FREEDOM AGAINST INTELLECTUAL UNIFICATION: THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW MARXIST TURN

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Introduction. The contemporary intellectual struggle of economic ideas, which often becomes political, is increasingly less confined exclusively to the field of theoretical argumentation. It is integrated into online platforms, editorial policies, academic curricula and public legitimization methods for knowledge that is widely accessible. In this context, the "Marx renaissance" (the Marxist turn) emerges as a wide range of critical approaches that explore power, inequality, ideology, and cultural reproduction rather than as a return to nineteenth-century economic determinism.

The Austrian School of economics is a particularly significant object of this conflict. Its methodological individualism, its subjective theory of value, its critique of centralized planning, and its understanding of the market as a dynamic process of continuous discovery and exchange of knowledge are in contrast to approaches that primarily explain social phenomena through the structure of class struggle. Therefore, the debate between the Marxist and Austrian traditions is not just an intellectual argument about resource allocation, but also a clash between different views of human nature, knowledge, freedom, and the limits of social construction.

Aim and objectives of the research. The aim of the survey is to conceptualize the place of the Austrian School in the context of the new Marxist turn and to determine under what circumstances criticism of liberal economic thought moves from academic controversy to intellectual unification. To achieve this aim, it is intended to: identify the differences between classical Marxism and contemporary forms of neo-Marxist criticism; define the epistemological bases of the Austrian School; to analyse "cancel culture" as an informal mechanism for regulating public discourse; and outline the principles of academic pluralism that can ensure productive competition between economic paradigms.

Research results and discussion. Karl Marx, representing classical Marxism, drew on the materialistic relationship of production and interpreted the dominant ideas as connected with the interests of the ruling class [1, p. 67]. In his writings, he criticizes political economy in order to identify the historical specificity of commodity production, wage work, and capital accumulation [2, p. 125–177, 270–280, 762–890]. The new Marxist turn[1] extends this framework: the objects of criticism include not only property, labour, production, exploitation, and accumulation of capital, but also environmental conflict, digital platforms, information, communication, ideology, cultural production, and social consciousness are subject to criticism. From this point of view, language and public relations are not seen as neutral channels for economic argument, but as elements of social relations through which economic

[1] This is not a return to the orthodox Marxism of the twentieth century, but rather a renewed interest in the language and tools of Marxism and in the structural critique of capitalism in contemporary economic and social philosophy. The book is dedicated to M. Musto, A. Badiou, J. Therborn, D. Harvey, K. Saito and K. Fuchs, on the new beginning of Marxist thought and the formation of 21st century Marxism.

interests, class positions, and ideological structures can be reproduced. In this way, the economic statement is increasingly analysed both for its theoretical justification and for the socio-political function it plays in a specific historical and communicative context. As a result, economic debates increasingly are judged not only on the logical strength of the arguments, but also on the expected social consequences of public expression of them.

The Austrian school offers a different epistemology. Ludwig von Mises considered the purposeful activity of man to be the starting point for economic analysis [3, p. 11]. Friedrich von Hayek stressed that the knowledge needed to coordinate economic activity is distributed among millions of actors and cannot be fully concentrated in a single centre [4, p. 519–520]. According to this approach, market prices are not only a tool of exchange, but also a mechanism for transferring local, incomplete and changing knowledge [4, p. 526]. For this reason, the centralization of economic decisions is seen as a problem not only of political freedom, but of the underlying limits of human understanding.

At the level of social philosophy, the conflict between these traditions is described as a conflict between constructivism and evolutionary rationalism. The first proceeds from the possibility of consciously restructuring social institutions in accordance with a normative project. The second underlines that a large part of the effective rules emerge through long-term interaction and not as a result of a single proposal. Hayek associated the claim to comprehensive planning with the fatal fallacy of reason, which overestimates the capacity of reason to understand the complexity of the social order [5, 27]. This does not exclude institutional reform, but it requires caution in the face of radical social construction.

In academic literature, the term "cancel culture"[2] should not be used as a political label, but as a description of a set of practices of public exclusion directed against a specific person, an organization, or a label, and the associated discourse of public disapproval. These practices may include collective withdrawal of support, ostracisation, exclusion from public platforms, professional or reputational demotion and other sanctions in response to perceived breaches of social standards [6, p. 1–3; 7, p. 146–148].

Intellectual unification is not the same as scientific consensus. Consensus is reached by open examination of arguments, evidence, and methods; it is formed by narrowing the range of legitimate questions and acceptable answers. In the first case, an opponent is a necessary participant in the production of knowledge; in the second, the adversary is an obstacle to the discourse. John Stuart Mill convincingly argued that even mistaken beliefs have social value, because they encourage advocates of truth to understand their cause rather than let it become dead dogma [13, p. 34].

From this perspective, the Austrian school is important not because its ideas are immune to criticism, but because it asks the questions that economic theory lacks when it is left to reflect on itself. Who has the knowledge needed for social coordination? How do individual valuations translate into price signals? Where is the line between correcting market failures and suppressing the decentralised search

[2] The concept has been approached from several perspectives: E. Ng and P. Norris emphasize public exclusion and ostracism [6, 7], M. D. Clark discusses cancellation as a form of digital accountability [9], E. Kaufmann views it in relation to academic freedom and self-censorship [10, p. 69–75], J. J. Fahey, D. C. Roberts and S. M. Utych discuss its partisan framing [11], M. J. Hobbs and S. O'Keefe examine reputational sanctioning and repair [12], and K. H. Cummings, B. Zafari and L. Beitelspacher differentiate the cancellation of a brand from a traditional consumer boycott [13]. In this way, cancel culture can be seen as a multidimensional social mechanism that includes moral condemnation, public visibility regulation, reputational pressure and, at times, economic withdrawal.

for solutions? What are the unintended consequences of policy intervention? Even a scientist who disagrees with the Austrian answers has to consider these questions.

At the same time, defending intellectual pluralism does not mean rejecting social criticism. Austrian tradition also needs to be opened to theories of power, inequality, and institutional exclusion. Its strength lies in its analysis of knowledge, entrepreneurship, and spontaneous coordination; its potential weakness lies in its lack of attention to how unequal access to resources affects people's actual capacity to exercise their formal freedoms. A productive debate is possible only if Marxist criticism does not reduce the market to an ideological mask of dominance, and if the Austrian approach does not reduce all social conflicts to the consequences of state intervention.

The main threat to the freedom of economic thought is not, therefore, the revival of Marxist theory itself. The subject of economics can be expanded by re-questions about inequality in other aspects of social life, exploitation and power in the context of ecological conflict, digital platforms, artificial intelligence, ideology, cultural production and social consciousness. The danger is that critical thought will become the only morally acceptable paradigm, and that alternative theories will be judged by their origin or political affiliation rather than their explanatory power. In such circumstances, "cancel culture" becomes a mechanism for the propagation of new orthodoxy, not liberation.

Conclusions. The new Marxist turn reflects the real need to rethink the social consequences of market transformation, inequality, and power concentration. However, its intellectual value diminishes when critical theory is turned into a tool to set the limits of what is permissible thought. The Austrian school, with its emphasis on knowledge limits, subjectivity, and spontaneous coordination, is a necessary

counterbalance to conscious social construction projects. Freedom of economic thought does not require the immunity of certain schools, but rather institutional conditions in which no paradigm can monopolize the right to dictate what questions can be asked. The new Enlightenment should be based not on the triumph of any ideology, but on a culture of reasoned disagreement.

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