

TURKISH PLOT OF THE BEGINNING OF RUSSIA'S TIME OF TROUBLES: THE "HOLY WAR" PROJECT: FALSE DMITRY I (LZHEDMITRY)

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INTRODUCTION

The idea of the "Holy War" originated in the Russian opinion-based journalism at the end of the XV – beginning of the XVI centuries and was documented in one of the lists of Nestor-Iskender's Tale of the Fall of Constantinople. The idea was presented in his work as a prophecy: "Руссии же род ... измаилита победят и седмахолмаго примут с преждезаконными сего..."¹. (Russian people ... will win the Ishmaelite and will obtain Sedmaholmago with its population). Later, Maximus the Greek justified the cronyism of Moscovia over all conquered Turks by the Orthodox people². These ideas became especially significant when the throne of the Tzardom of Moscovy was taken by False Dmitry I, who did not only pretend to be, but was perceived by all Russian society as the true son of Ivan the Terrible. It is no coincidence that even the captain of the lifeguard of tsar Dmitry Ivanovich, the Frenchman Jacques Margeret, believed that Moscow State is – "one of the best defenders of Christianity"³. Indeed, the time of the Impostor's reign was the best moment for the most active propaganda of the idea of the "holy war" and the beginning of its real preparation.

1. The concept and its impulses

This idea blended seamlessly into the "sacral world" of False Dmitry I, and especially into the concept of plots and symbols of the special charisma of his royal/imperial power⁴. The appeal of the church leaders of the Christian East to the new tsar also played in favor of the situation. For example, the patriarch of Jerusalem Sophronius in his special message to the "son" of Ivan Vasyliovych called him "the most faithful, the most glorious, the highest, the most holy, the most orthodox, God-fearing ... beloved son of our humility" and the true successor

¹ Сперанский М.Н. Повести и сказания о взятии Царьграда турками (1453) в русской письменности XVI–XVII вв. // Труды отдела древнерусской литературы Института русской литературы (Пушкинского Дома) АН СССР. Т. 10. М., Л., 1954. С. 136–165.

² Максим Грек. Сочинение. Казань, 1860, ч. 2. С. 318.

³ Маржерет Яков. Россия начала XVII в. Записки капитана Маржерета / Публ. Ю.А.Лимонова. М., 1982. С. 138.

⁴ For more details: Ульяновский В.И. Смутное время. М., 2006. С. 313–383.

of Ivan IV. The patriarch wrote about his daily prayers for the tzarevich – “the treasure and the pearl of great price”⁵. Although all these epithets and titles were forms of Greek flattery, in the eyes of the Russians and Lzhedmitry I himself, he was put up to the pinnacle of the world Orthodoxy as the only earthly ruler – the unwavering support of the Orthodox Church. In the universal Orthodox context, the image of the new Russian tsar was risen above all other rulers. In fact, the eastern hierarchs began to create the image of an almost holy tsar liberator. In this context, the concept of “Moscow, the Third Rome” received not only theoretical but also practical meaning for the embodiment of “theocratic eschatology” when the tsar of Moscow received the “messianic task”. Thus, the “idea of a universal Orthodox empire” began to loom again, which required the borrowing of the “text of imperial behavior”⁶.

The specified and non-specified factors of the “sanctification” of the power of the tsar Dmitry Ivanovich quite strongly influenced his personal consciousness and became a significant catalyst for his actions in order to develop the idea of “holy war”. False Dmitry I, too obviously for his environment, began to dream of the glory of the great rulers of the world. At the Boyar Duma meetings, he compared himself to Alexander the Great⁷. Contemporaries-foreigners were surprised at his desire for self-aggrandizement: “Dmitry... was so arrogant, ambitious and haughty, that, like Alexander the Great, demanded respect from his servants and subjects, decent not to the emperor, king and sovereign, but to God, and magnified himself not as his predecessors and former great princes did, but calling himself the king of all kings. When he or his wife (i.e. Marina Mniszech, therefore, not earlier than May 1606 – V.U.), was going from one room to another, the bodyguards and the servants had to show their respect and diligence not in the way as it was done in the houses of the other secular sovereigns with a bow; no, they had to kneel. It is good only to God, and to no one else on Earth”⁸. Even a fairly neutral Greek hierarch who lived in Moscow for quite a long time, Archbishop Arseniy Ellassonsky stated: “This tsar, being educated and wise, ruled the kingdom wisely, imitating the tsars, who ruled before him, and in

⁵ Российский государственный архив древних актов (далее – РГАДА). Ф.52, оп.2, спр. 118; Опись архива Посольского приказа 1626 года / Публ. В.И. Гальцов. М., 1977. С. 75; Смутное время Московского государства (1604–1613 гг.). Вып.1: Акты времени Лжедмитрия I-го (1603–1607 гг.) / Публ. Н.В. Рождественского // Чтения в обществе истории и древностей российских. 1918. Кн. 1. С. 77–79.

⁶ Живов В.М., Успенский Б.А. Царь и Бог. Семиотические аспекты сакрализации монарха в России // Успенский Б.А. Избранные труды. М., 1994. Т. 1. С. 123-124.

⁷ Записки Станислава Немоевского (1606-1608 гг.) // Титов А.А. Рукописи славянские и русские, принадлежащие И.А.Вахрамееву. М., 1907. Вып. 6, приложения. С. 64-65.

⁸ Петрей П. де Ерлезунда. История о великом княжестве Московском... М., 1867. С. 231; Буссов К. Московская хроника. 1584–1613 / Сост. А.И. Копанев, М.В. Кукушкина, ред. И.И.Смирнов. М., Л., 1961. С. 129.

particular he strove to surpass them in every royal act and success, but become addicted to the glory of man more than to the glory of God”⁹. If you trust Conrad Boussov, according to him, False Dmitry I ordered to call himself “the tsar of all tsars”¹⁰. The Polish Jesuits who came to Moscow with the tsar were astonished at his conduct: “He puffed up to such an extent that not only equaled himself to all Christian monarchs, but even considered himself superior to them, and said that he would, like another Hercules, be a glorious leader of whole Christianity against the Turks. He arbitrarily accepted the title of emperor, and demanded to be called so not only by his own subjects, but even by foreign sovereigns... He was of such a great opinion about his wisdom, power, and justice that he did not consider anyone equal to him, and even despised some of the Christian kind and powerful monarchs. Finally, he considered his dominance to be eternal”¹¹.

Moreover, the Impostor started diplomatic competitions for the official approval of his imperial title. He apparently continued the idea of Charles V of a universal monarchy, achieved through a victorious war with the Turks. The image of the ideal, pious, hereditary, God-crowned ruler, created by False Dmitry I actually had analogies with the theories of the “perfect sovereign”¹², created by German, Italian, and Spanish thinkers. Tsar Dmitry was also familiar with Machiavelli’s works on the sovereign, power and state, since he received a Latin edition of the publications from Antonio Possevino¹³.

The Impostor’s idea of the “holy war” was closely linked to his “war” for the Caesarian title. This title indicated his intentions to rule over part of the world, it was, in the words of O. Ageeva, “the demand for the creation of bipolar Europe with two Christian imperial centers”. On the other hand, “pretending to the imperial title, the sovereign seemed to admit that the title of Tsar-Caesar equals a lower-ranking title of king, depreciating the idea of Byzantine succession, which had no prestige in the west.” The displacement of the “Byzantine heritage” (The Second Rome) was offset by the orientation to the First Rome, which was perceived as the only historical past of both – western and eastern Europe¹⁴.

⁹ Дмитриевский А.А. Архиепископ Елассонский Арсений и мемуары его из русской истории: по рукописи трапезунтского Сумелийского монастыря. Киев, 1899. С. 105.

¹⁰ Буссов К. Московская хроника. С. 129.

¹¹ Рукопись Яна Велевицкого // Записки гетмана Санислава Жолкевского о московской войне / Изд. П.А. Муханова. СПб., 1871. Приложения № 44. С. 171-172.

¹² Ивонин Ю.Е. Имперская идея и проблема государственности в западной Европе XVI века // Вопросы истории. 1993. № 6. С. 31–44.

¹³ Юсим М.А. Макиавелли в России. Мораль и политика на протяжении пяти столетий. М., 1998. С. 23, 31–41.

¹⁴ Агеева О.Г. Имперский статус России: к истории политического менталитета русского общества начала XVIII века // Царь и царство в русском общественном сознании. М., 1999. С. 135.

In the message to Sigismund III Vasa of September 5, 1605, False Dmitry I was naming himself: “We, the most luminous and invincible monarch Dimitri Ivanovich, by the grace of God, the tsar and grand prince of all Russia, all Tatar kingdoms and other numerous possessions under Moscow monarchist power, sovereign and king”, “we are crowned and aneled by our holy patriarch not only in the rank of the emperor of our vast possessions, but also in the rank of the king of all the Tatar kingdoms which from ancient times obeyed our monarchy”¹⁵. In this formula, the Impostor appropriated all the names/symbols of earthly power in the triple hierarchy: emperor – king – tsar, emphasizing the equivalence of his power to the only modern emperor and height above the kings of the west and tsars of the east. In the order to Peter Chubarov, the envoy to Yuri Mniszech from September 21, 1605 there was another title: “The most eminent and invincible sole ruler, the great monarch Dmitry Ivanovich by the mercy of God the Emperor and Grand Duke of All Russia and all Tatar kingdoms and many other kingdoms, the king, tsar and possessor of Moscow monarchy subjects”¹⁶. “Invincible Caesar” was equated with the “Tsar of Glory” (let’s remember K. Bussov’s words, that the Impostor ordered to call himself “the tsar of all tsars”). Stanislav Borsha, who was among the mercenaries of the Impostor, remarked with amazement that the tsar “rejected that any sovereign in the world was equal to him and almost considered himself equal to God”¹⁷. For Polish ambassadors who refused to accept his imperial title, False Dmitry I postulated the idea that his power was God-given, so he also received the imperial title with power from God. So, “neither the Assyrians, nor the Medians, nor the Caesars of Rome had more rights and advantages for this title ... There is nobody equal to us in the Northern lands; no one rules us except God, but besides we distribute rights to the others... we are the supreme lawgiver and even are the highest law in our vast empire”¹⁸. In fact, the Impostor for the first time in Russia had developed the complex ideological system of the empire and formulated a meaningful filling of the title of emperor, relying on historical analogues and demonstrating considerable erudition.

It is interesting that the Polish ambassador, in response to the exorbitant ambitions of Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich, supposedly suggested him to conquer Crimea and Turkey first, in order to deserve the desired title. According to another, slightly modified version, the ambassador said: “Constantine the

¹⁵ Сборник русского исторического общества (далі – Сб. РИО). Т. 137. М., 1912. С. 748–754.

¹⁶ Там само. С. 187.

¹⁷ Русская историческая библиотека (далі – РИБ). Т. 1. СПб., 1872. С. 424.

¹⁸ Там само. С.412–414.

Great divided the empire into eastern and western parts; the first passed to the Turks and the second to the Germans: when the Grand Duke defeats the Turks, and takes Constantinople, then he can take the title of emperor. Now his power in the south is completely unknown, and is limited only to the north and part of the east"¹⁹. It is noticeable that Rome, hoping for a real war of the Moscow kingdom with Turkey, started to title Tsar Dmitry according to his desire "emperor" and "invincible"²⁰.

In addition to the title, False Dmitry I also exploited other symbols of power that required the possession of the "holy land" – Jerusalem. In particular, he built for himself a throne similar to King Solomon's throne, as it was described in the Bible²¹. This fact further indicated that it was the third and the greatest king of Israel (Solomon) who was the model for the Impostor. During private receptions tsar Dmitry Ivanovich used the Iranian throne, presented in 1604 by Shah Abbas to Boris Godunov. This is not a coincidence: in the dream program of the "holy war", False Dmitry I intended to continue the idea of Boris Godunov linking up Iran to this action by making Shah Abbas his ally. Even the inscription on the tsar's silver award medals was in Latin and consisted of the title "By the Grace of God the Emperor of Russia", declaring the idea of the scale of power of the Moscow ruler. Most likely, these coins were oriented to the Western countries (the image of the tsar in the crown of the Western sample, the inscription in Latin). The domestic Russian version of the medals was designed to reward the upcoming "Turkish campaign" and contained double Russian and Western symbols. This was evidenced by the Russian-language inscription: "Дмитрий Иванович Божиею милостию царь и великий князь всея России и всех татарских королевств и иных многих государств Московской монархии подлежащих государь король и обладатель и цесарь России и Самодержец" (Dmitry Ivanovich by the mercy of God the Tsar and the Grand Duke of all Russia and of all the Tatar kingdoms and other many states of the Moscow monarchy subjects, the king, owner and emperor of Russia and the Autocrat). Thus, the existing three titles (Grand Duke, King, and Caesar) directly indicated the coexistence of the Russian and Western systems and focused on the possession of "many other states"²². Trying to overpass in

¹⁹ Массе И. Краткое известие о Московии в начале XVII в. / Перев. А.А. Морозова, ред. Н. Рубинштейна. М., 1937. С. 132-133; Устрялов Н.Г. Сказания современников о Димитрии Самозванце. Ч. 1. СПб., 1859. С. 183, 344.

²⁰ Собрание государственных грамот и договоров, хранящихся в Государственной Комиссии иностранных дел (далі – СГГД). Ч. 2. М., 1819. С. 267–269.

²¹ For more details: Ульяновский В.И. Смутное время. С. 352–355.

²² Лаврентьев А.В. Для какой цели были отчеканены "золотые" Лжедмитрия I? // Вспомогательные исторические дисциплины. Т.26. СПб., 1998. С. 204–207.

everything his predecessors in the kingdom, Dmitry Ivanovich, according to Archbishop Arseniy Elasonskiy, was convinced that the Lord had saved him in his infancy from death (May 15, 1591), and he was appointed by the Lord for a world-class mission. The tsar wrote about this to his future father-in-law Yuri Mniszech: “We feel great grace of God over us, both in our health and in our state affairs”²³. Actually, this God-defined mission, as the Impostor believed, was the “holy war” for the liberation of the Holy Land and the creation of anti-Turkish league.

2. The idea of the holy war in the circle of the impostor

The idea of the “holy war” implied not only the liberation of Christian shrines, but also the conquest of the entire Byzantine Empire, headed by Constantinople. Western diplomacy tried to impose this idea on Russian rulers throughout the sixteenth century. Jesuit Antonio Possevino promised the title of “Emperor of the East” to Ivan the Terrible if he would re-conquer Constantinople and all the former dominions of the Byzantine Empire. The mission of the crusade against the Turks was offered to Ivan the Terrible also by the ambassadors of the Austrian emperor. The Pope’s envoy, Alessandro Comuleo, in 1594 sought to instill in tsar Fyodor Ivanovich the idea of establishing his authority over all Christians of the Greek rite. However, all these plans to involve Moscow in a global war with the Muslim world were unsuccessful, the attempt to involve Russia in the anti-Turkish league²⁴. also failed. Only the “son” of Ivan the Terrible and the “brother” of Fyodor Ivanovich, not so much because of external influences, but in accordance with his own ambitions and sanctification of his authority, perceived the idea of the “holy war” as his “sacred duty”.

It is considered that this idea was first introduced into his mind by representatives of the Catholic clergy while the Impostor still was in the Polish – Lithuanian Commonwealth. He made a promise, and of all his promises, given to obtain financial and military support, he only tried to put into action this one, after taking the throne. Interestingly, that already in his campaign against Moscow, False Dmitry I ordered to rename the city of Tsarev-Borisov (in honor of Godunov) to Tsargrad²⁵. Of course, this small town could not be compared to Byzantine Tsargrad, but the action itself was already a symbol of intent.

²³ СГГД. Ч. 2. С. 227.

²⁴ Флоря Б.Н. Османская империя, Крым и страны Восточной Европы в конце XVI – начале XVII в. // Османская империя и страны Центральной, Восточной и Юго-Восточной Европы в XVII в. М., 1998. Ч. 1. С. 53-54.

²⁵ Сборник материалов по русской истории начала XVII в. / Публ. И.М. Болдакова. СПб., 1896. С. 81.

At the end of the summer of 1605, a couple of months after his enthronement, Dmitry Ivanovich started persistent negotiations with the Polish king and the Pope regarding the creation of an effective league and the beginning of the “holy war”. On the orders of the tsar, the Ambassador to Sigismund III, Athanasius Vlasiev, in the autumn of 1605, had to lobby for the beginning of the war against the sultan for the liberation of Christians: “Greece, from where the roots and beginning of all piety, holy Bethlehem, where our Lord the son of God Jesus Christ was born and our Holy Word appeared, Nazareth and Galilee, the whole seaside country, and even the holy city of Jerusalem, where our Lord Jesus Christ, after having done many miracles, voluntarily accepted passion and death for our salvation and on the third day rose from the death”. The Impostor took the fate of Orthodoxy and Christians very much to heart: “Our holy Orthodox Christian faith is everywhere subjected to neglect and humiliation; Christians are like sheep without a shepherd, and the wicked power of the unbelievers extends and expands everywhere – “about this ... we sincerely and heartily regret”²⁶. In December 1605, the tsar sent to Rome the attendant Jesuit Andrew Lavitsky for the purpose “to declare to the Pope that Dmitry wants to start the war against the Turkish Sultan” and to ask “to incite western Christian sovereigns to this war, especially the emperor of Rome and the king of Poland”²⁷. In the personal epistle to Pope Paul V of November 30, 1605, False Dmitry I developed mainly the theme of the “holy war”²⁸. Andriy Lavitsky managed to get the audience with the sick emperor Rudolf II in Prague to inform him about the tsar’s plans for the “holy war” against the Porte and to request the support the action of the Impostor together with the king of Poland. Due to this information, the emperor even suspended talks with Turkish ambassadors regarding the peace treaty²⁹. The information of the Impostor’s intentions immediately ended up in the hands of the agent of the Republic of Venice Francesco Soranto, who reported to Doge: “It is not without the likelihood that one day he will be given the free hand to move against the Turks, it would be the best possible reason in case if he would decide to do this soon, to put on guard possible thoughts about peace”³⁰. The most reputable Vatican expert on eastern Europe, Jesuit Antonio Possevino, also developed the idea before the Duke of Tuscany that Muscovy, Poland, and the emperor could oppose the Ottomans.

²⁶ РИБ. Т. 1. С. 45-46.

²⁷ Рукопись Яна Велевицкого. С.137; *Магилина И.В.* Россия и проект антиосманской лиги в конце XVI – начале XVII вв. Волгоград, 2012. С. 252.

²⁸ СГГД. Ч.2. С. 231–234.

²⁹ *Александренко В.Н.* Материалы по Смутному времени на Руси XVII века // *Старина и новизна*. М., 1911. Кн.14. С. 352.

³⁰ Там само. С. 382.

The plan of the Impostor was elaborated in details in the letter to King Sigismund III, the text of which was preserved with defects, but it is the most important of all documents, therefore it requires a detailed citation: “Для грехов всего православного христианства и за незгодою всих великих господор христианских, неприятель крижа святого Христова, турский султан опановал веле христианских панств, а наболей грецких [...]*, на которой есть корень и голова всего благословенства [...]*, где пан наш Иисус Христос, Сын, Слово Божое, народитися злюбил, и святыи [...]*, Галилею и поморские земли вси, и самое там-то святое место Ерусалим, где пан наш Иисус Христос много чудов учинивши, муку и смерть для збавленья нашего доброволне под [...]* и встал з мертвых [...]*. Тые вси святые места видим отриманы измаилскими гордыми руками, а нашу святую правдивую православную хрестиянскую веру отвсюль видим [...]* и пониожную, яко овца не маючи пастыря; а зтого, поганьская владза везде роз[...]*, и много хрестиянских панств под свою владзу окрутне [...]?, а ничим насытитися не могут... Того мы великий господарь цесарь, великий князь Дмитр Иванович всее Руси самодержца, жалеем с души и сердца, и того у пана Бога просим и с пильностию промышляти хочем, жебы нам всим великим господаром христианским быть межи собою в приязни и в милости и в едноченью, жебы нашим великих господаров христианских стараньем христианство з рук бусурманских освобождено было, и рука бы наша [...]*, а поганьская была пониожена”³¹. (For the sins of all Orthodox Christianity and considering the discord of all great Christian lords, the enemy of the holy Creed of the Christ, the Turkish sultan captured many Christian lands, and considerable part of Greece [...] *, where there are roots and principles of all the blessings [...] * where our Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, and the Word of God, appeared, and the saint [...] *, all Galilee and Pomeranian lands, and the holy place of Jerusalem, where our Lord Jesus Christ made many miracles, and voluntary accepted travails and death for our deliverance [...] * and rose from the dead [...] * All these saint places are under the proud hands of Ishmaelite, and our true holy Orthodox faith is suppressed[...] * our pride is mortified like a sheep without shepherd; and non-Christian power is ruling [...] *, and many Christian nations are under their power [...] ?, can't get enough of anything. We, the great ruler Caesar, Grand Duke Dmitry Ivanovich, sole rule of all Russia, regret with all our heart and soul, and ask our Lord to take care of us to unite all Christians to be together in

* Lacunes in the text of the document.

³¹ Акты, относящиеся к истории Западной России, собранные и изданные Археографическою комиссиею / Ред. прот. И. Григорович. СПб., 1851. Т. 4: 1588–1632 гг. С. 252.

affection and mercy, at the same time with the efforts of all our Christian landlords it is necessary to liberate the Christianity from the hands of infidels, and our hand would [...] *, and the hands of heathen will be sublated). Consequently, False Dmitry I made a major emphasis on releasing the main shrines of the Christian world related to the terrestrial life of Jesus Christ. According to him, these shrines served to consolidate Christian west and Christian east to oblige all Christian countries with their rulers to take care of the liberation of these shrines from the Muslim conquest. It was some kind of continuation of popular ideas spread in Russia during the time of Ivan the Terrible about the tsar – liberator, the “emperor of the whole east,” who would liberate St. Jerusalem. If earlier and later (under Patriarch Nikon) the theories of “second Constantinople” and “new Jerusalem” in Russia / Moscow were developed, the Impostor intended to possess both the first Constantinople and the first Jerusalem, putting himself into the sacred context of the New Testament history and sacred-tsarist context of the first and most powerful Christian empire. By placing himself into the sacred world of such global proportions, False Dmitry I sought to prove to west the validity of his claims to the highest symbols of sub-celestial power, to show to the whole Orthodox world his piety and loyalty to the Orthodox Church, to win faith in his messiahship among the peoples of the Balkans and Greece, and finally to reach the desirable image of the Christian Ruler.

3. Specifics of actions: diplomacy

Was the idea of the “Holy War” real in 1605–1606? Was it just beautiful concepts and words or Tsar Dmitry really thought in terms of the holy war and was in preparation to the military actions? The multifarious sources available allow us to answer these questions quite objectively.

From the summer of 1605, tsarist diplomacy started to verify broadside public sentiment of potential partners of the “Holy War”. The envoy to Poland, Peter Chubarev, received the order (July 21, 1605) to inquire into the state of relations of the Polish king with the Crimean khan and the Turkish sultan. He had to clarify if the king made peace with the sultan, who was the initiator of peace, and who was the first to send gifts to the enemy. The envoy also had to find ways to get information about emperor Rudolf’s II relationship with the sultan: whether they were still at war or reconciled, whose troops incurred more losses during the military operations, whether the emperor had allies and what kind of relations he had with the Polish king. All this information Chubarev had to “проведати тайно у всяких людей; и что проведает, то все записати себе тайно”³². (find out secretly from all manner

³² Сб. РИО. Т. 132, С. 189-190.

of men and make his records secretly). Through another envoy, False Dmitry I declared to the royal court that he was ““со всею ратью на весну готов” (ready with all his army for the spring campaign) “but he never received clear response from Poles³³. Therefore, in the next decree of the messenger, the tsar was reprimanding the Polish side quite undiplomatically: “Our Highness invincible Caesar intends to wage war with evil people only in favor of the glory of God and the holy faith, without any other objectives. If, however, the king instructed you only to know our thoughts and not to do anything afterwards, it will be cunningness and cajolment”³⁴. At the same time, Tsar Dmitry tried to involve unsuccessfully England, France, Spain and the Republic of Venice to the anti-Turkish coalition³⁵. Thus, the main reliance of False Dmitry I was made on the Papacy: On November 30, 1605, in the personal epistle to the Pope, the tsar appealed persistently to start the war with the Porte for holy relics and asked the Pope to influence the emperor and other Catholic rulers of Europe³⁶. His Jesuit envoy Andriy Lavitsky had to inform the Pope that the tsar was ready to launch hostilities as soon as the emperor and the king of Poland would agree to support his actions³⁷. Realizing that the attempt to induce the practical actions of the western rulers is unrealistic, Dmitry Ivanovich addressed to Paul V with a special message of February 5, 1606, to help at least to ensure that the emperor would not conclude peace with the sultan. In response, the Vatican tried to push the tsar to start real military campaign without assistance. Pope’s nephew Cardinal Scipio Borghese, in response to the tsar’s appeal to the pontiff, assured him that all Catholic monarchs would support the Moscow ruler in this “holy cause”. To compliment the False Dmitry I, the Cardinal called him “the most powerful” commander of the “giant army”, convincing that the tsar himself will be able to defeat the Porte without any help of the other rulers, as “everybody is looking forward to his glorious victories.” At the same time the pontiff promised only to set the tsar as an example to all other rulers and to cover his name with “immortal fame”³⁸. Jesuit Antonio Possevino, an expert on “Moscow affairs” at the Vatican, also directed papal diplomacy to push the tsar to start hostilities against Turkey, while at the same time offering to officially reanimate the anti-Turkish league by attaching to its members (Holy

³³ Полное собрание русских летописец (further – ПСРЛ). Т. 14. М., 1965. С. 68.

³⁴ Сб. РИО. Т. 132. С. 191.

³⁵ Александренко В.Н. Материалы по Смутному времени на Руси. С. 233; Устрялов Н.Г. Сказания современников о Димитрии Самозванце. Ч. 1. С. 305, Ч. 2. С. 189; Hirschberg A. *Dymitr Samozwaniec*. Lwów, 1898. S. 153.

³⁶ РГАДА. Ф. 78, оп. 1, д. 3; СГГД. Ч. 2. С. 231–234.

³⁷ Рукопись Яна Велевицкого. С. 137.

³⁸ Рукопись Яна Велевицкого. С. 146.

Roman Empire and Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) Holy Moscow Kingdom as affiliated member³⁹. Polish nuncio Claudio Rangoni also had the task of calming of False Dmitry who was disillusioned by the inertia of the west over the “holy war”. The Cardinal wrote to the tsar on February 25, 1606, that Pope Paul V had directed all his forces to establish a real alliance between Warsaw and Moscow in the planned war against the Porte, and Moscow’s participation in this fierce action would take away “wings and a right shoulder”⁴⁰ from Turkey. Why did the papal curia push so hard the Impostor? The answer was given by the English agent Plessen in his special analytical report to London on September 3, 1605: The Vatican believed that the Tsar of Moscow could provide 150,000 armored soldiers, and thus the pontiff, and the western rulers could do nothing from their side⁴¹. All these attempts were defeated by the intransigence of the Polish king Sigismund III. In response to an attempt by False Dmitry I in a personal letter dated November 23, 1605, to persuade the king to ally and start a military march to the east, the king replied that he had a problematic relationship with the empire. Even Cardinal Rangoni, in his letter of February 25, 1606, explained to the tsar that he had not succeeded in overcoming “many obstacles” on the way to an agreement between the king and the emperor, “the Poles and the Germans by their nature disagree with each other, so the king does not consider it possible to conclude a treaty against the Turks with the emperor”⁴².

4. Specifics of actions: military preparation

At the long last, Tsar Dmitry started preparations for a military campaign unilaterally. This is evidenced by scattered and fragmented, but indisputable sources. First of all, the tsar set out to raise money for a military campaign. He collected money mainly from church structures. In particular, in the Joseph-Volokolamsky and Novodevichy monasteries the Impostor borrowed 3 thousand rubles from each of the monasteries in Ciril-Belozersky – 5 thousand, and in the Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery – 30 thousand, concerning other monasteries the information is not preserved. In addition, a special military tax was imposed on the monasteries. It was possible to find out this data only with regard to those church structures that kept the books of expenses for 1605–1606. In particular, the Cyril-Belozersky monastery in April 1606 paid a special tax “в государев царев и великого князя Дмитрия Ивановича всея Руси в полскои” (to the sovereign tsar and Grand Duke

³⁹ Александренко В.Н. Материалы по Смутному времени на Руси. С. 381–382.

⁴⁰ СГГД. Ч. 2. С. 272–275.

⁴¹ Александренко В.Н. Материалы по Смутному времени на Руси. С. 242.

⁴² СГГД. Ч. 2. С. 273–274.

Dmitry Ivanovich of all Russ for polskoye (i.e., in the field, in the southern steppes – V.U.) “поход за ратные люди” (military campaign) The monastery was also obliged to horse the army. For example, in May 1606 Krasnokholmsky Monastery of St. Nicolas provided “для полского походу” (for the field campaign) their servants and 35 stallions. From the Joseph-Volokolamsk Monastery, the horses were delivered,” под стрельцы, под Елец на государеву службу” (for streltsy, under Yelets for the sovereign service) for this purpose more than 297 rubles were collected from the monastic peasants, 8 horses and 8 rubles to feed the horses were taken from the village Ostashkovo alone⁴³.

Following the tsars order, weapons were intensively manufactured in the country. This was testified by Swedish resident Petrus Petrej. He wrote that False Dmitry I “commanded to mold a fair amount” of canons⁴⁴. Conrad Bussov, who lived in Moscow at that time and served for the Impostor, also wrote about the mass production of mortars and guns. He testified that the tsar sent a considerable amount of artillery in winter “to Yelets, which is located at the Tatar border,” as he had the intention to “visit the Tatars and the Turks”⁴⁵ in the summer of 1606. The Dutch merchant Isaac Mass, who also lived in Moscow, not only confirmed the production of a large number of mortars and guns, but also indicated that the Impostor had personally tested them⁴⁶. In 1818, a cannon was found in the Kremlin’s armoury with the inscription: “Божиею милостию повелением великого государя царя и великого князя Димитрея Ивановича всея великия Россия самодержца в первое лето государства его зделана бысть сия пушка в царствующем граде Москве в лето 7114 (1605 г. – В.У.) месяца сентября в 27 день. Мастер Ондреи Чохов, а делал пушечной литец Проня Федоров”. (By the grace of God, by the order of the great sovereign ruler Tsar and Grand Duke Dmitry Ivanovich, the great autocrat of Russia in the first summer of his sovereignty this canon was made in the reigning city of Moscow in summer of 7144 (year of 1605 – V.U.) in the month of September, 27th day. Master workman – Andrey Chekhov, and gun was casted by Pronia Fedorov). This cannon being preserved by miracle, since Peter the First, when the cannon was located, banned to recast it. The cannon weighed 116 pounds and 32 feet⁴⁷.

⁴³ РГАДА. Ф. 1192, оп. 2, спр. 15, арк. 133–141, спр. 16, арк. 229.

⁴⁴ Петрей П. де Ерлезунда. История о великом княжестве Московском... М., 1867. С. 210.

⁴⁵ Буссов К. Московская хроника.. С. 111.

⁴⁶ Масса И. Краткое известие о Московии. С. 118-119.

⁴⁷ Российская национальная библиотека. Отдел рукописей (далі – РНБ. ОР) Ф. 328, д. 91, д. 67-68 об.

It is likely, that a mobile fortress was also planned for the military actions; later on, after the murder of False Dmitry I, Russian publicists interpreted this fortress as the “hell” (“inferno”). They used this image to demonize the tsar whom they served and worshiped during his life. Neutral, though not positively disposed to Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich, the Dutch merchant Isaac Mass, who himself saw the fortress, wrote about it: “He ordered to make a monster-fortress, moving on wheels, with many small field cannons inside and various kinds of firearms, to use this fortress against the Tatars and thereby to frighten both themselves and their horses, and indeed this was invented by him very cunningly... and it was very skillfully made and all painted; elephants were depicted on the doors, and the windows were similar to the gates of hell, and they had to spew fire, and below were small windows similar to the heads of devils, where small guns were placed. Truly, if this fortress could be used against such enemies as the Tatars, it would immediately lead them into confusion and put the army to flight, because it was very skillfully invented. Due to this Muscovites called the fortress the monster of hell, and after the death of Dmitry, whom they called a sorcerer, they said that he locked the devil there for a while”⁴⁸.

False Dmitry I was taking seriously the preparation for the great war. He himself trained the noble regiments. Not only foreigners (Isaac Massa), but also the Russian elite (Prince Ivan Katyrev-Rostovsky) testified that he “himself was a brave warrior ..., possessed incredible strength in his hands”, “конское рыстание любляше, на враги свои ополчитель смел, храбрость и силу имея, воинство же вельми любяше”⁴⁹ (loving horse whinny, he was courageous to fight his enemies, having brevity and power, he loved his troops). So, according to the eyewitness, the tsar “himself trained his horsemen, they were brave fellows and nobles of good families, and the tsar gave them good remuneration ...”⁵⁰.

False Dmitry I tried in many ways to conduct surveillance in Sublime Porte using including captives as well. For example, he ordered to reward “Turkish captive Yakushko Fedorov, son of Nedoshyvok”⁵¹. In December 1605, the Turkish captain “Dus Bakhmet..., who caused great damage all over the river Don”⁵² and was captured by Cossacks “located near Azov” was brought to Moscow according to the special order of the tsar.

⁴⁸ Масса И. Краткое известие о Московии. С. 119.

⁴⁹ Там само. С. 118; Памятники древней русской письменности, относящиеся к Смутному времени // РИБ. Т. 13. СПб., 1909. С. 622.

⁵⁰ Масса И. Краткое известие о Московии. С. 121.

⁵¹ РГАДА. Ф. 210, десятины, д. 223, л. 80.

⁵² Масса И. Краткое известие о Московии. С. 121.

Yelets was determined as the main starting point of the military campaign, from where the troops had to go to the Turkish fortress of Azov. The second point of rendezvous was Astrakhan, from which the detachments also had to go to capture Azov. Conrad Boussov observed, as from the winter of 1606, “big quantity of ammunition, supplies and provisions was sent to Yelets, a town on the Tatar border; everything was brought there to accompany the army, so that by the spring they had stored large quantity of flour, powder, lead, fat, and all kinds of other things for three hundred thousand men, and it was ordered that all should be kept until his (Dmitry) arrival”⁵³. Isaac Mas also confirmed this information: “a lot of ammunition and supplies were sent to the town of Yelets in order before everything else to attack Tataria”⁵⁴. According to Polish mercenary Martin Stadnitsky, False Dmitry I concentrated near Moscow about 18,000 soldiers to march on Crimea, “where troops were sent daily”⁵⁵. This Moscow-area army did not manage to enter the campaign and was partially involved in the uprising against Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich, organized by Vasily Shuisky. Even the publicists of the Troubled Times, who of course defamed the impostor, pointed to his military preparations. For example, Abraham Palitsyn remarked: “Послав на Елец много избранного наряду пушечно и спустоши Москву и иныя грады тою” (He sent to Yelets a lot of ammunition and thus devastated Moscow and other cities). He noted that part of the troops had to raft along the Don river and the other part to move by land⁵⁶. This Moscow-area army did not manage to enter the campaign and was partially involved in the uprising against Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich, organized by Vasily Shuisky. Even the publicists of the Troubled Times, who of course defamed the impostor, pointed to his military preparations. For example, Abraham Palitsyn remarked: “Послав на Елец много избранного наряду пушечно и спустоши Москву и иныя грады тою” (He sent to Yelets a lot of ammunition and thus devastated Moscow and other cities). He noted that part of the troops had to raft along the Don river and the other part to move by land⁵⁷.

How numerous were the troops of the Impostor in the Crimean-Azov area? Jesuit Caspar Savitsky, who had personal contacts with the tsar indicated that the tsar himself named the figure of 160 thousand warriors. To tell the truth, some contemporaries (K. Bussov) mentioned fantastic

⁵³ Буссов К. Московская хроника. С. 111, 125.

⁵⁴ Масса И. Краткое известие о Московии. С. 143.

⁵⁵ История Димитрия царя московского и Марины Мнишек. Дневник Мартына Стадницкого / Публ. А.А. Титова // Русский архив. 1906. № 10. С. 161.

⁵⁶ Сказание Авраамия Палицына / Публ. О.А. Державиной, Е.В. Колосовой. М., Л., 1955. С. 114, 264.

⁵⁷ ПСРЛ. Т. 14. М., 1965. С. 68.

figure of 300 thousand. Some fragmentary specifics of the troops in Yelets can be found in the Murom Desiatnia of 1606, where the provision to local nobles of 50 quarters of the land for “за елецкую службу”⁵⁸ (Yelets service) was documented. False Dmitry I intended to come to Yelets before the beginning of the military expedition to personally lead the army. However, British diplomat William Smith reported that the “Turkish march” should have been headed by the most loyal to the tsar boyar of Moscow, Peter Basmanov, and Smith did not rule out that Basmanov had to lead the army against Sweden, not Turkey⁵⁹. Even during the exercises near Vyazma, Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich, seizing the conventional fortress, mentioned to his people: “God willing, we will take Azov in the same way over time”⁶⁰. Even during the exercises near Vyazma, Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich, seizing the conventional fortress, mentioned to his people: “God willing, we will take Azov in the same way over time”⁶¹ (ordered for all Russia and for many Poles to be prepared to go to Azov). Near Azov, Cossacks from the Don river were also very active, preparing to assault the fortress. Azov was an important Turkish fortress that controlled the Caucasus. Equally important was the city of Astrakhan. The fact that the troops were also concentrated here is evidenced in the desiatnias of the involvement of noblemen. For example, on December 28, 1605, in the Arzamas desiatina there were records on the distribution of salaries to “детем боярским, которым велено бытии на государеве службе в Астрахани”⁶² (boyar children who were ordered to be in the sovereign’s service in Astrakhan). In Murom’s desiatnia of 1606, 20 noblemen were named, who “в прошлом 113 (1605 г. – В.У.) году сказана была государева царева и великого князя Дмитрея Ивановича всеа Руси служба в Асторахан” (in the past year of 113 (1605 – V.U.) were on military service of the tsar and grand prince of all Russia Dmitry Ivanovich in Astorahan) “their allowances have been increased twice. Presumably, for this correction, the princes Kulunchak-Murza and Yemekiy-Murza Yenikeyev Tenishev, were ordered to mobilize 700 princes⁶³, murzas, cossacks and Mordvinians “ на государеву службу со всем служебным нарядом” (for a sovereign service with all official attire)⁶⁴. In addition, the cossacks were given the task of “knock down” with

⁵⁸ РГАДА. Ф. 210, десятины, д. 6, л. 5 об., 32 об.

⁵⁹ Александренко В.Н. Материалы по Смутному времени. С. 253.

⁶⁰ Устрялов Н.Г. Сказания современников о Дмитрии Самозванце. С. 53-54.

⁶¹ Сказание Авраамия Палицына. С. 114, 261.

⁶² Юшков А. Акты XIII–XVII вв., представленные в Разрядный приказ представителями служилых фамилий после отмены местничества. Ч. 1. М., 1898. С. 285.

⁶³ РГАДА. Ф. 210, десятины, д.6, л. 29-30, 37.

⁶⁴ РНБ. ОР. Ф. 464, спр. 5, арк. 1-2.

the Turks from the fortified town of Terek⁶⁵. Researchers believe that in the spring of 1606 the troops, headed by F.I. Sheremetyev and I.N. Saltykov were dispatched to Astrakhan⁶⁶.

At the same time, False Dmitry I was preparing military campaign to Crimea, since for this purpose, from September 1605 it was decided to cast the cannons. However, at first, during his march on Moscow to reconquer the throne, Tsarevich Dmitry tried to relay on the Crimean khan through special envoy Konstantin Shirkov, but in Crimea people did not believe him⁶⁷. Crimean ambassador Jan Akhmet Chelibey (Chelebi) reported to Boris Godunov in November 1604, referring to a man “Димитреем называют, царя Ивана сын, а мы для того не ведаем, прямой ли он царя Ивана сын или не прямой, только деи меж дву государей смуту учинил велику” (who is called Dmitry, tsar Ivan’s son, and we do not know if he is the son of tsar Ivan’s direct or indirect, but his deeds between two sovereigns made real riot). Moreover, the ambassador offered Khan’s assistance particularly to Godunov: “И царь (хан – В.У.) для государя хошь то сперва в Киев пойдет”⁶⁸ (And the tsar (khan – V.U.) for the sovereign may go to Kiev first). The Khan’s ambassador reported that King Sigismund III had sent to Khan his envoy, Jan-Anton Cherkashin, with a proposal to assist False Dmitry I in the war against Godunov⁶⁹. However, the ambassador had seen in Moscow the collapse of the Godunov dynasty and the reign of Dmitry Ivanovich. On July 8, 1605, the embassy clerk Athanasius Vlasiev began to negotiate with the Crimeans on behalf of Tsar Dmitry on “friendship and love.” The ambassador had to say in response that the Crimean Tatars “rejoiced” the reign of Ivan the Terrible true son, as well as in the release by him of all the prisoners of Boris Godunov. At the same time, the ambassador pointed at his own state similar to imprisonment and asked to be released and permitted to go to Crimea. He asked as well to return old khan’s letters to Tsar Boris, where “царское имя писано не по пригожу”⁷⁰. (royal name was not mentioned correctly). On July 21, 1605, the Crimean embassy was received by Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich himself, on the same day with the reception of the Tatar king Uraz-Mohammed of Kasimov and the Swedish prince Gustave in the Golden Chamber. The tsar was in ceremonial vestments sitting on the “throne of Solomon” He spoke to the Crimeans about the reign on the throne of

⁶⁵ СГГД. Ч. 2. С. 265-266.

⁶⁶ Лисейцев Д.В. Русско-турецкие отношения в начале XVII века: от конфронтации к сближению // Отечественная история. 2002. № 5. С. 171.

⁶⁷ Смутное время Московского государства (1604–1613 гг.). Вып. 1. С. 251.

⁶⁸ Там само. С. 175.

⁶⁹ Там само. С. 180–182.

⁷⁰ Там само. С. 186-187.

“his father” and “his brother”, to maintain peace, love and friendship with the khan; he gave valuable gifts to the ambassadors and let them go to Crimea⁷¹. Police officers were instructed not to allow the ambassadors to speak with the local population and to send dispatches to Crimea. The Crimeans had an order to stay in Mtsensk and wait for the royal envoy to the khan, together with whom they had to go to Crimea. From October 1605 until April 1606, quite a large embassy (about 150 people and twice as many horses) had to reside in Mtsensk and Novosil without sufficient food and feed. The police officers were informing Moscow regarding all trivialities and incidence with the Crimeans. The tsar (the title of “Caesar” was used in the orders) frightened the police officers to be punished by hanging them, if at least one Tatar escapes and go to Crimea⁷². At the same time, a plan for a military campaign to the South-East and Crimea was under development. It was only in March 1606 when the royal envoy to the khan – Afanasii Melentiev Kurlukov arrived in Livny, with a new Crimean envoy Alash-bogatyр (he came to Moscow in January 1606 with the royal messenger Konstantin Shirkov). Russian authorities have made every effort to prevent the Crimeans from learning about military preparations and plans. Moreover, at the beginning the police officers were ordered to hide the Crimean embassies from each other, only on March 21 both embassies were allowed to meet together, but provided that there would be present a secret person among the Russian nobles who spoke Tatar language and could understand what the Crimeans were talking between themselves. However, the Crimean ambassadors were not naive, so in the presence of Muscovites they spoke only about the tsar, his generous gifts and praised the Moscow ruler⁷³. Jan Ahmet Chelebius deliberately said that he had remembered the secret words of the tsar, to be rendered a verbatim to the khan⁷⁴. The tsar’s envoy Athanasius Kurlukov had to speak in the presence of the Crimean ambassadors mentioning that after the reign of the true son of Ivan the Terrible, “sovereigns of many states” sent their embassies: the emperor of Rome, the kings of Poland and Denmark “and other sovereigns” with greetings, and the new tsar sent his embassies “во все страны” (to all the countries). However, Athanasius did not succeed in getting anything special from the Crimeans, only information that “Можары с турскими не в миру” (Mozars with the Turkish are not at peace) and both sides are trying to enlist the support of the khan⁷⁵. Only on April 12, all the three embassies (two Crimean and Moscow) left to Crimea following the royal order. In such a

⁷¹ Там само. С. 188-189.

⁷² Там само. С. 196-245.

⁷³ Там само. С. 249.

⁷⁴ Там само. С. 250.

⁷⁵ Там само. С. 250-256.

way, the Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich tried to lull the vigilance of Kaza-Giray. After receiving all the information, Tsar Dmitry believed that the moment to start a military campaign against the Porte, weakened by rebellion and the necessity to fight on several fronts, was quite right. But the Turks also had their informants. The French ambassador to Istanbul, Jean de Gontaut Biron, baron de Salignac, informed King Henry IV that the Turkish authorities already knew about the preparations by the tsar of Moscow for the march on Azov and further into the main Turkish possessions⁷⁶. Greek merchants in Istanbul also have heard about the preparations and reported: “Prince Dmitry intends to attack Turks; this is a great luck and help for us”⁷⁷.

Consequently, not having received the support of the west, Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich decided to carry out a large-scale plan to confront the Muslim world on his own. In doing so, he intended to reinforce his title of “invincible”, the desire to become the “emperor of the East”, the ruler of the Holy Land and the main relics of the Christian world. This was the path at the same time of Alexander the Great and the biblical king Solomon, with whom the False Dmitry I sought to “equalize” in glory, grandeur, special sacrament and God’s mercy.

The Impostor discussed his anti-Turkish plans in private conversation with Carmelite Fathers who were traveling through Moscow to Persia. One of the Carmelites, Father Paul-Simon wrote about the new Russian tsar: “He is about 24 years old, of outstanding stature, with fine intelligence and tenacious memory, ambitious, thirsty for fame, courageous and brave, despising danger, very incendiary, broad-minded, prone to negotiation, but at the same time subjected to mood swing”⁷⁸. Together with Carmelites, the Impostor sent his embassy headed by Prince I.P. Romanovsky to shah Abbas to propose him joint military action against Turkey. It was stated in the order to the ambassador: “Впред великий государь... турскому за его неправды, а шевкалу за его измену терпети не учнет, пошлет на них многую рать свою и велит кумыцких людей до основания разорити и города во всех

⁷⁶ *Ambassade en Turquie* Jean de Gontaut Biron, baron de Salignac (1605–1610). Paris, 1887. P. 56; Флоря Б.Н. Османская империя, Крым и страны Восточной Европы в конце XVI – начале XVII в. // *Османская империя и страны Центральной, Восточной и Юго-Восточной Европы в XVII в. М.*, 1998. Ч. 1. С. 55.

⁷⁷ *Ambassade en Turquie* Jean de Gontaut Biron, baron de Salignac (1605–1610). Paris, 1887. P. 56.

⁷⁸ Bertold-Ignace de Sainte-Anne. Reverend Père. *Histoire de L’Etablissement de la Misson de Perse par les Péres Carmes-Dechausses (e l’année 1604–1612) / Bruxelles, 1886. P. 131; A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia Papal Mission of the XVII-th and XVIII-th Centuries. London, 1939. P. 110–111; Тюменцев И.О., Свиридонова В.П. Описание путешествия монахов по Волге в 1606–1607 годах (главы из “Хроники кармелитов”) // *Стрежень: научный ежегодник. Волгоград, 2000. Вып. 2. С. 171.**

украинских местах поставити” (From now forth, the great emperor ... will not tolerate the Turkish tsar for his wrong actions, and Shevkal for his betrayal, will send his warriors to them, and order to diddle the Kumyk people and put cities in all Ukrainian territories)⁷⁹. This embassy was sent just a few days before the murder of False Dmitry I, so on the way in the documents the name of Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich was wiped out and changed by the name of the Tsar Vasily Ivanovich Shuysky.

In fact, the relations with Persia and shah Abbas could provide the only real military ally to the Impostor in his anti-Turkish plans, since Persia had been at war with the Porte since 1604, and during the reign of tsar Dmitry Ivanovich, the shah was well on way in Turkish territory.

The shah, like the tsar, demonstrated incredible activity and international initiative: he sent embassies to the emperor, the kings of Spain, France, Poland, England, Scotland, the Doge of Venice. Like False Dmitry I, Abbas proposed a specific war plan: Western troops would attack the Bosphorus from the sea and Balkans from onshore, the Christian fleet would reach Syria and Palestine, and the shah himself would operate in the eastern Turkey, the Caucasus and the steppes, with the assistance of Moscow troops. The shah even offered a draft 18-point union agreement that no one had ever signed⁸⁰. At the same time, Abbas also appealed to the Pontiffs Clement VIII and Paul V, proposing to organize Western rulers and, in the event of the conquest of the Persian troops by Jerusalem, to transfer it to the Papal authority⁸¹. Both Popes, as in the case of False Dmitry I, tried to activate the shah himself for war. Sooner or later, the shah, like the tsar of Moscow, became disillusioned with his western allies. Only the two of them had real intentions and took real action for their realization, so their negotiations were to become fateful, and only the sudden murder of Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich eliminated this possibility.

Another ally of False Dmitry I in the anti-Turkish campaign cannot be missed, though his assistance was not systematical. We are talking about Zaporozhian Cossacks. Even in the time of Boris Godunov, Cossacks were receiving funding and weapons from the tsar, and the detachment of 3,700 Cossacks led by Ivan Solonin made several attacks on Turkish possessions of the western Black Sea, capturing 10 Turkish ships and burning Turkish cities Kyustendzhe and Mangolia⁸². at the approaches to Istanbul. The Impostor established links with Cossacks when he was still in Polish -Lithuanian

⁷⁹ Тивадзе Т.Г. Иранский вопрос во внешней политике Московского государства в конце XVI и в начале XVII вв. Автореферат дисс. ... кандидата исторических наук. Тбилиси, 1966. С. 11–14; Магилина И.В. Россия и проект антиосманской лиги. С. 259–261.

⁸⁰ Магилина И.В. Россия и проект антиосманской лиги. С. 186–198.

⁸¹ A Chronicle of the Carmelites in Persia. P. 103.

⁸² Александренко В.Н. Материалы по Смутному времени. С. 291–292.

Commonwealth. However, we have not yet been able to find any materials about the negotiations between Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich and Cossacks on joint actions on the southern front in the planned “holy war”, though such a proposal Cossacks would not be able to refuse.

The ambition of False Dmitry I and the desire to induce the Polish king to ally led to the situation when the tsar officially informed his future father-in-law Yuri Mniszech on January 29, 1606, about his first successes in the war against the Turks: “Part of our troops, we sent to Asia against Turks, fought against Turkish troops, with the help of God they were successful there, due to this some Turkish military leaders came to our town Terki, and retreating from the Turks took an oath for obedience to us”⁸³. Mniszech supported his son-in-law’s ambitions, Polish elites and king Sigismund III Vaza himself, who had received information about Tsar’s Dmitry’s intentions to fight against Sweden for the access to the Baltic Sea also demanded him to do so. On the other hand, it was the Polish ambassador to Crimea Florian Oleshko who in August 1605 informed the khan and the sultan of the Impostor’s military plans. Mniszech also openly shared the tsar’s military secrets: in early 1606 he reported that the war against Crimea and the Porte would begin at the same time soon⁸⁴.

CONCLUSIONS

In fact, all preparations were finished, the first military clashes with the Turkish troops took place in the Caucasus. However, it all ended suddenly – on the 17/27 of May 1606, False Dmitry I was killed in the Kremlin of Moscow by conspirators led by Vasy Shuisky. At this time, the entire western world was waiting for the beginning of the “holy war” of Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich against the Porte. This was fueled also by the impostors’ courtiers. In particular, the chief of the tsar’s personal guards, Frenchman Jacob Margret, reported that Moscow kingdom “serves as a stronghold of Christianity” and “has more means to repulse the attacks of the Scythians and other Mohammedan peoples than many can imagine”⁸⁵. Jesuit Jan Velevitsky emphasized the personal ambitions of the Tsar Dmitry Ivanovich: he considered himself “the second Hercules, the glorious leader of all Christianity against the Turks”⁸⁶. However, the “second Hercules” was killed

⁸³ СГГД. Ч. 2. С. 266.

⁸⁴ Виноградов А.В. Юрий Мнишек и дипломатические переговоры между Речью Посполитой и Русским государством в 80-х – 90-х годах XVI столетия // Смутное время: итоги и уроки. Иваново, 2012. С. 46–77.

⁸⁵ Устрялов Н.Г. Сказания современников. Ч. 1. С. 247.

⁸⁶ Рукопись Яна Велевицкого. С. 172.

at the outset of the “holy war”, never leading his army and not winning any significant victory.

SUMMARY

The article deals with the problem of the “holy war” and the plans of the anti-Turkish league, developed in the Moscow kingdom by the first tsar-impostor False Dmitry I. The theoretical considerations and diplomatic measures of the Impostor as well as the specifics of his actions are considered. It is shown that the ideas of Lzhedmitry continued to support the anti-Turkish ideology that prevailed in western Europe during the 16th century, however, these ideas were developed by him to liberate the religious shrines of the east and to increase his personal power and importance among European monarchs. Numerous facts of the real preparation of the Russian army for military actions in the east were provided, which were started but not completed because of the murder of the False Dmitry I.

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