

PERCEPTION AND LANGUAGE IN PLATO'S "CRATYLUS" AND PROCLUS' "COMMENTARY ON "CRATYLUS"

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INTRODUCTION

Plato, as it appears from his "Cratylus", was convinced that language is a way to cognition. Several issues on the interpretation and reading of the dialogue, especially in Ukrainian cultural environment, are to be addressed here. In my opinion, the dialogue can not be translated, but it can be interpreted only. By establishing this sort of terminology, I would like to emphasize difficulties in understanding of the dialogue as well as significant complications in its rendering into various languages due to numerous examples which resemble etymology of Greek words quite precisely. So we cannot translate the dialogue, it is possible just to interpret it in our own way. This occurs due to the fact that Plato never expresses his exact position on the discussed issue, namely the correlation between two opposite views on the nature of language, which are represented by contemporary notions of conventionalism and naturalism.

The most striking and obviously case of so-called "untranslatability" is the one with Greek word "anthropos" explained in terms of its etymology. According to Plato's analysis, the word is compiled of the prefix "ana-" followed by the root "opos", which mean "the one who looks up". For Plato, as well as for Socrates, the unique feature of human being is stargazing, which is entirely missing in all the rest creatures. Unfortunately, the plain and smooth structure of the dialogue should be disturbed in the process of its interpretation into any language, as well as there is no direct correspondence between the meaning of vocabulary and its components, e.g. prefixes. Neither Polish, nor English, nor Ukrainian languages possess anything similar to the example provided here by Plato.

The second, more obscure issue enlightened in the dialogue, is the controversy between conventionalism and naturalism, two opposite streams, which since have been represented during all four ages of understanding in the European thought and acquired their development in various fields. This is why St Augustine, being true Platonist, developed his theory of sign on the basis of some thoughts expressed in "Cratylus". Finally but not lastly, the theory of language acquisition acquired its continuation in so-called "20-century debate" between nativism and empiricism represented by Chomsky and Skinner theories of language respectively. This is why the truth

promulgated by Socrates as well as questions settled by his great disciple still remain valid in post-modern civilization.

In contrast to Plato, Aristotle was convinced that we can learn from experience only. His great follower, Thomas Aquinas, in his “Summa” says, that “nihil est in intellectu quod non erat in sensibus” – “there is nothing present in the intellect what was not present in the senses”. In such a way Aquinas establishes a basis for empiristic theories. But the question of empirism versus nativism underwent newer development in theories of Descartes, as well as his John Locke, his contemporary opposer. In our time, this question is represented by nativistic theories of Noam Chomsky.

1. Plato and the style of his dialogues

According to Heraclitus, the whole Cosmos is a well-organized system which resembles the language¹. Many pre-Socratics, as well as their followers, opined in the very same way, assuming Cosmos to be a harmonious formation derived from Chaos, as its opposite. Four ages of understanding having passed, the only thing that has really changed is terminology: Chaos was renamed by “Big Bang” theory, but the question is still open, as well as any bang requires someone to pull the trigger, but this is not a subject of this article.

Plato, being great thinker, made an attempt to summarize the achievements of his predecessors, uniting two opposite theories of constant flow (Heraclitus) and complete absence of movement (Parmenides). Plato’s theory of Forms was essentially an attempt to solve the dichotomy between view (that there is no real change or multiplicity in the world, and that reality is one) and that of Heraclitus (that motion and multiplicity are real, and that permanence is only apparent) by means of a metaphysical compromise. Plato, speaking in his dialogues on behalf of Socrates, his teacher, etymologically proves that the stargazing is the unique ability of humans. In fact, this is what can be seen even from the etymology of Latin verb “considerare”, which is common in English language as well, the root of which (sidera) means “star”. Plato says, that the word is compiled of the prefix “ana-” followed by the root “opos”, which mean “the one who looks up”: consequently, humans stare at what is considered to be “beauty”, or “cosmos”, which consists in harmony and is opposite to Chaos, from which the world was created by Demiurge.

It has just been represented the first, or external, level of difficulties which arise in the process of translation of Plato’s “Cratylus”, as well as in the process of reading of translated text. Plato provides the reader with a good set of words, primarily with names of gods, and strives to explain their etymology

¹ Curd, P. Presocratic Philosophy. In E.N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Retrieved from <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/presocratics/>.

by the means of, naturally, Greek language. But the problem of interpretation of those so-to-say straightforward Greek names into various languages arises due to rare coincidences on the level of their etymology. There are but few correspondences with these words that can be found in, for example, Ukrainian language.

The other, or internal type of difficulties in translating of Plato's "Cratylus" is linked with the interpretation of key terms. This question can be called "aposterior", as well as it does not appear directly at the reading of the text, but arises during its more precise interpretation: it deals with usage of various target-language words for the single word of original language. One of the most striking examples of such difficult words is Greek "onoma". But this question required preliminary explanation, regardless of the first-glimpse simplicity. We need to interpret the work itself to find out what it, or Plato the author, is saying. Similarly, when we ask how a word that has several different senses is best understood, we are asking what Plato means to communicate to us through the speaker who uses that word.

Despite the fact that dialogues possess relatively easy and reader-friendly form of explanation, the interpretation of dialogues requires deep understanding of questions settled by their author. Plato never strives to establish his authoritative solution to this or that issue which arises in the process of discussion: this is why it causes certain complications in grasping his precise point of view. Socrates, being the representative of Plato's positions in the dialogues, uses his well-known "Socratic method" of arriving to the proper solution, the most famous feature of which is avoiding direct indications to the correct answer.

This is why in order to understand properly the position of Socrates (or Plato) it is necessary to know what exactly he understands by this or that word. The task looks really simple, but at the first glimpse only, because by one and the same word Plato sometimes means various things. Here we arrived again at the word "onoma" which is used by Plato in various meanings. Primarily, in the "Cratylus" this word can be used in general meaning "word"; again, in other contexts it can be understood as "name"; this word sometimes is used in order to describe nouns in general; or even adjectives in certain contexts. This four-fold meaning of one and the same word should be clearly distinguished in order to avoid difficulties in understanding of the dialogue. For this purpose these meanings are to be clarified.

First of all, Plato is convinced that etymology is a proper way to cognition, which gives him the right to judge and conclude on the meaning of the names of Greek gods. One and quite large part of "Cratylus" is dedicated to the explanation of functions and purposes of various gods relying on the analysis

of their proper names, e.g. Dionysius: “Dionysus, the giver (διδούς) of wine (οἶνος), might be called in jest Didoinysus, and wine, because it makes most drinkers think (οἴεσθαι) they have wit (νοῦς) when they have not, might very justly be called Oeonus (οἰόνους)” (406 c) and many others.

But Plato was interested in god’s names not only due to just being religious person. Proclus in his “Commentary” on “Cratylus” explains the immense depth of Plato’s theology “If the God himself is so called, it is clear that both his first and his median activities may be given the same name as his ultimate one. Now (406C) referring to that, Socrates calls the God “Didoinysos”, deriving the name from wine (oinos), which, as we have stated, reveals all the powers of the God. For the oionous (406C5-6) is nothing else than the intellectual form which is separated off from the whole, and is already participated in [e.g. by soul], and has become single and “spe cific” (hoion). The altogether perfect Intellect is all things and operates in accordance with all things in the same way”². Apparently, Proclus provides us with completely so-called “internal” meaning of Plato’s text, similarly to what Swedenborg says about internal meaning of the Word.

This is how the reason arises for deeper understanding of Plato’s dialogues, and especially “Cratylus”. The basis for considerations of two main characters in the dialogue, namely Cratylus and Hermogenes, is language. Socrates, being a moderator of the discussion, strives to reconcile the two opposite views. The philosophy of language which was initiated in this dialogue, still has not obtained answers to the questions settled by Plato. In fact, it just acquired various solutions among different approaches during all four ages of understanding, namely Ancient, Scholastic, Modern and Post-modern periods. Questions, risen by Plato in his “Cratylus”, found their continuation in various nativistic theories of language, especially in recent works of Noam Chomsky³.

The two characters of the dialogue, Hermogenes and Cratylus, are on the opposite sides of the discussion, but at the end of the discussion they end up not that far one from another, as it looked initially: they accept position of Socrates, which is in their midst. In fact, this is what Plato strives to show in the dialogue, that there is no reason for choosing between the opposites in order to arrive at correct answer: the truth is in between the opposites. Plato, by reconciling two opposites, builds his system of Language as a way to cognition of the Universe.

² Proclus. *On Plato Cratylus*. (B. Duvick, Trans.). London: Bloomsbury, 2007, 350 p.

³ Chomsky, N.. *On Nature and Language*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 362 p.

After reconciliation of theories on constant movement (Heraclitus) and its complete absence (Parmenides), Plato reconciles two positions, known in the modern terminology as “conventionalism” and “naturalism”, represented by Hermogenes and Cratylus respectively. Socrates, being Plato’s representative in the dialogue, criticizes conventionalism and convinces Hermogenes in the necessity of accepting naturalistic views. But at the end of the dialogue, Socrates addresses Cratylus and convinces him in the impossibility of holding exceptionally naturalistic views, as well as names of certain things cannot comprise their essence⁴. This rises the question of how should be interpreted the position of Plato, expressed by Socrates.

Plato, with bringing up question on universals, and introducing aforementioned “Socratic” method into scientific investigation, never gives us direct answers to questions settled in his dialogues, but just gives us clues to the possible ways of solutions. This is why his dialogues, and especially “Cratylus”, provide us with certain ideas about nature of things in the world, and, especially, languages. Relying on Plato’s concept of idea, and his nativistic approach to the process of acquiring knowledge, it can be assumed that all languages have same origin and nature, namely reconciliation of conventional and nativistic theories. Certain explanations, e.g. on the nature of sound “r” in the word “scleros”, can be applied to various languages, even to Ukrainian, which supports nativistic approach, but explanations deal with Greek language exceptionally, like the aforementioned example of “anthropos”.

Actually, “Cratylus” rises various questions, which are still unanswered, and which served as a basis for various sciences, especially for linguistics and semiotics. St Augustine, being true Platonist, developed his doctrine of illumination, which is entirely Platonistic doctrine, as well as his theory of Signum⁵. As a rule, Aristotle’s “Perihermeneias” is commonly believed to be at the roots of modern science of Semiotics, but, apparently, Aristotle’s teacher had contributed to the development of this science even before Stagirite did. Language is represented in “Cratylus” as a system of signs, by which various things can be expressed in various languages, even in barbaric, according to Plato “everything has a right name of its own, which comes by nature, and that a name is not whatever people call a thing by agreement, just a piece of their own voice applied to the thing, but that there is a kind of inherent correctness in names, which is the same for all men, both Greeks and barbarians” (383 b).

Plato strives to reconcile two opposite views not just because he wants to establish his own theory, but because he respects previous thinkers, and

⁴ Sedley, D. *Plato’s Cratylus*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 328 p.

⁵ Deely, J. *Intentionality and Semiotics*. Chicago: University of Scranton Press 2007. 475 p.

even more – he is convinced that we already know everything, just proper recollection is required in order to arrive at proper answer. It seems that his theory of recollection prompts him to reconciliation of the opposites, namely conventional and nativistic approaches to the theory of Language. Modern science presents a variety of researches in conventional theories of meaning. For example, D. Lewis suggested the first theory on relation between social conventions and linguistic meaning⁶. The author starts with so-called “signalling” issues: in comparison with regular linguistic interaction, these so-called “signalling” issues there is no need for speakers to make an agreement on special actions in certain situations.

Consider a situation, when I ask for “blue” milk in the supermarket instead of “yellow” one, and I am given what I want without extra questions and without preliminary agreement, as well as it is known that low-fat milk is sold in blue boxes. Conventionality of meaning was a subject to discussion in works of many authors⁷. As a rule, today the majority of scholars support point of view of Hermogenes⁸, namely conventionalism of linguistic meanings, but there is a disagreement about the role of social conventions⁹.

The complexity of this question, raised by Plato, prompts variety of approaches to the interpretation of the dialogue and, consequently, variety of translations. The three English translations of the dialogue¹⁰ present different renderings of key words, starting from the very first paragraph. For example, Greek “synthemenoí” is translated as “conventional”¹¹, and in another – “by agreement”¹². It would be improperly to ask which one presents better option: there is no direct 100% equivalent to Greek word neither in English, nor in Ukrainian. And one more thing which complicates translation is that Plato preferred spoken word to the written. Plato never became a writer of philosophical treatises, even though the writing of treatises (for example, on rhetoric, medicine, and geometry) was a common practice among his predecessors and contemporaries.

St Augustine, being a true Platonist, speaks of “signum naturale et conventionale”, and provides explanation to these terms in his “De Doctrina

⁶ Lewis, D. *Convention*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969. 395 p., P. 165-7.

⁷ Lepore, E., Stone, M. *Imagination and Convention*. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015. 254 p.

⁸ Davis, W. *Philosophy of Language*. Malden: Blackwell, 2003. 254 p.

⁹ Rescorla, M. Convention. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2008 Retrieved from <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/convention/>>.

¹⁰ Jowett 1892; Flower 1921; Reeve 1997.

¹¹ Plato. *Cratylus*. (B. Jowett, 1892 Trans.). Retrieved from <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1616/1616-h/1616-h.htm>

¹² Plato. *Works in 12 vol.* V. 12. (H. Fowler, 1921 Trans.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd. Retrieved from <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=plat.+crat.+383a>

Christiana”. Signs for Augustine are genera for what words (Greek “onoma”) and theory of signs (Greek “semeion”) are same species¹³. It is mutual (and mute) convention, that Latin words are being constantly used as equivalents for Greek terms, but this present situation is quite paradoxical, although this was a subject to discussion in other work¹⁴ on the basis of St. Thomas’ works. Here just few examples are to be presented. The fact that Latin was always dependent on Greek shows common sites of both cultures. There are plenty of words in Latin that are translated directly from Greek, e.g. individuum is translation from Greek atom, accidens is translation from Greek symbebekos etc. This fact approves using copying as one of the methods of specific vocabulary reproducing in Ukrainian writings. For example, Thomas Aquinas uses Latin translations of Greek words widely in his works, but at the same time he applies entirely Greek words, e.g. hypostasis together with substance. Similar problems are faced in many modern languages, including Ukrainian. The difference between Latin specific words and their modern equivalents is explained on the material of various approaches and in various cultural contexts, including the Ukrainian one. The untranslatable words are examined in contrastive bilingual analysis. It is emphasized that in most cases there are no direct equivalents for some words in Ukrainian language.

Two words that can be interchanged in a context are said to be synonyms. St. Thomas sometimes employs different synonymous words side by side. For instance, “scientia” and “doctrina” sometimes are used as synonyms (ST, I, 1, 5) despite the fact that they can not be interchanged. There is a problem the translator faced, and there are three possible solutions: 1) literal translation: to render these signs by transliteration. In this case two terms in the same context are used with the same meaning; 2) assume that these lexemes are synonymous and apply substitution as translation method. In this case two terms are translated by one word; 3) adding an additional word in order to differentiate these signs. Each of these methods has its own advantages and disadvantages, and because of this translators employ different approaches in rendering these terms. This problem in English translation (by Th. Gilby) is solved by introducing an additional word. On the one hand, it helps to grasp that by two different signs one object is signified here, but on the other hand, additional words may change the structure of text. Moreover, St. Thomas sometimes uses these terms with clear non-synonymous meaning, e. g. (II-II, 181, 3). This example proves that these terms are not complete synonyms, and on this basis the difference between complete synonyms and half-synonyms could be defined. These words in the

¹³ Eco, U. *La Struttura Assente. Introduzione alla ricerca semiologica*. Milan, 1986. 237 p., P. 60.

¹⁴ Sodomora, P. *Treminological System of St. Aquinas*. [In Ukrainian]. Lviv: Spolom, 2010. 280 p.

so-called Classical period were used with quite different meanings. There are varieties of such examples of synonymous use of half-synonymous terms, e.g. “beatitudo” and “felicitas” which are rendered by one word – “happiness”, or substituted by “beatitudo”.

2. Two ways of rendering

Every translation of ancient texts, especially of philosophical ones, is accompanied by various problems. They arise similarly to chain reaction: each solution causes completely new difficulty. Applying a new approach to rendering terms may cause semantic substitution from perspective of the source or the target languages. Different compensative means sometimes are required, such as adding a new word in order to explain the meaning of the whole discourse.

Terminology is the most essential feature in every philosophical text, hence it must be clear and understandable, especially the terminology of St. Thomas’s works. The problem is Ukrainian philosophical terminology is not established yet. It is still on the stage of formation. Besides, the amount of Ukrainian translations in the field of medieval philosophy is ridiculously small. Prior to speaking about Ukrainian philosophy some preliminary observations about Ukrainian History should not be inappropriate.

Such situation is a result of unfortunate political state of Ukraine. The communist regime had a harmful influence on Ukrainian culture in general. The world knows about artificial famine which was one of the biggest crimes of the Soviet Government. During one year (1932–1933) millions of Ukrainian peasants died from starvation. This was a result of very creative politics directed to punish the peasants for their refusal to work in collective farms. In addition to this, thousands of Ukrainian intellectuals were killed in Siberian jails. No wonder that now Ukrainian culture suffers from such tremendous lack of researches and translations in different fields of the literature in general and in medieval philosophy in particular.

This short historical revue helps to understand the real situation existing in Ukrainian culture, especially in the field of philosophy. Formation of philosophical terminology is on its first stage. Compiling Ukrainian philosophical dictionary is the first problem arising in front of Ukrainian scholars.

It is well known that in “Summa”, as well as in his other works, St. Thomas frequently refers to different ancient and medieval authors. Unfortunately, just few works of these authors had been translated into Ukrainian. This awkward situation complicates the work on “Summa”. For example, quotations of different translations are used in German, French and English versions of “Summa”. The works of Augustine, Denise and other authors were translated before the

translation of “Summa” had been completed. Consequently, the base for translation had existed before the actual work started. This background had contributed to development and deepening of the translation language in general as well as of terminology in particular.

The main problem is that the major part of the terms can be translated differently. The first method to be used is transliteration, i.e. rewriting the word according to the rules of the target language, the second one is copying, i.e. reproduction of morphological structure, and sometimes translators apply analogy as well, i.e. finding the word with similar semantics. The difference between these methods presupposes discrepancy in semantic content of a term. At the first glimpse, transliteration seems to be more convenient, but it is not really so. In this case one would have a strange text full of incomprehensible words.

Hence this threefold way of terms translation should be considered step by step. Definitely, it is much easier to translate all the terms by transliteration. But there is a big difference between modern meaning of word *accident* and Latin *accidentia*, as well as between modern word *habit* and Latin *habitus* even in English language. There are different works of scholars concerning this problem, for example Jean Torrell discusses the meaning of *habitus* and its difference from modern *habit* according to Torrell¹⁵.

Completely different approach to rendering philosophical terms is based on copying. This method consists in precise translation of morphological structure of a word. Prefix, root, suffix and ending are rendered separately by equivalents of target language. A striking example of this approach is the term *accidentia* and its rendering into Ukrainian. The Latin word consists of prefix *ac-*, which means by- root *-cid-*, which means to fall, suffix *-ent-*, which indicates participle form, and ending *-ia*, which means plural neutral. Ukrainian word *prypadkovist'* is formed by the same structure as the Latin one. Prefix *pry-* means by-, root *-pad-* means to fall, but the suffix and the ending indicates feminine noun, singular. From philosophical perspective, a very important grammar form is lost. Neutral gender indicates something unstable and additional, and this semantics is very important for contrasting this term with substance, which is feminine. In the same way term *accidentia* is translated into Polish Language: *przy-padlost*.

Thus, given the morphological structure of these terms, it is necessary to determine what is signified by *accidentsia* and *prypadkovist'*. These terms, in spite of their common meaning, have some discrepancy in semantic content. The action or so to say the impact of these two words is different, though the meaning

¹⁵ Torrell J. *St. Thomas Aquinas. The Person and his Work* / J. Torrell // trans. Robert Royal. Washington : Catholic University of America Press, 1996. 407 p.

is almost the same. Semantic content of the term *accidentsia*, when transliterated into Ukrainian, includes uncommon and extraordinary semanteme in terms of foreign origin. At the same time, the foreign origin of this word is a real advantage because it is not filled with any commonly used meaning. But the same advantage implies a serious disadvantage: this is not a Ukrainian word and hence it is not understood widely. So an average reader does not grasp whole semantic content of this word. Of course, this is terminology, and it is natural for it to contain certain foreign vocabulary. In addition to this, the word *accidentsia* is also deprived of its original grammatical form.

Furthermore the following option, i.e. copying, should be considered on the basis of Polish translation of “Summa”. From the perspective of this approach the Ukrainian word *prypadkivist*, has its own advantages and disadvantages as well. First of all, this is an entirely Ukrainian word and so it is more understandable for an average Ukrainian reader. It implies semantics which helps to grasp necessary content of this concept. Besides, the term *prypadkivist* had been used by Ukrainian scholars in 19th century, but not frequently. Keeping in mind the concept of entire Ukrainian philosophical terminology, this is the only term one can use for translation of Latin *accidentia*. By means of using *prypadkivist* only the image of something non-substantial can be formed in the mind of a reader. Any transliterated term can not form such impression due to its emotional emptiness and different semantics. It is significant that two words with similar meaning, *accidentsia* and *prypadkivist* create completely different image. Despite the fact that these words are synonyms, they are of different connotations.

There is one more argument supporting copying as a translation method: the Latin word *accidentia* is a translation of the Greek word *symbebekos*, and the method of translation from Greek into Latin (*symbebekos* – *accidentia*) is exactly the same one as from Latin into Ukrainian (*accidentia* – *prypadkivist*). This argument supports using *prypadkivist* in Ukrainian translation. Of course, transliteration was not considered by St. Thomas to be an appropriate method of rendering a Greek term into Latin. We can not suppose St. Thomas using transliteration of Greek terms in his works.

Therefore the question is, if the sign “*accidentsia*” and the sign “*prypadkivist*” represent one and the same object. Apparently they represent the same object but they do so by different means. These signs have special relations to its object. This is only one example of a term and options of its translation. In fact, it is not easy to decide what method is better without having a broad view on different philosophical terms and methods of their translation. Paying attention to the context of each and every term is essential. Obviously all the terms must be agreed with each other. Proper solution of these problems contributes to compiling an adequate translation significantly.

3. Synonyms: two signs of single object

Two words that can be interchanged in a context are considered to be synonyms. But it was found in the process of translation that St. Thomas sometimes employs different synonymous phrases side by side. For instance, *scientia* and *doctrina* are used as synonyms in the 1st question despite the fact that they can not be interchanged. “Sed sacra doctrina accipit aliquod a philosophicis disciplinis”, and later “Et quantum ad utrumque, haec scientia alias speculativas scientias excedit” (*Summa*, Part I, Quest. 1, Art. 5). A very difficult situation arises here in front of translator and there are several ways to solve it, such as rendering these signs by transliteration, and in this case two terms in the same context are used with the same meaning, or assuming that these lexemes are synonymous and applying substitution as translation method, or adding an additional word in order to differentiate these signs. Each of these methods has its own advantages and disadvantages, and because of this translators employ different approaches in rendering these terms.

The first method is literal translation in order to reproduce these terms word by word (*scientia* – *science*; *doctrina* – *doctrine*), but using one word and later using the other in the same context with the same meaning would not make sense to the reader. Actually, one object is signified here by two different signs. This seems to be not quite accurate from logical prospective, but definitely accurate from textological one.

The second way of rendering is assuming that these words are synonymous and hence they are translated by the same term. But there are several hidden disadvantages here as well. Confusion of two terms with the same meaning unavoidably causes further disorder. Actually, these two terms, *doctrina* and *scientia* were of quite different meaning in the classical period. The first word had considerably narrower meaning comparing to the second one.

In another place of Th. Gilby’s translation this problem is solved very cunningly: “The science of sacred doctrine exceeds the other speculative sciences in both regards” (Et quantum ad utrumque, haec scientia alias speculativas scientias excedit). The translator brings in an additional phrase (*of sacred doctrine*), and this is a twofold fact. On the one hand, it helps grasping the fact that St. Thomas by using two words means one and the same thing, and definitely this is quite appropriate solution which helps to smooth away the difference between two words – science and doctrine. But on the other hand abusing of additional words and phrases in the text of translation may change the structure of the translated text in comparison with the original one. Evidently, modifier “*sacra*” in “*Summa*” is used with “*doctrina*” only, and never with “*scientia*”. This evidence proves the fact that these terms are not synonyms.

In addition to this, *scientia* and *doctrina* were not complete synonyms in ancient times. These words in the so-called “Classical” period were used with quite different meaning. St. Thomas sometimes uses these terms with clear non-synonymous meaning also. We can observe the difference between

doctrina and *scientia* in some passages of St. Thomas's works: "acceptio quidem scientiae vel intellectus fit per doctrinam et disciplinam" (*Summa*, Part II-II, Quest. 181, Art. 3). Here these two terms are clearly distinguished. Besides, the terms "*science*" and "*doctrine*" are distinguished by modern scholars as separate notions (*doctrine of signs – science of signs*)¹⁶.

There are few more such examples of synonymous use of non-synonymous terms, e.g. "*beatitudo*" and "*felicitas*" which are rendered by one word "*happiness*", or substituted by *beatitudo*. According to St. Thomas, "de ratione beatitudinis sit, quod sit summum bonum" (*Summa*, Part I, Quest. 26, Art. 3). But later, in 4th article St. Thomas says about contemplative felicity (*felicitas contemplativa*), which in English translation (by Th. Gilby) is rendered as "*contemplative beatitudo*". Term "*felicitas*", according to St. Thomas, is connected to earthly happiness, and consists in fame, richness and power: "*terrena felicitas*", (*Summa*, Part I, Quest. 26, Art. 4).

For the concept of the fully satisfactory condition Aristotle adopts the word "*eudaimonia*" while St. Thomas applies "*beatitudo*", or "*felicitas*" as synonym for this term. But the synonymic usage of these terms should be questioned. In English Language this term is translated as "*happiness*", provided it means not only a simply state of good feeling, but also something higher. St. Thomas, being much more interested in perfect happiness than in imperfect one, never clarified what he meant by imperfect happiness.

In "*Contra Gentiles*" St. Thomas explains what happiness does not mean, but there is no direct explanation what does it consist in. St. Thomas does not understand happiness as matter of self-sufficiency. Definitely, health, honor, riches and the other things do not constitute happiness either. As Aquinas thinks, happiness consists in contemplation of God only.

According to St. Thomas, all human beings naturally long for "*happiness*", and he calls this "*beatitudo*". This term, which corresponds to Aristotele's "*eudaimonia*", is traditionally translated by the word "*happiness*". And the main point is that the word "*happiness*" is normally used only for subjective state, but the psychological condition of feeling happy expressed by the word "*beatitudo*" has much wider meaning for St. Thomas. When used in a subjective sense, it means the act of enjoying the possession of an ability that actualizes man's potentialities. When used in objective sense, it means fundamentally the act of enjoying the possession of an ability that perfects man's potentialities. Or, "*beatitudo*" in the objective sense connotes the good which, when possessed, perfects the potentialities of a man as a man. Used in subjective sense, it connotes the act of possessing the good and the satisfaction or happiness, which accompanies the act.

¹⁶ Deely, J. *Four Ages of Understanding*. Chicago: University of Scranton Press 2001. 1250 p., P. 441-5.

This is evident that two words *beatitudo* and *felicitas* are not synonyms, and consequently the translator is supposed to use different words for rendering these terms paying attention to applying special terms in modern language in order to distinguish the notions. This is very important for preserving structure of translated text. The text will lose its precise meaning in case of translating these concepts by the same word since the difference between them is obvious. Optionally translator can use additional words and phrases to emphasize the difference between these terms, though in English translation of “Summa” (Gilby, Th. 1964) these terms are not distinguished.

Actually, St. Thomas was very precise in using terms. He distinguishes *assentire* / *consentire*, which are synonyms in modern English: “assentire est quasi ad aliud sentire, et sic importat quandam distantiam ad id cui assentitur. Sed consentire est simul sentire, et sic importat quandam coniunctionem ad id cui consentitur. Et ideo voluntas, cuius est tendere ad ipsam rem, magis proprie dicitur consentire, intellectus autem, cuius operatio non est secundum motum ad rem, sed potius e converso, ut in primo dictum est, magis proprie dicitur assentire” (*Summa*, Part I, Quest. 15, Art. 1). But sometimes in “Summa” different terms are used to describe one and the same thing. For instance, *causa efficiens* is found in one period of the text, and at the same time it appears as *effectiva*, *agens*, *activa*, *movens* in other periods.

4. Plato and his influence

When one compares Plato with some of the other philosophers – he can be recognized to be far more exploratory, incompletely systematic, elusive, and playful than they. In some of his works, it is evident that one of Plato’s goals is to create a sense of puzzlement among his readers, and that the dialogue form is being used for this purpose. There are several approaches to the reading and interpreting of “Cratylus”, and among newer, or non-classical ones, a comedy-based approach should be mentioned¹⁷, according to which whole dialogue is looked at as a comedy. The author of the approach claims that deep philosophical intentions of Plato should be understood in the context of Greek comedy, as well as philosophy of language for Plato is linked to a sort of game. But Plato’s dialogues do not try to create a fictional world for the purposes of telling a story, as many literary dramas do; nor do they invoke an earlier mythical realm, like the creations of the great Greek tragedians Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. Nor are they all presented in the form of a drama: in many of them, a single speaker narrates events in which he participated. They are philosophical discussions. This approach has its right

¹⁷ Montgomery, E. *Plato’s Cratylus: The Comedy of Language*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013. 248 p.

for existence in the light of Wittgenstein's "game theory" of language¹⁸. It is difficult to confirm whether comedy-approach is right or not, but the fact is that questions risen by Plato, still require their solution.

One more dialogue, which settles the question of nativism, is Plato's "Meno". The interest in this question has grown recently, the fact which proves great importance of Plato's works. In the dialogue, among other questions, Plato establishes that a boy knows geometry by intuition, without actually studying it earlier, being able to arrive at proper conclusions by simply logical investigation. Another question, settled in the dialogue, was that of knowledge and true belief. Philosopher asked, why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Since Plato, the value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology.

In fact, in Plato's *Meno*, Socrates raises the question of why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Call this the *Meno* problem or, anticipating distinctions made below, the primary value problem. Initially, we might appeal to the fact that knowledge appears to be of more practical use than true belief in order to mark this difference in value. But, as Socrates notes, this could be questioned, because a true belief that this is the way to Larissa will get you to Larissa just as well as knowledge that this is the way to Larissa. Plato's own solution was that knowledge is formed in a special way distinguishing it from belief: knowledge, unlike belief, must be 'tied down' to the truth, like the mythical tethered statues of Daedalus. As a result, knowledge is better suited to guide action. For example, if one knows, rather than merely truly believes, that this is the way to Larissa, then one might be less likely to be perturbed by the fact that the road initially seems to be going in the wrong direction. Mere true belief at this point might be lost, since one might lose all confidence that this is the right way to go. But this is a subject to another discussion. The influence of Plato's works was evident in various periods of development of European philosophy¹⁹, translations are available in Ukrainian²⁰, although the work on translations is being continued.

CONCLUSIONS

These two dialogues, namely "Cratylus" and "Meno" are still under investigated in terms of solutions to the questions settled there. Actually, dialogues ask more than they answer. But this was the style of Plato's works in general. But still, Plato is considered to be one of the most penetrating

¹⁸ McNally, Th. *Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Language: The Legacy of the Philosophical Investigations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. 269 p.

¹⁹ Proclus Diadochus. *In Platonis Cratylum Comment*. Lipsiae: In aedibus B.G. Teubneri, 1908. 1250 p.

²⁰ Platon. *Tvory*. [In Ukrainian]. (J. Kobiv, Trans.) Kyiv: Osnovy, 1995. 450 p.

philosophers in the history of philosophy. His influence is still valid in various fields of philosophy, especially in epistemology. When one compares Plato with some of the other philosophers who are often ranked with him – Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant, for example – he can be recognized to be far more exploratory, incompletely systematic, elusive, and playful than they.

Leaving the variety of theories aside, it is necessary to confirm that the idea of the dialogue, namely reconciliation of two distinct views on the nature of language, remains the same. The theory of language acquisition acquired its continuation in so-called “20-century debate” between nativism and empiricism represented by Chomsky and Skinner theories of language respectively. This is why the truth promulgated by Socrates as well as questions settled by his great disciple still remain valid in post-modern civilization. Many of his works therefore give their readers a strong sense of philosophy as a living and unfinished subject (perhaps one that can never be completed) to which they themselves will have to contribute.

SUMMARY

For Plato, language is a way to cognition. Several issues on the interpretation and reading of the dialogue, especially in Ukrainian cultural environment, are addressed here. The dialogue can not be translated, but it can be interpreted only. By establishing this sort of terminology, the difficulties in understanding of the dialogue as well as significant complications in its rendering into various languages due to numerous examples which resemble etymology of Greek words are evident. This occurs partially due to the fact that Plato never expresses his exact position on the discussed issue, namely the correlation between two opposite views on the nature of language, which are represented by contemporary notions of conventionalism and naturalism.

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