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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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The subjective prerequisites for the effectiveness of international legal sanctions depend on the political will of the subjects of international law, the choice of the appropriate legal position that will determine the launch and functioning of the coercion mechanism, as well as on the will of the offending state, which will decide to obey the requirements of the international community and fulfill the requirements sanctions resolution or refuse to implement them.

In such conditions, the national priorities of these states, the implementation of which depends on the preservation of the ruling regime, territorial integrity, own national or religious identity, are placed above the interests of regional and world security and are considered by the ruling regime as an inviolable principle of national self-preservation. Defending such priorities, states are not inclined to give up or adjust state policy, even under the pressure of collective sanctions, and

therefore violator states will be inclined to take a set of measures aimed at minimizing economic damage, until the sanctions package becomes ineffective [1, c. 166-168].

Such measures can have quite different forms and types, starting from changing the economic form, carrying out measures related to the manipulation of capital investments, carrying out import substitution, and ending with encouraging other subjects of international law to help bypass the prohibitions imposed by sanctions. A clear example of evasion of sanctions with an inclination to cooperation is demonstrated by Russia, starting with the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

The European Union, since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation, took the side of Ukraine, condemning the invasion of Russia, and therefore stopped selling to Russia technological goods and components necessary for the maintenance of military infrastructure. There are three types of sanctions regimes in the EU. First, there are sanctions adopted by the UN, which the EU transposes into EU law. Second, the EU can strengthen UN sanctions by applying tougher and additional measures. Finally, the EU can also introduce sanctions on its own initiative.

Restrictive measures (or «sanctions») are a tool of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy through which the EU can intervene where necessary to prevent conflicts or respond to new or ongoing crises, and to promote peace, democracy, respect for rule of law, human rights and international law [2, c. 107].

Starting from 2014, namely with the annexation of the Republic of Crimea, autonomous regimes of sanctions, introduced by the EU of its own free will, began to operate in relation to the Russian Federation, understanding the violation of the norms of international law. However, only starting from February 24, 2022, the EU began to introduce unprecedented packages of sanctions aimed at weakening the economic stability of the Russian Federation.

As of March 16, 2025, the European Union has implemented 16 packages of sanctions against Russia in response to its aggression against Ukraine. The latest, 16th package of sanctions, was approved on February 24, 2025, on the anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. This package includes a ban on the import of Russian aluminum, restrictions on the «shadow fleet» used to circumvent sanctions, and an expansion of the sanctions list to include 48 individuals and 35 organizations involved in undermining Ukraine's territorial integrity. Overall, EU sanctions aim to weaken Russia's ability to continue its aggressive actions by restricting access to critical goods, technologies, and financial resources [3].

The European Union continues to closely monitor the situation and remains ready to take further action if necessary.

The state against which international sanctions of an economic nature are applied has several options for getting out of economic isolation: lawful – stopping

the offense and fulfilling the requirements of the international community, or unlawful – finding ways to circumvent economic sanctions.

As for the sanctions adopted by the UN and transposed into EU legislation, such sanctions are not relevant given the fact that the Security Council vetoes any attempt to impose restrictions. Such a veto is imposed by the Russian Federation every time there is a question of condemnation or an attempt to impose restrictions. Such a gap in the structure of the UN is a separate topical topic for research. Therefore, the EU can only introduce autonomous sanctions, understanding the danger posed by the military aggression of the Russian Federation.

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МОРСЬКЕ ПІРАТСТВО ЯК ЗАГРОЗА НАЦІОНАЛЬНІЙ БЕЗПЕЦІ УКРАЇНИ: СУЧАСНИЙ СТАН ТА ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ БОРОТЬБИ

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Морське піратство є однією з найбільших загроз міжнародному морському транспорту та безпеці прибережних держав. Україна, маючи вихід до Чорного та Азовського морів, стикається з численними викликами у сфері морської безпеки. Зростання діяльності морських піратів в регіоні, а також посилення терористичних та злочинних елементів у прибережних зонах ставить під загрозу не тільки безпеку судноплавства, але й економічну стабільність, політичну незалежність та національну безпеку України.