

RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR 2014–2019 YEARS AS THE DECISIVE STAGE OF THE STRUGGLE FOR THE UKRAINIAN INDEPENDENT STATE

Sytnyk O. M.

INTRODUCTION

The overt aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, launched in 2014, determined the decisive stage of the struggle for the independence of the Ukrainian state. The urgency of this problem is primarily due to the need to form the ideological and political paths for a proper response to hybrid, information-sabotage means and methods of warfare, unleashed by the Kremlin and the search for effective means to counter them. In particular, the task of developing a full-fledged national (state) ideology, which is able to consolidate the nation in the conditions of war and confrontation with an insidious enemy, remains relevant.

Due to the incompleteness of the Ukrainian national liberation struggle of previous eras, and, in particular, the national liberation struggle of 1917–1921, at present the Ukrainian state once again faced the systemic aggression and expansion of the Kremlin regime.

In general, the process of Russian imperial expansion, like the imperial history of Muscovy, in general, has a rather long history, reaches the XII – XIII centuries, but was quite clearly manifested at the turn of the XVII – XVIII centuries.

It should be noted that every aggression of Moscow almost always took place with the expectation of precisely the Ukrainian traitors. The latter usually served as the fifth column of the occupiers and in every way contributed to the interests of the Kremlin.

A number of Ukrainian scientists and thinkers considered the relationship between the Russian and Ukrainian peoples in the context of opposing two types of civilizations – sedentary, agricultural on the one hand, and hunting-nomadic, invasive on the other.

Throughout its history, the Moscow state has shown a predatory nature and a tendency to expand towards its neighboring countries. Especially in relation to such rich as Ukraine. However, for Moscow

(Russian) colonialism, the seizure of material resources alone was not enough. This was complemented by the absorption of human resources: the most intelligent, socially active and strongly gifted Ukrainians. It was necessary for the endless colonial wars of the Moscow state, which at the turn of the XVII – XVIII centuries transformed into imperial Russia.

Especially for Russians, the cult of war and the seizure of foreign territories was close, regardless of whether or not neighboring Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic States, the Caucasus, or much further: Siberia, Central Asia, the Far East, and the like.

It should be noted that it is precisely here that the historical origins of the attitude of Russians towards Ukrainian farmers are rooted: for centuries a malicious and envious desire has been formed not only to rob Ukrainians, but also a parasitic desire to squeeze everything possible from them. This trend reached its climax in the first half of the twentieth century under the rule of the Bolsheviks. And now we have a kind of reproduction of the Moscow imperial-totalitarian regime, which is trying to seize Ukraine again at any cost.

1. Background of the Russian-Ukrainian War of 2014–2019

Y. Dashkevich noted that when creating their Ukrainian state, Ukrainians should reconsider and clarify their history, based on truth, reliable facts and historical events. Being for centuries under the rule of the conquerors, the Ukrainians were actually deprived of the opportunity to influence the formation of national consciousness and the development of history, with the result that the history of Ukraine was written primarily to please these conquerors¹. O. Doni suggests that Russia is trying to usurp the history of Ukraine as a springboard for aggression. First, they steal Ukrainian history, then deny the right of Ukrainians to exist as a separate ethnos, then they attack Ukrainian territory². These are, as a rule, the actions of the Russians.

The Moscow state absorbed the aggressive, conquering policy of the Golden Horde. She contrasted the European values with the Messianic ideology of the Third Rome, and then threw herself with Asian fanaticism

¹ Дашкевич Я. Як Московія вкрала історію Київської Русі-України. URL: <http://uainfo.org/blognews/398664-kak-moskoviya-ukrala-istoriyu-kievskoy-rusi-ukrainy-doklad-doktora-istoricheskikh-nauk.html#sel=8:1,10:45>.

² Доній О. Диспут з росіянами на радіо «Свобода». URL: <http://kyiok.com.ua/hromadskist/1153-donii-na-rosiiskomu-radio-rozpoviv-chyi-kniaz-volodymyr-video.html>.

into the arms of Bolshevism³. As in all previous centuries, the goal of the Moscow Horde was primarily not to separate individual territories (now it is the Crimea and Donbass), but to conquer the capital, Kiev. It was also extremely important for Muscovy, despotic in essence, to destroy any hotbeds of democracy, especially if they concerned the veche system, that is, the people's rule.

The formation of the Russian Empire in the XVIIIth century had far-reaching political consequences, both for the Russian people and for a number of countries that came under its authority or had a common border with it. The imperial idea became the ideological rationale for the unusual territorial expansion of Russia. Its origins can be traced back to the end of the XVth century. The imperial doctrine that was formed by the leaders of the Orthodox Church and supported by the political elite of the Moscow State became the official ideology of the Russian autocrats. Its practical application demanded enormous material resources and human sacrifices from the government circles of Muscovy. At the same time, it greatly influenced its further ethnopolitical development⁴.

The external manifestations of Moscow imperialism are explained by the aggressive practice of the Moscow tsars and governments. Muscovy needed weapons money, because the neighboring states grew culturally and economically, and consequently, militarily. To increase taxes, the government could not, because there was no longer nothing not taxable, and the old taxes were not enough to fill the treasury. It remained to rob the neighbors. The people of Moscow, on the orders of their tsar, joyfully went to let down, enslave, exploit, rob the neighboring nations⁵. Through the history of Moscow's expansion in relation to Ukraine and other countries, the entire predatory nature of Russian imperial colonialism was fully manifested, which was NOT abhorred by any mean means to achieve the aggressors' invaders.

Southern Ukraine in the Russian imperial projects was assigned the role of a springboard for the further expansion of the Russian Empire in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Here it was even planned to build a third,

³ Нестайко О. Великі міфи імперії. Втеча від власної ідентичності. 3-е вид. допов. Львів: ЛА «Піраміда», 2008. С. 184.

⁴ Дашкевич Я. Як Московія вкрала історію Київської Русі-України. URL: <http://uainfo.org/blognews/398664-kak-moskoviya-ukrala-istoriyu-kievskoy-rusi-ukrainy-doklad-doktora-istoricheskikh-nauk.html#sel=8:1,10:45>.

⁵ Штепа П. Московство: його походження, зміст, форми й історична тяглість. 9-е вид. Дрогобич: Відродження, 2012. С. 161.

besides Petersburg and Moscow, capital of the Russian Empire. The name «Novorossiya» was better suited to such intentions for the newly-established territories. In the case of the implementation of these intentions, this territory from the outskirts of the Russian Empire turned into its center. Changes in the region in terms of its imperial incorporation were aimed at transforming this Ukrainian-Cossack region into Novorossia. Introducing here the «Russian world» (in modern terms), all the cells of Ukrainian life, the remnants of the Cossack territorial structure, the Cossack agrarian structure based on free-labor were destroyed. Instead, imperial despotism was planted⁶.

The Ukrainian nation was massively Russified and denationalized. But, at the same time, the communist Russian empire hypocritically called Ukraine a sovereign republic, actually using all methods of genocide against the Ukrainians⁷. A tough authoritarian power was established by the Communist Bolsheviks after the revolutionary explosion of 1917⁸. But the basis of Bolshevism was the former imperial authoritarian-bureaucratic subculture. This «culture» coincided with the ideology of the ruling Communist Party and was constantly used by it as an instrument of a repressive system in suppressing national movements, and above all – the Ukrainian people⁹. At the same time, Bolshevism was a combination of Marxism, Leninism and Russian imperialism, characterized by elements of Russian fascism and chauvinism¹⁰. Therefore, the ideology of Bolshevism permeated the desire for power and the possession of as many resources as possible, regardless of what kind of people they belong to.

V. Vasilenko, considering the genesis and nature of the war of Russia against Ukraine, noted that the armed attack of the Russian Federation on Ukraine was unexpected both for the Ukrainian politician and the public, and for the international community. However, objectively the war was caused by the imperatives of Ukrainian politics in Russia. The outstanding military theorist Karl von Clausewitz in his classic work “On War”, the fundamental tenets of which are relevant today, wrote: “War is the

⁶ Турченко Г. Ф. Исторична наука і сучасна гібридна війна Росії проти України. *Наукові праці історичного факультету Запорізького національного університету*. Вип. 46. 2016. С. 297, 298.

⁷ Лук'яненко Л. У листопадові жалобні дні. Кому був вигідний голодомор? К.: МАУП, 2004. С. 50, 51.

⁸ Попович М. В. Міфологія в суспільній свідомості посткомуністичної України. *Дух і літера*. 1998. № 3–4. К.: Сфера, 1998. С. 64.

⁹ Білас І. Г. Репресивно-каральна система в Україні. 1917–1953: Суспільно-політичний та історико-правовий аналіз: у 2 кн. К.: Либідь-Військо України, 1994. Кн. 1. С. 14.

¹⁰ Галамай С. П. Боротьба за визволення України. 1929–1989. Львів: Каменярь, 1993. С. 63, 64.

continuation of politics by other means”. So, at one time, in December 1917, the Ukrainian policy of the government of Soviet Russia ruled by Lenin led to the declaration of war to the Ukrainian People’s Republic. The consequence of that war, which ended in the fall of 1920, was the forceful way of planting the communist regime in Ukraine and incorporating it into the USSR. Since then, any form of the Ukrainian national liberation movement – the demands of cultural autonomy, the armed struggle of the UPA – Soviet Russia resolutely suppressed, and its participants severely punished. In the past, Ukraine became the engine of transformation of the Moscow kingdom into an empire and was its powerful spiritual, cultural and resource donor. Having annexed the territory of Ukraine, the Moscow kingdom expanded its borders to the borders of Eastern Europe, and subsequently proclaimed itself an empire, appropriated the ancient name of Ukraine – Russia – and the entire history of Ukraine-Russia, including the ancient Russian statehood. Owing to such a special role of our country in the history of Russia, the restoration of the independent statehood of Ukraine in August 1991 became a challenge to the Russian imperial consciousness and psychologically traumatizes the modern Russian imperial chauvinists. The revival of Ukraine’s independence is inevitably associated with the restoration of its national memory and an isolated national history and, accordingly, makes the history of Russia curtailed, destroys the myth of millennial statehood, European identity and the supposedly original and natural affiliation of the latter to the European civilization space. Therefore, the Russian imperial chauvinists understand that without the return of Ukraine (with its territories, resources and human potential) to the bosom of Russia, any attempts to restore its imperial status are unpromising. Considering this, the Russian political elite and ordinary citizens are mostly convinced that: Russians and Ukrainians are one people, their reunion in one state should end with the formation of a powerful ethnic group and the formation of a “Russian world” with one church, one language and one culture; Ukraine is part of Russia and should not exist separately from it; Ukraine must in the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the problems of Russia caused by it; Ukraine’s independent statehood is a geopolitical anomaly and represents a strategic threat to Russia; Russia without Ukraine is geopolitically incomplete and cannot be reborn as a world superpower. The anti-Ukrainian ideologems and revanchist aspirations rooted in the Russian mentality determine the

content of Russia's foreign policy towards Ukraine and its ultimate strategic goal, which provides for the total destruction of the latter as a national unit, subject of international law and geopolitical reality¹¹.

According to V.P. Gorbulin, the starting point for the formation of a hybrid world pattern was Russia's aggression against Ukraine. And this is not an estimate in the spirit of a romantic Ukrainian-centrism – this is an objective state of the question. As the Sarajevo murder freed up a compressed spring of deep contradictions and complex processes that led to the First World War, so the direct annexation of Crimea by Russia and its impact on the Donbass became the same trigger for the start of a new world hybrid war. It should be noted that, of course, “hybrid war” is a phenomenon of the XXI century. But in the history of Russian-Ukrainian relations, some of their techniques were used before. In 1917–1921, many of these methods were already used by Bolshevik Russia in the struggle against Ukraine. This was the response of the former imperial metropolis to the Ukrainian attempt to defend its independence, proclaimed in January 1918 by the Central Rada. Ukraine did not want the Bolshevik dictatorship, the destruction of democratic freedoms, the “red terror” and the return to the control of Russia, now Bolshevik. In response, regular troops went to Ukraine from Russia under the red flag of the communist revolution and the fake slogan of “helping the fraternal people in the struggle against the world bourgeoisie”. They were helped in every way by the local “fifth column” of the Bolsheviks and other pro-Russian elements who were particularly active in the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine. Then Ukraine lost its independence for many decades¹².

For several decades, the Bolsheviks and their followers, the communists and neo-communists, weaned people to solve problems on their own, to think and take responsibility. But they taught that the “wise” leadership will decide everything for us. And as a result: we have what we have done with our inaction or indifference. And this is especially clearly seen in the example of Donbass. The population of the latter, for the most part, in 1991 voted for the independence of Ukraine. But the hopes that were placed on this perspective were not justified. Those residents of the region who saw independence of Ukraine, above all – economic

¹¹ Василенко В. Війна 2014 року: спроба системного аналізу. *Український тиждень*. 2014. № 42. Спецвипуск. С. 28, 29.

¹² Турченко Ф. Проект «Новоросія» і новітня російсько-українська війна. К.: Інститут історії України НАН України, 2015. С. 146.

independence, already in the early 1990s faced a whole range of socio-economic problems, and for those citizens who sought, above all, political independence and Ukrainization, the realities turned out to be delicate from the desired result. At the same time, the Kiev authorities practically withdrew from the solution of cultural and national problems of the region, while for local authorities, pro-Ukrainian sentiments remained alien and unacceptable.

Despite the intensive imitation of democratic reforms in Russia during the 1990s, a democratic society did not form there. Moreover, throughout all this time, the Russian state has preserved the tradition of despotic authoritarianism and scornful attitude towards fellow citizens inherited by centuries. The Bolshevik organs of violence and terror (the “Cheka”-DPU-NKVD-MGB-KGB) led this tradition to the extreme forms of the destruction of both our own and neighboring peoples.

L. Harding noted that Putin, having replaced B. Yeltsin in 2000, quickly created a transformed post-Soviet Russia. The FSB has become the dominant authority in the country – a huge secret organization with unlimited resources, which operates outside the law in accordance with its own set of rules (also secret)¹³. In fact, the FSB became the successor to the KGB, having overrun most of the methods of the latter, inherent to the NKVD – dressing up in the Ukrainian military, vile use of civilians, and the like.

The transformation of the KGB into the FSB led only to a more cynically refined preservation of this criminal system, and Putin’s creature when replacing Yeltsin has every reason to be considered not just unsuccessful, and moreover destructive for many thousands of Ukrainian and Russian, and ultimately for the most historical the fate of Russia.

The system of state power in the Soviet Union was of a criminal nature. This is evidenced by many facts, in particular, that on the orders of Stalin in the Soviet Union, random innocent people were often shot according to plan and quotas, including children from twelve years old. The mimicry of the Moscow authoritarian regime led to the formation of an unusually unique form of the vile, deceitful and cowardly (proclaiming as the enemy number 1 – the United States, he does not fight with him, but mostly destroys Russians in Eastern Ukraine) of fascism.

¹³ Гардінг Л. Мафіозна держава. Як один репортер став ворогом брутальної нової Росії. К.: Темпора, 2014. С. 20.

Constant views on the revolutionary changes in Russia, the belief that national problems can be solved within the framework of a single all-Russian revolutionary-democratic front led to the loss of the chance that gave Ukrainians the opportunity to create their own independent state. All this not only led to the defeat of the national liberation struggle of 1917–1921, but also led to the further total destruction of the Ukrainians throughout the existence of the Bolshevik government.

2. Specificity of the Russian-Ukrainian War of 2014–2019 in the Context of the Struggle for the Ukrainian Independent State

The modern Russian-Ukrainian war has become a natural consequence and continuation of the centuries-old expansion of the Moscow state, with its imperial creations: autocracy, Bolshevism and Putinism with neoshovinizism against Ukraine. Already at the beginning of the XXI century, we were faced with the resuscitation of neo-Bolshevism in the form of authoritarian tendencies in modern Russia, the main thing in the Putin regime.

According to F. Turchenko and G. Turchenko, not only the revolution of 1917–1921, but also the revolution of 1991 turned out to be incomplete. After all, post-Soviet Russia did not abandon its imperial ambitions, and without complete control over Ukraine, the restoration of the empire is impossible. The idea of reviving historical New Russia under the flags of the “Russian world” was chosen as one of the instruments of this¹⁴.

History tends to repeat. Especially – in cases when a certain people or a nation does not draw proper conclusions regarding errors and omissions. First of all, it concerns the events of 1917–1921, when, being in a peculiar bifurcation point, after centuries of statelessness, which was at the same time a result of the disunity and fragmentation of Ukrainians, Ukraine received a unique chance of independence. However, due to a number of objective and subjective circumstances, this could not be achieved by the Ukrainians. And how payback is terror, famine and total annihilation by Moscow invaders of the most conscious representatives of our nation, including modern aggression. The modern modern imperial policy of the Kremlin is the implementation of the methods of autocracy and

¹⁴ Турченко Ф. Проект «Новоросія» і новітня російсько-українська війна. К.: Інститут історії України НАН України, 2015. С. 130, 179.

Bolshevism, with a combination of criminal oligarchic and sabotage and terrorist forms¹⁵.

The heiress of the Russian Empire – the Russian Federation is now actively pursuing an expansionist policy, promoting and aggressively spreading the ideas of the so-called “Russian world”. The short-sighted, haphazard and treacherous policy of the previous Ukrainian government in the humanitarian, ethnonational and informational sphere, and sometimes direct connivance on the part of some officials to spread these ideas, led to the fact that Russian chauvinistic ideas were fixed in the mass consciousness of the population of the southern and eastern regions, allowed carry out the criminal annexation of the Crimea and spread separatist sentiments in the east of the country with the support of a certain part of the local population axis to unite with the “big Russia”. Russia’s support of the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine and its direct entry into the war against Ukraine showed the depth of immorality and crime of the Russian authorities, who for the sake of spreading their ideas and reviving the Great Russian Empire are capable of violating international legal norms, violating their own international obligations, using the most disgraceful and terrorist criminal methods of propaganda and war – open lies, distortion of facts, even bloodshed, the use of hostages among the world mass population, mass terror and torture of prisoners and the like¹⁶.

It is well known that the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014–2019 has a hybrid, information-sabotage character. During the annexation of the Crimea – the seizure by the Russian special services (under the guise of “unknown persons”) of government buildings in Simferopol and the removal from power of the leadership of the ARC; the deployment in the Crimea of the so-called self-defense detachments (“green men”), who took control of the power structures of the Crimean peninsula and the key objects of its infrastructure, blocked the units of the power structures of Ukraine on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea; the introduction of Russian troops in the Crimea under the guise of military exercises and under the guise of the relevant articles of the Agreement on the conditions of the stay of the

¹⁵ Ситник О. Донцовська візія національно-визвольних змагань у контексті російсько-української війни 2014-2016 років. *Треті Бандерівські читання. «Візія Української держави в ідеології українського націоналізму»* : збірник матеріалів, м. Київ, 3 лютого 2016 р. Київ–Івано-Франківськ: Місто НВ, 2016. С. 180, 181.

¹⁶ Гай-Нижник П. (керівник проекту, упоряд. і наук. ред.). *Формування загальнонаціональної ідентичності українців в контексті сучасних викликів. Агресія Росії проти України: історичні передумови та сучасні виклики*. К.: «МП Леся», 2016. С. 50.

Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine; “Legalization” of the fact of occupation of the Crimea by holding a “referendum” on the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, as well as the adoption of relevant decisions by the Parliament and the President of the Russian Federation on the inclusion of Crimea to Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation; the liquidation of the Ukrainian authorities in the Crimea, as well as the ousting of Ukrainian troops from the territory of the Crimean peninsula. Thus, Russia annexed the Crimea and created “foundations” for its integration into the Russian Federation. At the same time, the Russian annexation of the Crimea was not recognized by the overwhelming majority of countries and caused a negative reaction from the US, the EU and their partners, who imposed sanctions against Russia.

When creating the so-called “Novorossiya” and solving the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine, the following factors of hybrid war took place: destabilization of the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine by organizing mass anti-power protest actions, clashes with law enforcement agencies and supporters of the unity of Ukraine, as well as seizing administrative buildings; implementation of the “Crimean” scenario in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including the establishment of control over part of their territories, the creation of “militia groups” from among the representatives of the Russian special services, criminalized law enforcement agencies and local pro-Russian forces; “Legalization” of the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics (DPR and LPR) by means of holding corresponding “referendums”, as well as “elections” of their “authorities”; Russia’s full support to the separatists, including financing their activities, training militants and supplying them with weapons, military equipment and ammunition, as well as the introduction of Russian troops into the territory of the DPR and LPR; the implementation by the Russian Federation of political and economic pressure on Ukraine, as well as the buildup of a group of armed forces of the Russian Federation near the Ukrainian border; discrediting the military operation of Ukraine against the Russian-terrorist groups and the disintegration of the country, attempts to submit this operation as “punitive against its own population”¹⁷. All this showed quite significant preparation of the Russian Federation for complex aggression.

¹⁷ Марчук Е. Девять реалий о гибридной войне в Донбассе. URL: http://news.liga.net/news/politics/12867318-marchuk_devyat_realiy_o_gibridnoy_voynе_v_donbasse.htmhttp://gazeta.dt.ua/internal/gibridna-viyna-yak-klyuchoviy-instrument-rosiyskoyi-geostrategiyi-revanshu_.html.

V. Gorbulin believes that the West, for its part, in essence, “washing its hands”, allowed aggression on the part of the Russian Federation. Western analysts, in particular Peter Dickinson, are speaking more and more about this in their material for the Atlantic Council. He notes that most of the Western media immediately after the Russian aggression against Ukraine unexpectedly “blind” as to who was the aggressor in the Ukrainian conflict and how the occupation forces should be named, inventing some new words and phrases in return, the only meaning of which is not to call the Russian such an aggression¹⁸.

The current Russian-Ukrainian war belongs to this type of armed conflict, which is called “hybrid”, “non-linear”, “non-conventional”. In the course of wars of this type, various methods of fighting the enemy are used. In general, the characteristic features of hybrid wars are as follows: aggression without an official declaration of war; concealment by the aggressor country of its participation in the conflict; “Information war” – propaganda and counter-propaganda with the use of “dirty” information technologies; widespread use of the “fifth column” and irregular armed formations (including under the guise of the civilian population), the disregard of the aggressor by international standards of warfare, existing agreements and new agreements; political and economic pressure measures; confrontation in cyberspace and the like¹⁹.

Most international military experts recognize that there is a threat of new conflicts in Europe, and Russia’s aggression threatens the security of not only Ukraine, but the whole of Europe. In a hybrid war in its own territory it is difficult to win, because it has no boundaries. Therefore, it is this factor that has influenced the miscalculations of the Ukrainian authorities in the conduct of the anti-terrorist operation. The Russian-Ukrainian border cannot be closed if Ukraine does not control the information space and the air of the East of Ukraine. At the same time, the terrorists will continue to carry out provocations on the border and seized territories with the information support of the Russian mass media. The network actions of terrorists in the occupied territory, together with the support of the Russian troops on the border, will constantly allow Russia to continue supplying weapons and ammunition to terrorists. Therefore, until

¹⁸ Горбулін В. Хитромудра невизначеність нового світопорядку. URL: <http://gazeta.dt.ua/internal/hitromudra-neviznachenist-novogo-svitoporyadku-.html>.

¹⁹ Турченко Ф. Проект «Новоросія» і новітня російсько-українська війна. К.: Інститут історії України НАН України, 2015. С. 143.

the information space in the Donbas is controlled by Ukraine, Ukraine will not be able to count on the support of its own population in the conflict region. This situation will contribute to the formation of a permanent social base of terrorists of the LPR and the DPR²⁰.

Virtually the entire history of the Ukrainian liberation movement of the twentieth century was aimed at creating a Ukrainian independent conciliar state. And an important guarantee of this was the massive support of the Ukrainian nation²¹. The modern Russian-Ukrainian war, like the preceding Revolution of Dignity, has led to a number of challenges. First of all, it concerns the readiness of Ukrainians to defend their nation and state. At the same time, the fact that the part of Russians joined the defense of the independence of Ukraine became important²². Awareness of involvement in these events also contributed to the understanding by representatives of other nations that the aggression of the Russian Federation can be directed not only against Ukraine, but also against their states. It is recognition of the duty of protecting our own state priorities and honoring national values can give Ukrainians a chance to defend their state and preserve national dignity²³.

During the entire period of independent Ukraine, problems with the formation of civil society in the country constantly made themselves felt. In part, this was due to the traditional individualism of Ukrainians. But to a large extent it was the result of the existence of a post-totalitarian inheritance, with people's subconscious fear towards the authorities and power structures, civic infantilism and the like. At the same time, each time the manifestations of discrimination of the rights of citizens in: 1990–1991, 2004 and 2013–2014, – led to civil outrage, which resulted, among other things, were Orange Maidan and the Revolution of Dignity. These events were also the result of the creative rise of the Ukrainian nation and the result of the Spirit's action – not just as a transcendental factor, but rather a concrete phenomenon, which often inspires ethnic Russians and representatives of other nations living in Ukraine. And

²⁰ Дацюк С. А. Стратегія перемоги України у війні з Росією. URL: <http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/datsuk/53a5542ba2a4a/>.

²¹ Ільницький В. Основні форми співпраці українського визвольного руху з різними соціальними групами населення у Карпатському краї ОУН. *Східноєвропейський історичний вісник*. № 2. 2017. С. 65.

²² Ситник О. Історичні витоки російсько-української війни 2014–2017 років. *Східноєвропейський історичний вісник*. № 2. 2017. С. 79, 80.

²³ Ситник О. М. Парадигма української націоналістичної ідеології в контексті національно-визвольної боротьби першої половини ХХ-го та початку ХХІ-го століть. (Л. Тимошенко, Ред.). *Дрогобицький краєзнавчий збірник*. 2015. Спецвипуск II. С. 355, 356.

precisely because of this Spirit, there were always forces to resist the invader-occupier, the most vivid examples of which, for example, in the twentieth century were: the Kholodnoyarskaya Republic, the UPA army, and, as their original reproduction, the modern movement of volunteers and volunteers.

The modern war for the independence of Ukraine in the form of a hybrid version of the information-sabotage war is primarily a war of ideologies. For our country, the main ideological problem of this war is the rejection of the remnants of Sovietness, and for Putin's Russia it is a weak reanimation of the USSR, with all its ideological and political attributes and symbols. Many did not expect this war, but why only Putin's long-term and annoying appeal to the ideological dogmas of the Soviet Union is worth it. At the same time, in modern Russia – this country of the absurd, there are attempts to combine deliberately incompatible and contradictory things (communism and Russian nationalism, etc.).

Calling Ukraine's southeast in the spring of 2014 Novorossia, Putin showed not only his own incompetence in history, a cynical disregard for the foundations of international law and a perverted view of the world order. Clearly, he and his Kholuy entourage were motivated by the desire to see Ukraine within the framework of the former colony – both in tsarist times, in fact and in Soviet times, and to a certain extent – even in the period of independence. After all, from the very beginning of gaining state independence, our country, primarily because of the ideological and political dependence on the Kremlin of various figures such as Ivashko, Kravchuk, Kuchma, Yanukovich, etc., could not really get rid of the imperial shackles of Moscow. At the same time, all this time, even to this day, the ideological oppression of the Moscow Patriarchate over Ukraine. But in Ukraine, the state ideology has not yet been formed, which should protect the interests of the state, in particular – ideologically and politically.

Putin's fanatical obsession with resuscitation of the Russian imperial ideal and the ideology of the USSR led to the fact that on the way to the realization of these manic whims, he is ready to go for any restrictions and sufferings even for his own people. In fact, during the reign of Putin, he could not solve a single problem in the country for further socio-economic and cultural development, as a result of which Russia is degrading, the population is dying out. This country has become a raw materials appendage that eats away its natural resources, its vast territories are falling

into neglect, but the Kremlin's priority is the traditional course aimed at restoring the Russian imperial system and spreading it to the whole world. The obsession with which Putin is implementing this course overshadows all other problems that are ignored and sacrificed in order to achieve relevant imperial goals. Nevertheless, his power rests on the support of the masses. This is because Putin indulges the low instincts of the Russian people, turning them into a crowd, using and fueling chauvinism, imperialism, great power, the thirst for revenge for the defeat in the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR. Therefore, Ukrainian political analysts accurately described Putin's policy as rashism, that is, a type of modern Russian fascism and Nazism, rightly revealing parallels between Putin and Hitler. In order to preserve his power against the background of modest achievements in Russia's socio-economic and cultural development, Putin, in order to support his popularity, must constantly find enemies and fight them. To maintain power and implement his adventurous foreign policy, Putin must always maintain a tense situation in his country and in the world, resorting to appropriate destructive actions²⁴.

In general, it should be summarized that our historical experience convinces us that in developing the Ukrainian state strategy it is necessary to change and restructure its basic principles, namely: in the formation of social ideology, it is necessary to get rid of the pacifist philosopher categorically; the nation should be brought up on the principles of national heroism, the priority of state and national interests; it is necessary to abandon the illusionary vision of international relations and firmly apply the logic of geopolitics, according to which Ukraine, as a state located in the geostrategic zone, cannot afford to relax militarily and conduct deceptive pacifist international policy, not to react to threats from imperial tendencies, above all Russia; Russian imperialism is chauvinistic, and therefore it is especially aggressive to those nations that defend their own identity and independence.

During the centuries-old history of Moscow expansion with respect to Ukraine and other countries, the entire predatory nature of Russian imperial colonialism was fully manifested, which was not disdained by any vile means to achieve the aggressor's own objectives. The current trend testified to the loyalty of the Russian monarchy even to seemingly

²⁴ Пасічник В. Російська загроза незалежності та державному суверенітету України: зміст та духовні детермінанти. URL: <http://preobrazhennja.org.ua/content/rosijska-zagroza-nezalezhnosti-ta-derzhavnomu-suverenitetu-ukrayiny-zmist-ta-duhovni-determi>.

progressive and patriotic-minded Ukrainian thinkers. The process was not only physical entry into the Russian Empire. But, more importantly, the ideological, political and moral-psychological introduction to imperial practice.

It should also be noted that modern wars and military-political conflicts have significant differences from previous models. At the same time, during world history, especially the twentieth century, quite a lot of wars had signs of a hybrid and information-sabotage character. Now, most wars are not only armed in military terms, they often have a close connection with the psychological impact on people's minds through agitation, propaganda and other means of influence. This is especially true of the modern hybrid war unleashed by the Kremlin against Ukraine.

Currently, active opposition of Ukraine to actions by the Russian Federation, including with the use of military force, did not allow to fully implement the "Crimean" scenario in the east of our country. In fact, the hybrid war of Russia against Ukraine turned into an armed conflict between the two countries with the direct involvement of troops from both sides. At the same time, despite the attempts of the Russian side to hide the participation of its armed forces in the actual war, this fact was recognized by the overwhelming majority of the world community, which led to the strengthening of the US and EU sanctions against Russia.

In order to properly repel the hybrid, information-sabotage means of war that the enemy is waging against Ukraine, we need to consider the following:

- the nation should be brought up on the principles of national heroism, the priority of state and national interests;

- since with the development of civilization processes and the advent of globalism, the forms and types of interethnic, interstate confrontations expanded and became more diverse, it became possible to use open and closed methods of attack and sabotage in a war with a rival, and at the same time making information "only political interference" through informational attacks "In the internal affairs of the victim country, or by the appearance of "civil conflict in it";

- Russian imperialism has a chauvinistic essence, and therefore it is especially aggressive towards nations, ignoring the "leading role" and "mission" of the Russian nation and state; it is clear that in this case the Ukrainian nation and state are under the brunt of Russian expansionism

and chauvinism, because they carry the main challenges of the Russian imperial identity: they “take” the historical heritage and culture of the past (before the XVII century) from Russians, break a large number of Russian great-power myths, such as the “fraternal peoples”, the “civilizational role” of the Russian empire, the “justification” of Russian communism, etc., deprive the empire of its geopolitical scope, for it cuts off its stratum. This is an important part of the Black Sea region, therefore, Ukraine’s foreign policy should be as thoughtful and balanced as possible in relation to the Russian state and rationally adequate in relation to its threats.

SUMMARY

An attempt was made to examine the Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014–2019 through the prism of the struggle for a Ukrainian independent state. Attention is focused on the incompleteness of the Ukrainian national liberation struggle of previous eras, and in particular the national liberation struggle of 1917–1921. This is especially relevant, since now the Ukrainian state, once again, in the early twentieth century, faced with the manifestations of systemic aggression and expansion of the Kremlin regime. It was noted that outright aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, launched in 2014, led to the decisive stage of the struggle for the independence of the Ukrainian state. It was emphasized that the importance of this topic is due to the need to form ideological and political ways of a proper response to hybrid, information-sabotage means and methods of warfare, unleashed by the Kremlin and the search for effective means to counter them. It is noted that the modern occupation policy of Moscow has created a number of problems, primarily of an ideological nature, given the need to overcome the remnants of Sovietism and totalitarian symbols. It is also indicated that every aggression of Moscow almost always took place with the expectation of precisely Ukrainian traitors. The latter usually served as the fifth column of the occupiers and in every way contributed to the interests of the Kremlin.

Key words: Russian-Ukrainian war, Ukraine, the struggle for an independent state, aggression of the Russian Federation, hybrid war, information-sabotage means of warfare, ideology.

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Information about the author:

Sytnyk O. M.,

Doctor of Historical Sciences, Associate Professor,
Head of the Department of History, archeology and philosophy,
Bogdan Khmelnytskyi Melitopol state pedagogical University
41/7, Universitetskaya St., Melitopol, 72312, Ukraine