related with crimes against humanity), eventually, the list was supplemented by the production and dissemination of the weapons of mass destruction, terrorist attacks and other threats posed by non-state actors, even infectious diseases [1, p. 13]. Unfortunately, and no surprisingly, Russia as the basic threat to the principles and values of the international legal order and the main source of world insecurity has not been established due to a well-known composition of the United Nations Security Council. However, this gap was filled by the European Union, NATO and numerous States. Threats posed by Russia are rather comprehensively described in the NATO Strategic Concept 2022: «the Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. It seeks to establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion,

subversion, aggression and annexation. It uses conventional, cyber and hybrid means against us and our partners. Its coercive military posture, rhetoric and proven willingness to use force to pursue its political goals undermine the rules-based international order» [2, p. 4], and Russia's nuclear capabilities as well as attempts to destabilize countries to NATO's East and South is among the list.

As regards Ukraine's security, it is clear that it goes beyond the Ukraine's battlefield and extends to the security of European countries (East European in particular) at times even balances between the global security. This needs to be explored bearing in mind Russia's narratives to restore and expand its fields of power which it proves periodically attempting to attack one or another country (e.g. Sakartvelo, then Ukraine), continuously strengthening military capabilities and expanding propaganda machine. Another factor is fragmentation and polarization in geopolitical and economic field and a shift which has been most visible recently in a changing USA rhetoric under President's Trump administration, including the suspension of the support to Ukraine [3] and even contesting the essence of the transatlantic bond which was for decades used to be implied by NATO.

Taking into account the given landscape, security and defense of Ukraine are to be searched in a puzzle of different interrelated economic, military, political, strategic, human and ideological aspects which need to be balanced and perceived in a rather unpredictable environment. Decisions to support Ukraine in political, military, financial and humanitarian means are to be adopted by these who are historically and ideologically close and far from Ukraine, these who need to deal with other global emergencies, including terrorism, displacement, hunger, violence, injustice and climate change. Even more, in an interconnected world which is becoming a new era of breaking rules, a responsibility of each actor has increased as it encompasses also a global aim to prevent escalation of new military conflicts. National security interests can no longer be perceived in a narrow domain and international security cannot be achieved through selective standards.

Although basic values have been put at stake and a world of increased competition witnesses too little trust, key pillars shall be retained. Comprehensive approach is needed in seeking for Ukraine's security which shall be a shared goal and in this respect the United Nations General Assembly should be used to an extent possible, as was achieved for initiating of the establishment of an international register of damage for Ukraine [4]. «If the purposes of the Charter are to be achieved, redressing the pervasive historical imbalances that characterize the international system – from the legacies of colonialism and slavery to the deeply unjust global financial architecture and anachronistic peace and security structures of today – must be a priority.» [6, p. 9]. The importance of continuity strengthening military resilience goes without saying, but the immaterial side in this fight is not less relevant. Trust in the European values, including democracy, liberty, human rights, is what should help prevent the risks posed by Russian

propaganda. Despite an uneasy accession path, the role of the European Union should not be underestimated as it represents the European values and forms a platform to stand against authoritarian regimes; the NATO's role of deterrence should not be forgotten as well. Unprecedented sanctions adopted by the European Union in respect of Russia and its political leaders represent how crises may foster resilience, unity and adjustments needed in a changing geopolitical environment. Even in the darkest time diplomacy is what perhaps dies the last, therefore the dialogue with the USA should continue, however, making no discounts when it comes to a principal approach as regards Ukraine's sovereignty, borders and achievement of responsibility of Russia and its individuals caused to Ukraine and its people.

Finally, one shall not forget that all establishments, processes and decisions are subject to change and evolution. Military support for Ukraine, which at the beginning was rather reserved, has turned to its increasing scale and open declaration by European States and finally reached a discussion of sending European troops to Ukraine. Whatever called, for peace enforcement of collective self-defense, displacement of such military forces would find basis in international law, however, the decision remains political and it is extremely complicated given all global security implications, the capabilities of a nuclear aggressor state and still different expectations of individual countries and their communities.

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